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Essays on International Trade and Political Economy
ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two essays in international trade and one essay in
political economy.
The first essay analyzes the role of firm-level and country-level reputation for
quality in international transactions. It studies the entry and pricing strategies of
high-quality and low-quality exporters when buyers cannot observe the quality of a
product prior to purchase. In a steady-state industry equilibrium, country reputa-
tions are endogenously set by the quality of their exports, leading to the possibility of
multiple equilibria and low-quality traps. We show that export subsidies have a pos-
itive long-run effect on average quality, reputation and welfare in countries exporting
low-quality goods. However, they have the opposite consequences in countries that
export high-quality products. We present some evidence consistent with the model
in the empirical pattern of US export prices.
The second essay studies the choice between home country and host country fi-
nancing for multinationals facing demand uncertainty. Three main channels are iden-
tified. The cost of capital depends on local financial development. A diversification
channel arises from the ability of geographically diversified firms to generate more
stable cash flows. By contrast, contagion risk may result in inefficient liquidations
iii
when firms raise funds exclusively on their home market. In particular, the model
predicts that the prevalence of affiliate production and the share of parent finance
should increase with the correlation of business cycles between the home and host
markets. Moreover, exchange rate risk tilts the financing decision towards local debt.
The third essay deals with the emergence of mass education. Using data from
the last 150 years in 137 countries, we show that large investments in primary edu-
cation systems tend to occur when countries face military rivals or threats from their
neighbors. Interestingly, democratic transitions are negatively associated with ed-
ucation investments, although democratic political institutions magnify the positive
effect of military rivalries. These empirical results are robust to a number of statisti-
cal concerns and hold when we instrument military rivalries with commodity prices
or rivalries in a given country’s immediate neighborhood. We also present histori-
cal case studies, as well as a simple model, that are consistent with the econometric
evidence.
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1. IMPROVING “NATIONAL BRANDS”:
REPUTATION FOR QUALITY AND EXPORT PROMOTION STRATEGIES1
1.1 Introduction
Why are consumers willing to pay more for indistinguishable “Made in Germany”
than “Made in China” products? In which way is building a solid reputation for
reliability and quality key to a developing country’s economic success – and how
can it be achieved? Conversely, can a history of exporting cheap low-quality goods
be an obstacle per se to national development strategies aimed at upgrading quality
over time? These questions find no clear answers in standard models of international
trade, which assume that consumers are perfectly informed about the characteristics
of every available product and leave no role for country reputations. However, as
an old and large literature on experience goods has shown, starting with Nelson
(1970), quality is not fully known to consumers prior to purchase for a wide range of
goods. Inferring the quality of a good on offer requires time, and is achieved both
through search and through experience. For these categories of goods, country-of-
origin affects product evaluations and consumers’ decisions. Indeed, many survey-
based studies in the marketing literature, summarized by Roth and Diamantopoulos
(2009), emphasize the role of country-of-origin labels in setting consumer perceptions
of quality.
1 Joint with Julia Cage´, Harvard University and Paris School of Economics.
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In this paper, we argue that a “national brand image” matters because it provides
an anchor for the expected unobservable quality of imports. Consumption decisions,
in practice, are based on a limited information set about the characteristics of goods
or varieties. To understand the determinants of demand faced by entrants as well
as incumbents in an industry, we need to consider the information available to con-
sumers at the time of purchase: information gathered as a result of past consumption
experience and word-of-mouth diffusion, but also the producer’s brand name, and
the country where the good was manufactured. Together, these elements determine
perceived quality, which affects consumption more than true quality when the latter
is not observable. Specifically, for new and unknown foreign brands, the main piece
of information available to consumers is the “made in” label, which indicates the
country of manufacturing, and creates a key role for national reputations. We call
“national reputation” the common component of consumers’ perceptions of the qual-
ity of goods produced within a given country. Usual examples of such priors are the
widespread perceptions that “German goods last a lifetime” or “Chinese goods break
down quickly”. Country reputations determine the quality that buyers expect from
a product before they learn any information specific to this variety. In the long-run,
they should adjust to the the actual average quality of exported goods.
Indeed, using newspaper content analysis to proxy for national reputations, we
provide some evidence that a better reputation is associated with higher unit prices
on exports to the US, after controlling for other determinants of within-sector vertical
specialization across countries. Moreover, this relationship is stronger for sectors
with more quality differentiation, which lends support to the asymmetric information
foundation of our model.
We proceed to analyze the impact of asymmetric information concerns on the
2
demand for imported goods and on the long-run quality composition of a foreign
country’s exports. Quality uncertainty leads to consumption patterns where both
brand reputation and country-of-origin matter, and where incumbents are able to
charge higher prices than unknown brands. As long as quality is gradually observed
through consumption, asymmetric information about quality distorts demand, com-
pared to the perfect information case, relatively more for new entering firms without
established brand names. It raises profits of low-quality firms benefiting from good
country-of-origin labels, but is an obstacle to exporting for high-quality firms unable
to signal their type in low-reputation countries. Broadly speaking, we are addressing
three main questions. First, how does a poor “national brand” act as a barrier to
entry into foreign markets? Second, under which conditions do quality expectations
have self-fulfilling effects, keeping some exporting countries into low-quality traps?
Finally, which policy instruments can help countries overcome the adverse impact of
such information asymmetries?
More specifically, we consider a two-country model with a continuum of potential
foreign exporters heterogeneous in quality, and a constant flow of new entrants per
period. Quality is exogenous and known to firms but not observed by consumers be-
fore purchase. Hence, import demand depends on perceived quality, which has two
components. Goods imported from a given country are first evaluated according to a
country-wide prior, which is determined by the average quality of the country’s ex-
ports in a long-run industry equilibrium. Importers then learn about the true quality
of firms that have exported in the past. The fraction of informed consumers increases
with the time a firm has been active on the market. The effect of the country prior
will thus prevail for new exporters, and fade over time as buyers gain familiarity with
individual foreign brands. On the supply side, potential foreign exporters decide
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whether to enter the market and when to exit, taking into account the impact of their
decisions on expected future sales. If active, they sell at a price determined by the
buyer’s quality expectation. We assume that the cost of producing one physical unit
of the good is monotonically increasing in quality, but the cost per quality-adjusted
unit is decreasing in quality. Thus, although our focus is on vertical differentiation,
quality and productivity are positively related in our model.
Our main channel is a distortion in entry and sales due to unobservable qual-
ity. Asymmetric information fosters entry by low-quality firms, which earn higher
profits than under perfect information by free-riding on high quality expectations. It
depresses profits of the highest-quality firms, forced to incur initial losses in order
to reveal information about their type. At the industry level, there are two types of
steady-state equilibria with endogenous country reputations. In a high-quality, high-
reputation equilibrium, imperfect information does not hinder entry of high-quality
firms into export markets, but generates excess entry by low-quality firms. In a low-
quality, low-reputation equilibrium, a range of firms with above-average quality are
permanently kept out of the market by the informational friction. With costs too high
to allow for positive profits in the first periods, and quality too low for initial losses
to be recouped with future profits, this set of firms choose never to be active. Fur-
thermore, there can be multiple low-quality equilibria, such that countries with bad
quality reputation can be locked into exporting low-quality, low-cost goods.
The model yields interesting policy implications. In particular, imperfect informa-
tion about the quality of imported goods provides a justification for export promotion
policies in economies specialized in low-quality products. Some export-led growth
strategies for developing countries, pursued in the past by East Asian economies,
rely on exporting low-quality, low-cost goods and gradually moving up to higher
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quality, higher unit value goods2. China is attempting to follow the same path. With-
out policy intervention, though, we show that it may not be feasible if the economy
is trapped in a self-fulfilling low equilibrium, in which the country’s reputation for
low quality prevents high-quality firms from entering export markets. A successful
export promotion policy then involves either subsidizing exporters’ initial losses, or
investing public resources into raising the country’s perception abroad. Indeed, we
find that export subsidies improve the average quality of exports, raise unit prices
received by exporting firms, and have a positive welfare effect in countries that are
initially in a low-quality equilibrium3. However, subsidies have the opposite long-run
effects in countries exporting high-quality goods. In the latter case, the induced entry
by low-quality firms creates a negative externality on all exporters, lowering average
quality, reputation and aggregate profits.
Moreover, we show that large reputation shocks, for instance triggered by heavily
mediatized events or by a government-sponsored national promotion campaign, can
have self-fulfilling features. Small reputation shocks only have short-lived effects.
But when there are multiple steady-states, a large positive reputation shock in a low-
quality equilibrium raises prices received by all firms and allows more firms with
above-average quality to enter, thereby driving up the true average quality of exported
goods. Reputation and quality increase jointly until the economy settles in a higher
2 We dwell in more detail on the Japanese and South Korean examples in section 1.2.
3 The case for export subsidies is mixed in the existing literature. Brander and Spencer (1985) first
introduced the idea of welfare-enhancing subsidies in a Cournot strategic rivalry, and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (2006) developed an infant-industry argument for protective trade policy. Flam and Helpman
(1987) find that the desirability of export subsidies is ambiguous, depending on the production struc-
ture. Demidova and Rodrguez-Clare (2009) show that subsidies improve productivity in a model with
heterogeneous firms, but are nonetheless detrimental to welfare due to losses in terms of trade and
variety. Recently, Aghion, Dewatripont, Du, Harrison, and Legros (2011) make a more specific case
for targeted industrial policy towards more competitive sectors. The main arguments for active trade
policy relying on coordination failures and externalities are reviewed and assessed in Harrison and
Rodrı´guez-Clare (2009).
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steady-state.
This paper relates to two main strands of literature. In a closed economy frame-
work, several early papers (Shapiro, 1983; Riordan, 1986; Farrell, 1986; Liebeskind
and Rumelt, 1989) have studied entry and pricing strategies for experience goods, for
which quality is unobservable a priori and is only revealed through repeated con-
sumption. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (1996, 2006) incorporate the experimentation
and learning processes by consumers. Furthermore, there is evidence of the benefits
of a reputation for quality in terms of brand premia (Imbs, Mumtaz, Ravn, and Rey,
2010) and image spillovers across products of the same brand (Sullivan, 1990). We
develop these insights further by considering the demand for imports, where initial
priors depend on country-of-origin and reputations are built not only for specific
firms but also for exporting countries as a whole.
In the international trade literature, vertical quality differentiation has recently
been studied by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007); Johnson (2010); Verhoogen (2008); Hal-
lak and Sivadasan (2009); Kugler and Verhoogen (2011); Manova and Zhang (2011)
and Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman (2009). However, these papers assume per-
fectly observable quality and deal with the choice of quality by exporters. Instead,
we abstract from the endogenous quality choice by firms and study the implications
of asymmetric information on the equilibrium quality range of exports.
The literature most closely related to this paper deals with the policy implications
of asymmetric information about the quality of foreign goods. Grossman and Horn
(1988) examine the infant-industry argument in a two–period model with moral haz-
ard in the choice of quality, and find no case for temporary or permanent protection.
However, the extensive margin of trade in their model concerns only low-quality
firms, while we show that a subsidization policy can also encourage entry by high-
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quality firms in an infinite-period setting with overlapping generations of firms. Bag-
well and Staiger (1989) point out that asymmetric information may lead to insufficient
entry by high-quality firms; but they focus on a single-firm, single-consumer inter-
action with two quality levels, and do not allow for reputation externalities between
firms. We will show that these externalities, from the entry decisions of heteroge-
neous firms to buyers’ beliefs, lie at the core of the effects and policy implications of
unobservable quality. Chisik (2003) develops the idea of a “reputational comparative
advantage” whereby country labels act as a coordinating device for exporters, but
also assumes away within-country reputation externalities by building a single-firm
model. Lastly, Dasgupta and Mondria (2011) develop a two-period model with sim-
ilar features to ours, where the quality of new exporters is unobservable and that of
continuing exporters is known by a fraction of consumers. However, their paper deals
with firm reputations and the role of intermediaries in providing quality assurance,
taking as given the first-period price. We take the analysis further by endogeniz-
ing country reputations in an infinite-horizon setting and characterizing steady-state
equilibria.
Other papers introducing imperfect information in trade have addressed differ-
ent issues such as uncertainty about demand conditions for firms entering a foreign
market (Hoff, 1997; Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia, 2008), reputation-building for
distributors in the importing country (Araujo and Ornelas, 2007), or marketing costs
incurred to make consumers aware of the existence of foreign goods (Arkolakis, 2010).
Rauch and Watson (2003) focus on the tendency of buyers in developed countries to
start small in building partnerships with suppliers in less developed countries, in
order to learn about their ability to fill large orders. Finally, there are some empir-
ical studies of the effect of perceptions of foreign countries on trade flows. Guiso,
7
Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and Disdier and Mayer (2006) find a relationship be-
tween bilateral trust or bilateral opinions and imports, but do not consider the quality
aspect of countries’ reputations. Specific reputation shocks have only been analyzed
through event studies, such as the negative perception of France in the US at the on-
set of the Iraq war (Michaels and Zhi, 2010), and recalls of Chinese toys (Freedman,
Kearney, and Lederman, 2009).
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 presents motivating
historical evidence and stylized facts on the importance of national quality reputa-
tion for exporters. Section 1.3 lays out our modelling framework and Section 1.4
analyzes high-quality and low-quality steady-state equilibria with endogenous repu-
tation. Section 1.5 explores the effects of export promotion policies on quality, repu-
tation and profits. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Empirical motivation
1.2.1 Historical motivation: Creating “National Brands”
Since their creation, country-of-origin labels have been related to protectionist
concerns. When the “Made in Germany” label – now an internationally recognized
signal of quality – was introduced, it was as a policy instrument against German
exports. The label was originally created in the United Kingdom by the Merchandise
Marks Act of 1887 to signal foreign products, then considered by the British society
as inferior to domestic ones. Ironically, a few years later, in 1894, a commission of
the German Reichstag reported that German manufacturers found the label to be
of good use: having achieved superior quality, they were better able to distinguish
themselves from British manufacturers. Even more surprinsingly, as reported by
Umbach (2003), “English manufacturers even began to forge the label, printing it on their
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English-made products”. The “Made in Germany” label had turned from a signal of
poor quality into a signal of the best quality.
Similarly, at the end of World War II, “Made in Japan” goods had a reputation
for being cheap low-quality goods. Japanese companies were suffering from an in-
ferior “national brand”. On the contrary, currently, Japanese cars and electronics are
ranked among the most reliable in all consumer surveys. More generally, Japan’s
pattern of specialization in manufactures has evolved dramatically, shifting from un-
skilled labor-intensive goods to human capital and R&D-intensive products (Balassa
and Noland, 1989). Japanese companies achieved such a dramatic change by pri-
vately imposing strict quality norms. They formed export cartels which provided
product quality guarantees, by setting product design and quality standards, es-
tablishing industry brand names, guaranteeing delivery schedules, and mediating
disputes between individual exporters and foreign buyers (Dyck, 1992). Providing
product quality assurances to importers stimulated growth in exports and improved
terms of trade. Hence, as argued by Lynn and McKeown (1988), the ability to estab-
lish collectively a reputation for product quality was key to Japan’s export success.
This ability was the outcome of both private companies and government initiatives:
in the public policy realm, not only did antitrust laws permit the formation of export
cartels, but export restrictions were exercised under the Control Law4.
Government initiatives also played a key role in the shift in South Korea’s pattern
of trade specialization since the 1970s. Public investment subsidies were tied to ex-
porting activity, as Korean governments were determined to favor the emergence of
4 The first paragraph of Article 48 of this law sets that “any person desiring to export goods of any
designated type, or goods destined for any special areas, or to export goods by means of any designated form
of transaction or payment, may be required to obtain the approval of the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry”. (Matsushita, 1979)
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the country on the international trade scene5. These policies resulted in the channel-
ing of credit at negative interest rates to South Korean conglomerates and provided
them with insurance against business risk, particularly in the export market (Aw,
Chung, and Roberts, 1998). This export-led development strategy is often pointed as
having been the hallmark of East Asian miracle growth (e.g. World Bank, 1993). Inci-
dentally, Korea’s determination to play a growing international role was showcased
by hosting the Olympic games in Seoul in 1988. From a historical point of view, the
1988 Olympics symbolized the success of over three decades of active government
intervention in the economy6.
In a similar way, the 2008 Beijing Olympics reaped a huge prestige bonanza for
China, being (again) the most-viewed televised event ever – in the United States, the
cumulative audience amounted to over two-thirds of the population – and represent-
ing China’s grand entrance onto the world stage. However, an interesting takeout of
this example is also its limitations. China is struggling to move up the value chain
in its exports7. Although a large-scale national promotion event can help improve a
country’s image abroad, it is far from sufficient to overcome a bad reputation when
the economy seems stuck in a low-quality trap, whereby high-quality firms suffer
from the country’s reputation in their attempts to export. The strategy of Lenovo, the
only Chinese company to get a worldwide sponsorship for the 2008 Beijing Olympics,
5 Pack and Westphal (1986), Westphal (1990), Levy (1991), and Rodrik (1995) have documented the
importance of government investment subsidies in Korea.
6 On September 17, 1988, over a billion people worldwide watched the Olympics opening ceremony,
telecast from Seoul, the then largest television audience in history (Larson and Park, 1993) and a global
advertisement for the country’s image. South Korea “emerged from the Games in triumph both as host and
competitor. (...) [It] has been bent on showing the world that it is no longer a place to overlook. The Games are
only part of that” (New York Times, 10/08/1988).
7 E.g. Schott (2008) documents that the prices that US consumers are willing to pay for Chinese
exports are substantially lower than the prices they are willing to pay for OECD exports in the same
product category; furthermore, the gap or “OECD brand premium” has been increasing over time.
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is revealing in this respect. With a Western-sounding name, the legacy of the I.B.M.
brand name and technology, and a chief executive who hails from Dell and NCR,
the Lenovo Group is not a company that most Americans would assume is Chinese.
This is exactly what the company aims for (although Lenovo’s largest shareholder
is the Chinese government), aware of the fact that the typical American consumer
associates Chinese products with cheap and unreliable: “They want to be viewed as a
global company, not a Chinese company, in the West or they’ll never be able to beat the cheap
rap”.8 Hence, whether China can, in the coming years or decades, successfully follow
the same path as Japan and South Korea in the past, remains an open question.
1.2.2 Stylized facts: National reputations and unit prices
Moving beyond anecdotal motivations, we provide some additional evidence of
the importance of country-of-origin reputations in current trade patterns. This section
shows that the quality of a country’s exports, as measured by unit prices, is not
only determined by observable fundamentals such as the country’s income level and
factor endowments. Perceptions, mediated by news sources, also seem to play a role
– either because the media are a supplier of information beyond observable country
characteristics, or because of a pure reputation effect. Both of these interpretations
are associated with asymmetric information in the demand for imports, which is the
foundation of our model.
More specifically, news coverage of a country provides a proxy for national repu-
tations. For consumers, the media are providers of information about safety scandals
or successful businesses in foreign countries, work practices, and the general reliabil-
ity of foreign goods. For firms sourcing inputs from foreign suppliers, news also re-
8 New York Times, 06/20/08.
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flect information relevant to risks of delays, disruption of supply chains, or corruption
practices, which affect their expected value from the importer-exporter relationship.
Our working hypothesis is that media coverage is a channel through which coun-
try perceptions are formed, confirmed or changed, affecting the demand for goods
produced in countries that receive massive positive or negative news coverage9. We
establish that controlling for the determinants of unit values and specialization into
higher-quality goods that have already been identified in the literature, better reputa-
tion is associated with higher unit prices on exports. This relationship does not need
to be interpreted causally but rather as an equilibrium outcome under asymmetric
information: in our model, the relationship between the national reputations of ex-
porting countries and the quality of their exports will run both ways to generate a
price-reputation dependence.
Data
We collect news coverage data from the Factiva database, which comprises over
31,000 news sources. We developed a script that searches all US news and business
publications for articles covering a given foreign country, in a given year, and in-
cluding a keyword from a list of relevant terms10. We gather data on 146 countries
over 1988-2006, excluding countries of less than 1 million inhabitants, which receive
almost no coverage in US media. The list of 116 keywords was identified through a
systematic listing of recurring terms and phrases in the coverage of foreign countries
9 This empirical approach is inspired by the literature on media bias. The broad insight from this
growing literature is that media coverage affects real outcomes, such as voting (Della Vigna and Kaplan,
2007), political participation (Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sinkinson, 2011), political accountability (Besley
and Burgess, 2002), or stock market reactions to earnings announcements (Dyck and Zingales, 2003).
10 Or any word sharing the root of the keyword. For instance for the keyword “counterfeit”, the script
also searches for “counterfeited”, “counterfeiting”, etc.
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and companies in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Business Week and the
Boston Globe. We sort them into four categories. The “political” category relates to
the foreign country’s general political context, and is split between positive terms
(e.g. “democratic transition”) and negative terms (e.g. “corruption”). The “quality”
category deals specifically with quality issues, improvements or scandals; we also
distinguish between positive (e.g. “quality control”) and negative (e.g. “class-action
suit”) terms11. To avoid misclassifying negative articles as positive and vice versa, we
exclude articles where a negating word appears around the keyword. For quality-
related keywords, we conduct the searches both at the aggregate country level and in
articles dealing with specific industries for 11 sectors12.
We obtain the number of articles published in US news sources with positive
or negative keywords per country-year for political and quality categories, and per
country-year-industry for quality categories. We define current news variables with
the number of articles in each category in the current year. Article counts are normal-
ized by the sum of all articles in the same category and same period across countries.
The normalization accounts for the positive trend in the number of articles in the
database over time.
11 Examples of search results on China are: “World briefs - Houston Chronicle, 31 December 1996, 486
words, (English) ... BEIJING - China is preparing this week to carry out a series of legal reforms hailed by some
as a step toward greater rule of law and protection of individual rights. ...” (political, positive); “Brilliance
China Automotive Holdings Limited Announcement - PR Newswire, 5:16 AM, 31 December 2003, 3733 words,
(English) ...relationship with the JinBei group of companies and will be in a better position to monitor and exer-
cise more stringent quality control over the automotive components that it purchases from the JinBei group of
companies. Accordingly, the Directors consider...” (quality, positive).
12 Aerospace/Defense; Automobiles; Chemicals; Clothing/Textiles; Computers/Electronics; Con-
sumer Products; Food/Beverages/Tobacco; Machinery/Industrial Goods; Paper/Packaging; Pharma-
ceuticals; and Telecommunications.
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Specifically, for country c, industry i, year t and k ∈ {positive, negative} :
industry quality newsc,t,i,k =
# quality articlesc,t,i,k
∑c # quality articlesc,t,i,k
political newsc,t,k =
# political articlesc,t,k
∑c # political articlesc,t,k
We match the news data with US import data at the 5-digit SITC level from Robert
Feenstra, described in Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). We calculate f.o.b. unit
values at the 10-digit HS level where quantity units are homogeneous across obser-
vations. We then construct sectoral indices of export unit values for each country c by
taking averages, across all 10-digit products exported in the 5-digit sector, of c’s unit
prices relative to those of all countries exporting the product to the United States.
Our independent variables include gravity variables from CEPII13 and interna-
tional and civil conflicts from the Correlates of War database. The correlation of votes
at the United Nations General Assembly controls for the degree of political alliance
with the United States. Following Schott (2004) on the determinants of unit prices,
we include the capital/labor ratio of the exporting country and the fraction of its
population having achieved at least secondary education. These data are constructed
respectively from Penn World Tables 7.0 and from Barro and Lee (2010). Finally,
the length of quality ladders from Khandelwal (2010) measures the extent of quality
variation, and therefore the scope for vertical differentiation, within 5-digit sectors14.
13 Distance, GDP, population, common border, common official language, former colonial ties, com-
mon legal origin, common currency and GATT/WTO membership; from Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010).
Note that GDP, market size and remoteness are also determinants of firms’ choice of export quality
across destinations, as shown by Manova and Zhang (2011).
14 Khandelwal estimates the quality of US imports from price and market share data. Conditional
on price, a product with higher market share is assigned higher quality. In our framework, it is more
precisely a measure of perceived quality. The scope for vertical differentation (length of quality ladders)
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Mean St. dev. Min Max
Export unit value index 89.287 107.237 0.002 2795.957
Positive industry quality news 3.167 4.229 0 93.574
Negative industry quality news 3.126 3.578 0 40.323
Quality ladder 2.072 0.8776 0 5.803
Capital/labor ratio 60.952 36.482 0.438 153.856
Skilled fraction of population 50.161 19.156 2.001 92.656
UN vote correlation 0.223 0.347 -0.680 0.882
Table 1.1 provides some descriptive statistics.
Unit prices, reputation and quality
Table 1.2 reports the results of the industry-level specifications. As mentioned
above, we include as independent variables GDP per capita, capital/labor endow-
ment and education attainment, which affect the quality range of a country’s pro-
duction. We also include year and sector fixed effects and cluster standard errors
by country. We show that export unit values, after controlling for these and gravity
variables, are correlated with the type of news that appear in US printed media about
the exporting country and its companies.
In column 1, we find that within industries, countries where a sector receives bet-
is then calculated from the heterogeneity in estimated product qualities within products.
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Table 1.2: Export unit prices and industry news coverage
Unit value index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pos. industry quality news 0.035* 0.006 0.046 0.016 0.030* 0.000
[0.018] [0.019] [0.030] [0.029] [0.016] [0.017]
Neg. industry quality news -0.059*** -0.010 -0.053*** -0.007 -0.056*** -0.008
[0.021] [0.022] [0.019] [0.021] [0.019] [0.021]
Pos. quality news*ladder 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Neg. quality news*ladder -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Total industry quality news -0.008 -0.007
[0.025] [0.025]
Capital/labor ratio -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.174*** -0.174***
[0.053] [0.052] [0.061] [0.061] [0.054] [0.054]
Skilled fraction of pop. 0.009 0.009 0.025 0.025 0.010 0.011
[0.070] [0.069] [0.084] [0.084] [0.069] [0.068]
UN vote correlation 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.230*** 0.230***
[0.084] [0.084] [0.089] [0.089] [0.084] [0.084]
Pos. political news 0.099 0.098
[0.064] [0.064]
Neg. political news -0.087 -0.086
[0.060] [0.060]
Gravity variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 157 906 157 906 143 024 143 024 157 906 157 906
R-squared 0.261 0.261 0.264 0.264 0.261 0.261
Year and industry FE. Clustered SE by country in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All news variables, capital/labor ratio and the skilled fraction of the population are in logs.
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Table 1.3: Export unit prices and country news coverage
Unit value index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pos. political news 0.110 0.006 0.005 0.004
[0.069] [0.062] [0.062] [0.056]
Neg. political news -0.089 -0.052 -0.052 0.029
[0.064] [0.054] [0.055] [0.041]
Pos. quality news 0.163* 0.195** 0.222** 0.251*** 0.423**
[0.088] [0.086] [0.088] [0.085] [0.171]
Neg. quality news -0.120 -0.119* -0.170** -0.166** 0.005
[0.075] [0.071] [0.083] [0.080] [0.120]
Pos. quality news*ladder -0.030 -0.029 -0.028
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Neg. quality news*ladder 0.025 0.024 0.023
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021]
Total news -0.421
[0.301]
Capital/labor ratio -0.173*** -0.164*** -0.172*** -0.164*** -0.173*** -0.174***
[0.053] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046] [0.047] [0.046]
Skilled fraction of po. -0.004 0.009 0.021 0.009 0.021 0.023
[0.066] [0.060] [0.057] [0.060] [0.057] [0.054]
UN vote correlation 0.155* 0.170* 0.142* 0.170* 0.142* 0.138*
[0.084] [0.087] [0.080] [0.086] [0.080] [0.077]
Gravity variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 204 237 203 883 203 460 203 883 203 460 203 460
R-squared 0.261 0.262 0.262 0.262 0.263 0.263
Year and industry FE. Clustered SE by country in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All news variables, capital/labor ratio and the skilled fraction of the population are in logs.
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ter coverage in US media charge higher unit values on the sector’s exports, relative to
countries receiving less favorable coverage. The coefficient is larger for negative qual-
ity news, about quality defects or scandals, than for positive news, about successes
and quality control. We also find that unit prices are higher on imports from political
allies (high correlation of UN votes) and lower on imports from countries with higher
capital-labor ratios15.
In column 2, we interact the news variables with Khandelwal’s quality ladder
measure. A longer quality ladder implies that the sector has more dispersion in
quality, hence is more vulnerable to concerns about unobserved quality. Consistent
with our interpretation in terms of asymmetric information, we find that the effect
of industry-level news is magnified in sectors where there is more scope for vertical
differentiation. According to the point estimates, a 10% increase in the quantity of
positive (respectively, negative) quality-related news relative to other foreign coun-
tries is associated with a 0.3% increase (respectively, 0.5% decrease) in the unit value
of exports in a sector at the mean of quality ladders. For the sector with the longest
quality ladder, i.e. the most vertical differentiation, the corresponding values are
respectively a 0.8% increase and a 1.3% decrease in unit value.
It may be that these results are affected by the total volume of news coverage of a
country if some countries are more heavily covered by US media because of a cultural
or geographical proximity not captured by our controls, and are also more frequent
and trusted trading partners. Controlling for the total amount of news concerning
the country-sector pair, however, does not change any of the relevant coefficients
15 This result on capital-labor ratios seems to contrast with the existing literature. However, we can
replicate Schott (2004)’s finding that higher capital-labor ratios are associated with higher unit values
when the independent variables only include, beyond K/L, year and sector fixed effects, as in his paper.
When we add country fixed effects or control for gravity variables, the positive coefficient on the capital-
labor ratio disappears.
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(columns 3 and 4). Finally, in columns 5 and 6, we include political news at the
country level, and find insignificant coefficients, confirming that the most relevant
information is quality-related news rather than general country images. Note that we
already proxy for political goodwill towards foreign countries with the correlation of
UN votes.
In Table 1.3, we repeat the exercise with aggregate country news per year instead
of news covering specifically the industry, both political and quality-related. Again,
we find that positive news about quality are associated with higher unit prices on
exports, and negative quality news with lower unit prices. Political news coverage
does not enter significantly after including the UN vote measure of alliances. The
coefficients do not vary in a significant manner according to the length of quality
ladders. Thus, these results seem to indicate that national reputations are formed at
the country-sector level rather than at the overall country level.
To sum up, we have shown that countries with a better quality reputation, me-
diated by news coverage, have higher unit prices after controlling for known deter-
minants of country-wide quality. The link is stronger in sectors with large scope
for vertical differentiation, supporting our interpretation of country reputations as a
component of expected quality. Naturally, although reputation shocks may not be
directly related to changes in the actual quality distribution of a country’s exports,
long-run perceived and actual quality go hand-in-hand, and the contents of media
articles are related to both. What we have shown is that after controlling for observ-
able country characteristics, there is still a role for quality perceptions to influence
unit prices. These results support the presence of imperfect information in interna-
tional trade transactions. We proceed to formalize these insights in a model with
asymmetric information.
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1.3 Model setup
1.3.1 Firms
We develop a model with two countries, Home and Foreign. We focus on the
industry equilibrium in an export-oriented sector in Foreign, for which Home is the
importer. The industry is composed of overlapping generations of foreign exporters.
We do not model explicitly the domestic market of foreign firms: all firms in the
industry produce for export only16.
There is a constant number E of potential exporters being born every period.
Each new firm draws a quality parameter θ from a distribution G (θ) with support on
[θm,∞) and density g (θ), and has the option to produce a good of quality level θ17.
At the beginning of every period, firms decide whether to stay active and export, or
shut down. Each firm has capacity 1, so that it can choose to sell either one unit or
nothing.
If it produces and sells, a firm j of type θ incurs a cost wθ+ k, including both pro-
duction costs and trade and transport costs. k includes all costs that are independent
of quality, while wθ is the portion of costs that increases with the quality of the prod-
uct (e.g. quality control processes, better intermediate inputs, more skilled workers).
16 We could easily extend the model to allow firms to serve their domestic market as long as the
decisions to enter the domestic and export markets are separable. The key assumption is that there is
no information flowing between buyers located in different geographic markets. In particular, a firm
having established a reputation in its domestic market would not be able to transfer this reputation to
export sales.
17 For simplicity we do not model the choice of quality. We can think of the exogenous quality draw
as determined on the domestic market before considering the decision to export, or as a technology
blueprint which comes from an R&D process with uncertain outcome: all firms invest the same sunk
cost in R&D and randomly, some come up with better quality products than others.
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Hence, profits at period t + s of a firm j born at date t are:
pit+s (j) = pt+s (j)− wθ (j)− k (1.1)
where pt+s (j) is the price at which firm j sells its output. The price-setting mechanism
is described in the next subsection.
A firm can freely exit at any period and realize zero profits from this period
onwards; however if it chooses to exit the export market in a given period, it cannot re-
enter later18. Moreover, each firm has an exogenous probability 1− δ of disappearing
every period, independent of both quality and the firm’s age. The probability that a
firm still exists from one period to the next, conditional on not choosing to exit, is δ.
There is no additional discount rate.
1.3.2 Buyers
In Home, a pool of importers each demand one unit of the good. We assume
that there are no tariffs or transport costs19. Potential demand for imported goods
in Home is assumed to be large, in the sense that the market size is sufficient for all
foreign exporters to find a buyer at a price that does not exceed the expected value of
their goods. The true utility from consuming the product is θ, but is not observable
before purchase. We can think of θ as characteristics that are observed only upon
consumption, or for durable goods, as the inverse of the probability of breakdown
per period.
At the beginning of every period, each active firm is randomly matched to a buyer
18 This assumption is inconsequential for the steady-state analysis. It rules out coordination problems
among high-quality firms along the transition path.
19 Ad valorem tariffs are introduced in Appendix A.3.
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in Home. The firm cannot sell to another importer in that period, nor can the buyer
purchase from another exporter before the next period. The firm then sets the price
equal to the expected value of the good for its buyer. The indirect utility buyer i
receives from variety j is:
ui (j) = θ (j)− p (j) (1.2)
which can be derived from an additively separable utility function where buyer i
consumes a numeraire good and one unit of the imported differentiated good. As
θ (j) is not observed, the maximum price that an importer i is willing to pay for the
output of firm j at time t + s is given by its expected quality from the perspective of
the buyer:
pt+s (j) = Eit+s
[
θ (j) |Iit+s
]
(1.3)
where Iit+s is the information set of buyer i at time t + s. We assume that firms hold
all the bargaining power and receive the full expected surplus of the transaction20.
There are two types of buyers, informed and uninformed. Uninformed buyers
(noted U) have no information specific to firm j; they do not know its quality or
how long it has been an active exporter. The only information at their disposal is
the “national reputation”, i.e. a prior µt+s about expected quality among all foreign
exporters. µt+s is common across buyers. Informed buyers (noted I) know the true
quality of firm j, either because they have past experience from consumption of good
j or because they have received information from another importer who has. Hence,
20 Also, long-term contracts between exporters and importers are ruled out in this setting: all contracts
are one-period sales contracts and firms are matched to customers for one period only. In particular,
there cannot be price schedules resembling an introductory pricing strategy, whereby buyers would pay
a low price in the initial period and offer a sequence of prices contingent on their future consumption
experience.
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the relevant information sets of both types of buyers are:
IUt+s (j) = {µt+s}
I It+s (j) = {θ (j) , µt+s}
The price received by a firm j matched with buyer i in period t + s is therefore equal
to its quality if i is informed, and to the country’s reputation if i is uninformed; so
(1.3) can be rewritten as:
pt+s (j) =
 µt+s if i ∈ Uθ (j) if i ∈ I (1.4)
In the first period when a firm j enters the market, all importers are uninformed
about j. Then, if firm j has exported s times in the past, a fraction ρ (s) of buyers are
informed, where we make the following natural assumptions:
Assumption 1: ρ′ ≥ 0, ρ (0) = 0, and lim
s→∞ ρ (s) = 1.
The fraction of informed buyers increases as the firm gains export experience21.
Note that a concave ρ (s) would capture the idea that a firm having already exported
is more likely to be matched again with one of its previous buyers or with someone
close to a previous buyer in terms of informational diffusion; hence the rate at which
the scope of informed buyers expands would decrease with the number of periods the
firm has been on the market. However, the only conditions needed for our analysis
is that ρ is monotonically increasing and takes values between 0 and 1.
21 A possible microfoundation for the ρ (s) function is that importers belong to distinct groups within
which information diffusion takes place. The fraction of informed buyers rises according to the prob-
ability of sampling a buyer from an uninformed versus an informed group. See Appendix A.2 for a
formal development.
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For expositional simplicity we will drop the j notation in the next sections and
refer to “firm θ” instead of “firm j with quality parameter θ” whenever possible.
1.3.3 Timing
For a given cohort of firms born at date t, the timing of moves is as follows:
• At t, each new firm j draws a parameter θ (j) and decides whether to export or
not.
• For each s ≥ 1, at time t + s:
– Each active firm j is matched with a buyer i and observes whether i is
informed or uninformed.
– The price is set at Eit+s
[
θ (j) |Iit+s
]
, and production and sales take place.
– For each good j that was sold, the fraction of informed buyers rises from
ρ (s) to ρ (s + 1) .
– The exogenous death shock is realized. Firms that survive decide whether
to stay active.
– New firms are born (cohort t + s).
1.3.4 Perfect information
Under perfect information, all θ (j) are observable by all parties. All firms receive
a price p∗t+s (j) equal to true quality regardless of how long they have been exporting:
p∗t+s (j) = θ (j) for all s
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Therefore, it follows from (1.1) that firms are active exporters if and only if θ ≥ θ∗,
where the perfect information threshold is defined as:
θ∗ ≡ k
1− w (1.5)
Under perfect information, the model therefore predicts a sorting of firms into non-
exporters and exporters similar to that of Melitz (2003). We can define productivity
as the inverse of the cost per unit of quality w+ kθ . The firms with the highest quality
θ are also those with the highest productivity. Firms above the quality threshold
θ∗, or equivalently below the quality-adjusted cost threshold w + kθ∗ , are and remain
exporters, while firms below the threshold never export.
1.3.5 Imperfect information: Price and profits
Under asymmetric information, suppose µt is the buyers’ prior about the expected
quality of a good from the foreign country at time t. This prior is the national rep-
utation or “national brand”, and is taken as exogenous by individual firms. We will
derive its equilibrium value in the next section, as a function of the quality distribu-
tion of exports. The price offered to a firm j born at date t is either the country-wide
prior, if the buyer is uninformed, or its true quality, if the buyer is informed. The
probability of receiving a price which reflects the firms’ true quality increases with
the firm’s export experience. In the first period in which firm j is active, no buyer has
any information specific to the firm, so that the price only depends on the prior:
pt+1 (j) = µt+1 (1.6)
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Then in the following periods, conditional on firm j still being active, the pricing
equation (1.4) implies that the price received by firm j is set according to the following
rule:
pt+s (j) =
 θ with probability ρ (s− 1)µt+s with probability 1− ρ (s− 1) for s ≥ 1 (1.7)
where ρ (s− 1) is the fraction of informed buyers for a firm that has previously ex-
ported s − 1 times. In particular, a firm that exports for the first time faces only
uninformed importers (ρ (0) = 0). As lims→∞ ρ (s) = 1, the expectation of the price
converges to the perfect information price θ (j) over time if firm j stays in the market
indefinitely.
Expected profits of firm j in future periods, conditional on remaining active, are
the difference between its expected price and its production cost:
Ejtpit+s (j) = (ρ (s− 1)− w) θ (j) + (1− ρ (s− 1)) Etµt+s − k (1.8)
Expected profits place a larger weight on true quality, and a smaller weight on na-
tional reputation, as the firm gains tenure into exporting. It immediately follows that
if reputation is time-invariant, a firm with quality above the country prior (θ (j) > µ)
expects to realize an increasing sequence of profits over time, while a firm with qual-
ity below the country prior (θ (j) < µ) expects decreasing profits. For all active firms,
if µ is constant, the price is monotonically converging towards θ and profits are mono-
tonically converging towards their perfect information value (1− w) θ − k.
We also assume that the updating parameter is large enough, relative to the cost
of producing quality:
Assumption 2: ρ (1) > w
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This assumption ensures that expected profits from repeat purchases – as opposed
to initial purchases – are increasing in true quality.
1.4 Industry equilibrium
In this section, we define a steady-state industry equilibrium as one in which
national reputation is pinned down by the average quality of a country’s exports and
the quality distribution is stationary. We lay out the existence conditions for high-
quality and low-quality steady-state equilibria and characterize the price, entry and
exit patterns in each equilibrium type.
1.4.1 Equilibrium definition
First, let us define the equation of motion for national reputation. Country rep-
utations evolve according to the actual quality of exported goods in the previous
period:
µt+1 = µt + η
(
θt − µt
)
(1.9)
where η < 1 and θt is the average quality of foreign firms’ exports at period t. Rep-
utation rises (respectively, falls) from one period to the next if the average quality of
exported goods in the previous period was higher (respectively, lower) than expected.
Setting η < 1 captures the slow-moving aspect of reputations and only matters for
equilibrium stability.
Country reputations are taken as exogenous by individual firms. In each period
t, let Mt (θ, s) be the number of active firms of quality θ having previously exported
s times. Given an underlying quality distribution G (θ), we derive θt as the average
quality of exports across quality levels and cohorts of firms:
27
θt =
∫ ∞
θm
θ
[
∞
∑
s=0
Mt (θ, s)
]
dθ∫ ∞
θm
[
∞
∑
s=0
Mt (θ, s)
]
dθ
(1.10)
Along with µt, this determines µt+1 according to (1.9).
In each period, a firm of quality θ having exported s times in the past stays active
if the expected present value of doing so, PVt (θ, s) , is positive. The firm is free to exit
at any future date. Let T (θ) be the exit date (possibly infinity) that maximizes the
firm’s intertemporal problem. Then PVt (θ, s) is the discounted sum of current and
future profits in (1.8) up to the optimal exit date:
PVt (θ, s) =
T(θ)
∑
u=0
δu [(ρ (s + u)− w) θ + (1− ρ (s + u)) Etµt+u − k] (1.11)
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, Etµt+u = µt+u for all u. There are E new firms
per period, with quality draws distributed according to the pdf g (θ). A new firm of
quality θ is active at t + 1 if PVt+1 (θ, 0) > 0. Hence the number of active new firms
per quality level is:
Mt+1 (θ, 0) =
 Eg (θ) if PVt+1 (θ, 0) > 00 if PVt+1 (θ, 0) ≤ 0 (1.12)
Among incumbent firms of quality θ having exported s times, δMt (θ, s− 1) survive
from period t to period t+ 1. They remain active if PVt+1 (θ, s) > 0 in equation (1.11).
Thus the number of active old firms is, for s ≥ 1:
Mt+1 (θ, s) =
 δMt (θ, s− 1) if PVt+1 (θ, s) > 00 if PVt+1 (θ, 0) ≤ 0 (1.13)
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Equations (1.9), (1.10), (1.12) and (1.13) determine θt+1 and µt+2. We can then
define the industry steady-state as an equilibrium with constant reputation and a
constant distribution of quality.
Definition 1.1
{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a steady-state equilibrium if and only if:
(i) For all θ ∈ [θm,∞) and all s ≥ 0, if Mt (θ, s) = M (θ, s) and Etµt+u = µ for all
u ≥ 0, then Mt+1 (θ, s) = M (θ, s) in (1.12) and (1.13);
(ii) If Mt (θ, s) = M (θ, s) for all θ ∈ [θm,∞) and all s ≥ 0, then θt = µ in (1.10).
Condition (i) ensures that the number of firms in each quality-age segment is
constant in the steady state. Condition (ii) states that the average quality that results
from an equilibrium distribution of active firms is equal to the equilibrium country
reputation; it guarantees that µ is constant in a steady state. In other words, a steady-
state with national reputation µ is a rational expectations equilibrium if the average
quality of active exporters is equal to buyers’ quality expectation. The endogenous
entry and exit decisions induced by µ justify the reputation ex post.
From this point on, we assume that the quality draw of entrants has a Pareto
distribution with support on [θm,∞) and shape parameter α > 1:
G (θ) ≡ 1−
(
θm
θ
)α
(1.14)
and note µ0 the unconditional expectation of quality draws: µ0 ≡ αα−1θm.
1.4.2 High quality equilibrium
We call “high-quality equilibrium” (HQE) a steady-state equilibrium where the
country reputation µ exceeds the perfect information quality threshold θ∗.
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Definition 1.2
{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a high-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ > θ∗ and{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 1.1.
First, we characterize firms’ entry and exit decisions in a high-quality equilibrium
given µ. We then proceed to derive the existence conditions for a HQE.
Entry and exit
In a HQE, national reputation is high and time-invariant, i.e. µt = µ > θ∗ for all
t. Therefore, a firm with quality equal to the country’s reputation would be viable in
a perfect information setting. All firms receive high prices as they enter the export
market, which encourages entry. Formally, we can prove the following.
Lemma 1.1 In a HQE with country reputation µ > θ∗,
(i) All entrants are initially active;
(ii) Firms with θ < θ∗ expect to exit after a number of periods T (θ) weakly increasing in
quality θ;
(iii) Firms with θ > θ∗ stay in the market until hit by the exogenous shock.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
The sorting of firms according to their quality parameter is represented in Figure
1.1. Low-quality firms below θ∗ find it profitable to enter initially as they have low
production costs, and can therefore reap positive profits as long as buyers do not
have information about their type. The higher the country reputation, the higher
the price they receive in the first period. As first-period profits are decreasing in
quality, low-θ firms always find it profitable to enter the market as fly-by-nights.
However, given the expected profit equation (1.8) and Assumption 2, profits from
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Figure 1.1: Sorting of firms by θ with high national reputation
repeat purchases are increasing in quality and converging over time towards their
perfect information value. Hence, all firms below θ∗, which would not survive under
perfect information, face a decreasing sequence of profits converging to a negative
value. They will eventually see their expected present value of profits turn negative
and exit. The number of periods T (θ) that a firm with quality θ < θ∗ stays active
is pinned down by the condition that its expected profit is positive for the first T (θ)
periods it exports, and negative in all following periods.
Let us define θT as the highest quality type that exits after selling for T periods –
or the lowest quality type that exits after selling for T + 1 periods:
θT = max
{
k− (1− ρ (T)) µ
ρ (T)− w , θm
}
for T ≥ 1 (1.15)
and limT→∞ θT = θ∗.
For high-quality firms above θ∗, it is always profitable to enter and keep export-
ing. Firms between θ∗ and µ have expected profits declining over time, but positive in
every period. Firms above µ have expected profits increasing over time. The highest
quality firms incur losses in the initial period, but recoup these losses in later periods
once enough buyers have received information about their type. Their expected in-
tertemporal profits are always positive. Thus, firms above θ∗ never exit before they are
forced to by the exogenous shock, as their per-period profits are converging towards
the strictly positive perfect information level.
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Average quality
In a steady state indexed by µ > θ∗, the number M (θ, s) of active firms of quality
θ having already exported s times is derived from Lemma 1.1 and equations (1.12)
and (1.13):
M (θ, s) =

δsEg (θ) if θ < θ∗ and s < T (θ)
0 if θ < θ∗ and s ≥ T (θ)
δsEg (θ) if θ ≥ θ∗
(1.16)
so that the total number of active firms of quality θ is 1−δT(θ)1−δ Eg (θ) if θ < θ
∗, and
1
1−δEg (θ) if θ ≥ θ∗. Using (1.10) and (1.14), we derive the steady-state average
quality of exports in a HQE as a function of µ and exogenous parameters:
θ (µ) = µ0
1−
∞
∑
T=0
δT+1
[(
θm
θT
)α−1 − ( θmθT+1)α−1
]
1− ∞∑
T=0
δT+1
[(
θm
θT+1
)α − ( θmθT+1)α]
 (1.17)
where θ0 ≡ θm and θT, θT+1 are defined by (1.15). The average quality of active firms
is higher than the mean of the unconditional distribution of θ, as lower-quality firms
exit earlier than high-quality firms. However, it lies below the perfect information
average export quality.
Existence conditions
There exists a HQE if there is a fixed point of θ (µ) in equation (1.17) such that
µ = θ (µ) > θ∗. Proposition 1.1 establishes existence conditions.
Proposition 1.1 There is a unique HQE if and only if θ (θ∗) > θ∗, or equivalently if and
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only if
α
(
θm
θ∗
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α
> α− 1 (1.18)
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
An equilibrium steady-state reputation is a reputation µ such that θ (µ) = µ. The
intuition of the proof is as follows. Starting from a reputation above θ∗, raising µ
has a negative effect on actual quality. Improving national reputation, for a given
distribution of θ draws, does not affect the decisions of firms above θ∗ to stay or
exit, as they are already remaining active as long as possible. However, it encourages
lower-quality firms to stay longer: for firms below θ∗, a higher µ raises all T (θ),
implying that low-quality firms wait longer before exiting the market. In short, the
incentives of high-quality firms are not affected but those of low-quality firms result
in a higher export duration of firms producing “bad” varieties. Hence, the average
quality of exported goods falls when µ increases. It follows that θ (µ) is strictly
decreasing on [θ∗,∞) and therefore if θ (θ∗) > θ∗, there is a unique fixed point of
θ (µ) in the high quality region. This fixed point is the unique HQE.
The HQE existence condition (1.18) holds for δ high enough, α low enough,
and/or w and k low enough. A high δ implies that exogenous exit is relatively less
prevalent than endogenous exit, increasing the relative mass of high-quality firms. A
low α means that there is high dispersion in the prior distribution of θ, and therefore
more firms at the right tail of the distribution pushing up the mean. A low w re-
duces the relative cost advantage of low-quality firms, as well as the loss incurred in
initial periods by high-quality firms. Lower w and k also lower the perfect informa-
tion threshold θ∗ , making it more likely that the economy ends up in a high-quality
equilibrium.
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1.4.3 Low quality equilibrium
We call “low-quality equilibrium” (LQE) a steady-state equilibrium where the
country reputation falls short of the perfect information quality threshold θ∗.
Definition 1.3
{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a low-quality steady-state equilibrium if µ < θ∗ and{
µ, {M (θ, s)}s,θ
}
is a steady-state equilibrium according to Definition 1.1.
As in the high-quality case, we first detemine the entry and exit patterns given µ
and then derive existence conditions.
Entry and exit
In a LQE, national reputation is low and constant, i.e. µt = µ < θ∗ for all t.
A firm with quality µ would never export in a perfect information setting. Under
asymmetric information, we can show the following:
Lemma 1.2 In a LQE with country reputation k + wθm < µ < θ∗,
(i) Firms with quality θ < θL enter the export market and exit after selling for one period,
where
θL ≡ µ− kw < µ < θ
∗ (1.19)
(ii) Firms with quality θ > θH enter and stay in the market until hit by the exogenous
shock, where
θH ≡ k− µ
(
1− Aρ
)
Aρ − w > θ
∗ (1.20)
and Aρ ≡ (1− δ)∑∞s=0 δsρ (s) .
(iii) Firms with quality θL ≤ θ ≤ θH never enter the market.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
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Figure 1.2: Sorting of firms by θ with low national reputation
Figure 1.2 shows the sorting of firms by quality into “fly-by-nights”, non-exporters
and continuous exporters. Fly-by-night firms exist as long as µ > k +wθm, which en-
sures that some low-quality firms realize positive first-period profits. These firms
would not survive under perfect information, but gain from the information asym-
metry. However, given µ < θ∗ and Assumption 2, they would make losses if they
were to stay active in the second period, after buyers have received a firm-specific
signal. Firms below θL therefore exit immediately after selling once.
All firms with better quality than the country reputation µ are not profitable in the
first period when they enter export markets. Above θH, the present value of expected
profits is positive: expected profits from sales in later periods, when a larger portion
of the price reflects true quality, exceed initial losses. The negative profits in their first
periods of existence can be interpreted as investments in building a brand name or
firm-specific reputation, distinct from the country reputation.
An intermediate range of firms [θL, θH ] around θ∗ never become active exporters.
Those with θL < θ < θ∗ have negative expected profits at all periods, while those
with θ∗ < θ < θH would be profitable in the long run once enough buyers have
gathered information about their type. However, for the latter, the present value
of their profit stream is negative: losses incurred in the initial periods in order to
establish a reputation are not made up for with later profits. Hence this range of
firms is kept out of export markets by the information asymmetry and the cost of
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revealing quality.
Lastly if µ < k + wθm, then there are no active firms below θ∗, given that national
reputation is too low for any firm to realize positive first-period profits. This results in
a high average quality of exported goods. Therefore, there cannot be an equilibrium
with endogenous reputation in this region.
Average quality
In a steady state indexed by µ < θ∗, the number M (θ, s) of active firms of quality
θ having already exported s times is derived from Lemma 1.2 and equations (1.12)
and (1.13):
M (θ, s) =

Eg (θ) if θ < θL and s = 0
0 if θ < θL and s ≥ 1
0 if θL ≤ θ ≤ θH
δsEg (θ) if θ > θH
(1.21)
so that the number of active firms of quality θ is Eg (θ) if θ < θL and 11−δEg (θ) if
θ > θH. Using (1.10) and (1.14), we derive the steady-state average quality of exports
in a LQE as a function of µ and the economy’s exogenous parameters:
θ (µ) = µ0
1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α
 (1.22)
where θL, θH are defined respectively by (1.19) and (1.20). The volume of sales and
average quality are lower than in high-reputation equilibria, due both to the existence
of a gap in the distribution of active exporters, and to the fact that low-quality firms
exit after selling for one period only.
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Existence conditions
The industry has at least one LQE if there exists a fixed point of θ (µ) in equation
(1.22) such that µ = θ (µ) < θ∗. Specifically:
Proposition 1.2 If θ (θ∗) < θ∗, there exists at least one LQE.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
In other words, if condition (1.18) does not hold, there is an odd number of LQE
and no HQE. The lowest possible level of national reputation (µ = θm) results in the
highest average quality, as it drives out all low quality firms and some high quality
firms. Hence θ (θm) > θm and if θ (θ∗) < θ∗, there must be at least one fixed point in
(θm, θ∗). However, the equilibrium may not be unique, since θ (µ) is not monotonic
over the interval. In the low reputation region, increasing µ has two consequences
with opposite effects on average quality. First, it enables more firms to realize positive
profits from first-period sales (higher θL). This fosters entry by firms with below-
average quality, given that θL < µ in a LQE; and it lowers the expected quality of
active firms. Second, increasing µ reduces the loss incurred by high-quality firms
before they have been able to signal their quality to buyers, allowing more firms
with above-average quality to be active (lower θH). The net change in θ depends on
the balance between these two effects. As long as the economy remains in the low
reputation region (µ < θ∗), there is no effect of a better reputation on the exit rates
of exporters: all active firms below θ∗ sell for one period only, while all active firms
above θ∗ stay as long as they are able to.
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Figure 1.3: Parameter values for HQE and LQE (θm = 1, k = 1.5, w = 0.5)
1.4.4 Summary: Industry steady-states
To sum up, depending on parameters, the rational expectations steady-state falls
into one of two categories. The type of equilibrium will depend on whether the (not
necessarily unique) fixed point of θ (µ) falls left or right of θ∗. In a “high-quality
equilibrium”, all firms produce and sell for at least one period, firms above θ∗ remain
active until they are exogenously forced to exit, and firms below θ∗ exit in finite time
after a number of periods increasing in θ. In a “low-quality equilibrium”, there is a
gap around θ∗ where firms are never active. Below θL, they exit after exporting for a
single period; above θH, they only exit exogenously.
In general, we cannot rule out multiple equilibria. If θ (θ∗) < θ∗, there are an
odd number of LQEs. If θ (θ∗) > θ∗, there is one HQE and there are either zero or
an even number of LQEs22. These multiple equilibria give rise to the possibility of
self-fulfilling reputation shocks, examined in section 1.5.
22 A graphical example of multiple equilibria is shown in Figure 1.7.
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Figure 1.3 illustrates the existence condition (1.18). In the dark region, the condi-
tion holds and a unique HQE exists. This is true for low enough α and high enough
δ. In the light grey region, there is no HQE; the steady-state of the economy is nec-
essarily a LQE. A higher k or w shifts the border to the left and expands the no HQE
region. Conversely, lowering k or w widens the HQE region.
1.4.5 Additional predictions: Unit prices and hazard rates
The model yields additional predictions on the patterns of price and exit rates.
Although these results are not the main focus of our paper, their consistency with
existing empirical evidence lends support to our theory. First, we characterize the
path of prices for a given cohort of firms.
Result 1.1 Unit prices. In a steady-state low-quality equilibrium, the average unit price
charged at t + s by firms born at date t is strictly increasing in s. In a steady-state high-
quality equilibrium, the average unit price charged at t + s by firms born at date t is strictly
increasing in s for all s if µ > αα−1θ1 and for s ≥ T
(
α−1
α µ
)
otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
At the firm level, there is a brand premium for high-quality firms both in a HQE
and in a LQE: the price charged increases over time for a given good provided that
its quality is better that the country average. Result 1.1 establishes that on average,
incumbents receive higher prices than entrants, and the average price among a cohort
of firms is higher, the longer the cohort has been active on export markets. This result
follows from the fact that over time, an increasing fraction of prices reflect firms’ true
quality parameters, and the average quality of a cohort of firms weakly increases over
time as the lowest quality firms exit.
39
Interestingly, these predictions are supported by the findings of Foster, Halti-
wanger, and Syverson (2008) on the behavior of US firms in their domestic market.
They show that entering businesses have significantly lower prices than incumbents,
and prices rise with plant age.
Second, our model implies that firms’ exit rates vary systematically with their
quality and across cohorts.
Result 1.2 Hazard rate. In a steady-state equilibrium, the aggregate hazard rate is weakly
decreasing in quality and in firms’ export experience.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
The first part of Result 1.2 establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active
firms that exit per period is higher for lower-quality firms, both in a LQE and in a
HQE. Low-quality firms exit voluntarily in finite time while high-quality firms only
exit when hit by the exogenous death shock. The second part states that the proba-
bility of exit, across quality levels, decreases with the age of a cohort. It derives from
the fact that the distribution of quality among older cohorts has a higher lower bound
than among younger cohorts.
This last prediction is consistent with the findings of Besedes and Prusa (2004) on
survival rates in US import relationships at the disaggregated product level. They
estimate that the probability that the import relationship will end falls with its dura-
tion for differentiated products. We confirm these results in our product level data:
within HS-2 manufacturing industries, the average hazard rate of HS-10 products
drops from 31% in the first year the country exports the good to 8% after 10 years
(see Appendix A.4 for details).
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1.5 Policy implications
How can countries improve their “national brand name” – and is it worth it? First-
best policies would involve conducting verifiable quality audits, or taxing low-quality
firms and subsidizing high-quality ones. These policies are not feasible when policy-
makers are not better informed than consumers about firms’ quality levels. Here, we
look at the effects of two main policy instruments on reputation, quality and welfare:
export subsidies, and export promotion campaigns creating reputation shocks.
1.5.1 Export subsidy
Consider a permanent23 unanticipated subsidy to fixed export costs, resulting in a
lower effective k for active exporters, financed by non-distortionary lump sum taxes.
Since there are no domestic consumers in our model, welfare considerations abstract
from changes in consumer surplus. We will compare the effect of the subsidy on
aggregate industry profits and its direct cost in the steady-states before and after the
subsidy.
Starting from a LQE
In a LQE, a decrease in k induces more high-quality firms to start and continue
exporting (lower θH) and more low-quality firms to export for one period (higher θL).
We prove that the overall effect on average quality, and thus steady-state national rep-
utation, is positive with Pareto-distributed quality draws and δ not too low: starting
from a LQE, an export subsidy increases long-run equilibrium quality.
23 We are comparing the long-run industry equilibria with and without the policy. With a temporary
subsidy, if the equilibrium is unique, the economy would return to the initial steady-state in the long-run
after the subsidy expires.
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Proposition 1.3 An export subsidy in a LQE increases the steady-state average quality and
welfare of the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
The welfare result is a consequence of the higher long-run reputation. The entry
response to the subsidy creates a positive externality on firms that would be exporting
regardless of the policy. They receive higher prices on their exports due to improved
reputation. This externality lies at the core of the beneficial effect of an export subsidy
for a country that is in a low equilibrium. New exporters also benefit from the better
reputation as well as the subsidy, so that the increase in aggregate profits exceeds
the tax cost of the subsidy. Hence, our model provides a new justification for export
subsidies in countries exporting goods at the low end of the quality ladder24.
Figure 1.4 provides a numerical example of the economy’s transition to its new,
higher steady state in a case where the LQE is unique. It shows the transition dynam-
ics for average quality, reputation, the thresholds θL and θH, as well as the number
of active firms and aggregate profits following an unanticipated permanent decline
in k, and assuming that all firms correctly anticipate the future path of µ. In the first
period in which the subsidy is introduced, reputation is unchanged but the lower
cost makes entry profitable for a larger range of firms. The gap (θL, θH) immediately
narrows. The immediate net effect is a decline in average quality as the entry of low-
quality firms dominates on impact for an unanticipated subsidy. However, over time
as new cohorts of high-quality firms enter and decide to stay active, average quality
θ and reputation µ start rising, while θL further increases and θH keeps falling. µ
adjusts to θ with a lag, further encouraging entry and pushing up θ. This continues
24 In a setting where firms would set prices in a competitive way, we would have to balance this gain
against the argument that an export subsidy tends to subsidize foreign consumers.
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Figure 1.4: Export subsidy in a LQE. Parameter values: θm = 1, α = 3, δ = 0.9, η = 0.1,
E = 100, k = 1.5, ksubs = 1.2. θ∗ = 3. The initial unique steady-state of this
economy is a LQE with µ = θ ≈ 2.211.
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until reputation has caught up with actual quality and the economy has reached its
new steady state.
Starting from a HQE
We have shown that an export subsidy enhances welfare in low-reputation ex-
porting countries. Can the same policy be beneficial for a country that already ex-
ports high-quality goods? The next proposition states that instead of allowing a
high-reputation country to move further up the quality ladder, a subsidy is actually
detrimental to average quality and welfare in a high-quality equilibrium.
Proposition 1.4 An export subsidy in a HQE lowers the steady-state average quality of
exports and welfare of the exporting country.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
This result hinges on the changed exit patterns of high-quality versus low-quality
firms. A decrease in k lowers θ∗ and induces low-quality firms to stay longer. It does
not change the incentives and decisions of high-quality firms. Hence, since average
quality is initially above θ∗, the subsidy lowers actual mean quality: the number
of low-quality firms increases while the number of high-quality firms remains un-
changed.
This lower average quality, in turn, damages the country’s reputation, which ad-
justs slowly to observed average quality. It has a negative effect on the profits of all
active firms, all the more so as they have been active for a shorter time. Hence, the
entry of lower-quality firms induced by the subsidy exerts a negative externality on
all other active firms, through its effect on national reputation. This externality ex-
plains why the overall increase in aggregate profits of all firms receiving the subsidy
is not large enough to cover the cost of the policy, despite a higher volume of sales.
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Intuitively, we can decompose the welfare effect into two components, respec-
tively the effect on the intensive and extensive margin of profits. For the combination
of quality and export experience for which firms are active both with and without
the subsidy, the effect is unambiguously negative: they receive lower prices, and the
additional profits brought about by the subsidy are taken out of taxes. For the addi-
tional periods in which firms below θ∗ stay in the market because of the subsidy, their
profits fall short of the cost of the subsidy: otherwise, since the price is lower than
in the absence of the policy, they would have been exporting without the subsidy.
Therefore, the net effect is unambiguously negative.
Figure 1.5 shows an illustration of the transition to the new steady-state. When
the policy is introduced, low-quality firms immediately stay longer, leading to an
increase in the number of active firms and a steep decline in average quality. National
reputation then starts adjusting downwards until it reaches its new steady-state level.
Aggregate profits first rise above their long-term value, because reputation remains
“too high” during the adjustment period. Over time as µ falls and new cohorts of
firms respond to the lower cost, the economy converges to a steady-state with lower
reputation and quality. As subsidies reduce firms’ costs, aggregate profits are higher
than in the initial equilibrium; but the increase in profits does not match the cost of
the subsidy.
In a nutshell, in a HQE, a subsidy to the fixed cost k actually lowers average
quality by promoting entry of low-quality firms. Overall, the desirability of an export
subsidy depends on the tradeoff between encouraging entry by high-quality firms
which are deterred by the cost of establishing a reputation, and inducing entry by
low-quality fly-by-nights.
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Figure 1.5: Export subsidy in a HQE. Parameter values: θm = 1, α = 2, δ = 0.9, η = 0.1,
E = 100, k = 1.5, ksubs = 1.2. θ∗ = 3. The initial unique steady-state of this
economy is a HQE with µ = θ ≈ 3.461.
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1.5.2 Export promotion campaign and reputation shocks
An export promotion campaign is an effort to promote the quality of foreign
goods in Home, e.g. through advertisements by export promotion agencies or ex-
porters’ associations, or by hosting “mega-events” to showcase the country – as we
mentioned, the Olympics in Seoul in 1988 and in Beijing in 2008 were explicitly as-
signed this goal by government officials. We model it as a one-shot increase in the
national image µt from the initial steady-state, absent any changes in the underlying
quality distribution of firms. More generally, the analysis below applies to reputation
shocks not driven by changes in the quality distribution. We focus on situations in
which the economy is initially in a stable low-quality equilibrium.
Unique steady-state
If the economy has only one long-run equilibrium, it must return to this steady-
state in the long run. The export promotion campaign only has short-run effects on
the distribution of quality. Figure 1.6 provides an example of the transition dynamics
associated with a positive shock. An export promotion campaign results in a one-shot
increase in national reputation µt, starting from the steady-state.
The initial jump in reputation fosters entry by firms in segments of the quality
distribution where they were previously inactive: θH decreases and θL increases. The
net effect of the entry response is a drop in average quality θ immediately after the
shock occurs. Thus, the gap between actual and perceived average quality leads
national reputation to adjust downwards in the following periods. As the country’s
reputation moves back down, the range of qualities for which entrants choose to stay
inactive widens again, driving average quality back up until it has reverted to its
original steady-state value, along with reputation. There are no long-run effects.
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Figure 1.6: Positive reputation shock with a unique LQE. Parameter values identical to Fig-
ure 1.4. µt rises exogenously to 2.5 at t = 1.
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Figure 1.7: Multiple equilibria. Parameter values: θm = 1, α = 2.2, δ = 0.7, η = 0.1, E = 100,
k = 1.2. θ∗ = 2.4. The steady-states of this economy are µS ≈ 1.900, µU ≈ 2.230
and µ′S ≈ 2.477
Multiple steady-states
If the economy has multiple steady-states, there are several low-quality equilibria.
Figure 1.7 provides an illustration of this case. Assume the country starts in a stable
LQE µS. If there are no steady-states with higher reputation than µS, an export
promotion campaign has the same effects as when the steady-state is unique.
If there exists a steady-state µ > µS, there must be an even number of steady-
states with µ > µS. Let us define µU > µS such that µU is a steady-state and for all
µS < µ < µU , µ is not a steady-state. Similarly define µ′S > µU such that µ
′
S is a
steady-state and for all µU < µ < µ′S, µ is not a steady-state. µU is unstable and µ
′
S is
stable.
Starting in µS, a “small” promotion campaign moves national reputation to a level
µt such that µS < µt < µU . The impact of a small campaign is similar to the case
with a unique equilibrium: in the long run, the economy returns to µS. A “large”
promotion campaign moves national reputation to µt > µU . Then, the resulting
entry by firms below the initial θH and above the initial θL leads to an increase in
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average quality, magnifying the shock. Actual quality follows reputation in a self-
fulfilling manner. Quality and reputation keep rising until the economy settles in
the more favorable steady-state µ′S. In the example of Figure 1.7, µ
′
S is a high-quality
equilibrium. These results are summarized in Proposition 1.5.
Proposition 1.5 Positive reputation shocks
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the highest µ among steady-states,
a one-time positive shock to national reputation µt increases aggregate profits and decreases
average quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady-states above µS, a
small one-time positive shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation increases
aggregate profits and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no
effect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µS such that there exist other steady-states above µS,
a large one-time positive shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation increases
aggregate profits and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
Proof: see Appendix A.1.
Figure 1.8 illustrates the transition to the new steady-state. With the parameter
values of Figure 1.7, the economy starts in the LQE µS and the unanticipated one-
shot policy at time 1 results in a jump of the country reputation above µU . Following
the large shock, the economy moves to the HQE µ′S. Note that the policy is not
anticipated prior to time 1, but once the shock is realized, we assume that all firms
have correct expectations of the subsequent path of µ. The immediate effect of the
shock is to boost expected profits for all firms, fostering entry by a range of firms that
did not export in the initial steady-state. For a large shock as defined in Proposition
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Figure 1.8: Large positive reputation shock with multiple equilibria. Parameter values iden-
tical to Figure 1.7. µt rises exogenously to 2.35 at t = 1.
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1.5, the net effect of additional entry around θL and θH is to raise average quality,
sufficiently so to ensure that reputation in the next period remains above µU . As the
policy was not anticipated by high-quality firms in the previous periods, µ falls in
the immediate aftermath of the shock. Reputation rises thereafter as new cohorts of
high-quality firms decide to enter and stay active, until the economy settles in the
new steady-state µ′S with higher quality and higher aggregate profits.
To sum up, a policy which brings about a positive shock to national reputation
has only short-lived effects on the quality distribution of exporters and on aggregate
profits in a unique steady-state or if the shock is small. However, a large shock
starting from a low-reputation, low-quality equilibrium is self-fulfilling when the
economy has multiple steady states. It encourages entry by high-quality firms. In
the portions of the average quality-reputation function where entry by high-quality
firms drives up quality more than entry by lower-quality firms drives it down, a
one-shot increase in reputation brings about a permanent increase in quality, profits
and welfare. To be successful in the long-run, an export promotion campaign based
solely on improving the country’s brand image must therefore induce a large jump
in beliefs. A negative reputation shock has the opposite effects, as stated in Corollary
1.1.
Corollary 1.1 Negative reputation shocks
(i) Starting from a unique LQE or from a LQE that has the lowest µ among steady-states,
a one-time negative shock to national reputation µt reduces aggregate profits and increases
average quality in the short-run, and has no effect in the long-run.
(ii) Starting from a stable LQE µ′S such that there exist other steady-states below µ
′
S,
a small one-time negative shock (µt > µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces
aggregate profits and may increase or decrease average quality in the short-run, and has no
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effect in the long-run.
(iii) Starting from a stable LQE µ′S such that there exists other steady-states below µ
′
S,
a large one-time negative shock (µt < µU as defined above) to national reputation reduces
aggregate profits and average quality both in the short-run and in the long-run.
This last result implies that there can be long-term consequences of a sudden
large drop in reputation, which moves a country to a less desirable steady-state equi-
librium. In particular, large product recalls or heavily mediatized consumer safety
scandals concerning exports of one country can permanently affect the structure of
its industry25, lowering both quality and reputation in the long-run.
1.6 Conclusion
We have shown that when consumers are not fully informed about the quality
of what they buy, national reputation matters for exporters. For new firms without
established brand names, the inability to reveal quality to consumers before purchase
distorts the incentives to enter export markets. Low-quality firms rely on the national
brand, while high-quality firms suffer from it. This framework helps explain the
high observed turnover rate among new exporters, and a “brand premium” whereby
incumbents receive higher unit prices than entrants.
More broadly, unobservable quality tilts the long-run quality composition of an
export-oriented industry towards its low end, all the more so as the exporting econ-
25 Chisik (2003) provides an example of such a negative reputation shock in the Colombian garment
industry: “Although expanding at a rapid rate throughout the early 1970s Colombia’s deteriorating reputation
became a determining factor in the contraction of this industry. Much of this demise can be attributed to a
single Colombian garment firm that took a contract (for 50,000 men’s suits) that was beyond their capability. The
poor-quality result so tarnished the American importer’s name that other high-quality importers became wary of
Colombian-sewn garments. With the payoff to high-quality production reduced, Colombian garment firms then
concentrated on low-quality markets, and the newly- found unfavorable reputation was justified.”
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omy has a poor reputation for quality in the importing country. In that respect,
reputation has self-perpetuating features since future national reputation adjusts to
past exports quality. These issues are particularly relevant for developing countries
trying to grow into exporting increasingly sophisticated goods. National reputations
create history dependence in the range of goods a country can successfully export. A
damaged national reputation is a barrier to entry for companies that develop more ex-
pensive high-quality products, threatening the success of such a growth strategy. To
overcome the adverse aggregate effects of asymmetric information, the optimal policy
critically depends on whether the country’s initial equilibrium is a high-quality or a
low-quality one. In cases with low initial reputation, we find that policies that lower
the cost of exporting can lead to a welfare gain by improving the country’s long-
run average quality and reputation. We also show that policies inducing a positive
jump in consumer beliefs can have self-fulfilling effects on the quality of exports if the
shock is sufficiently large, but have no long-run effects if the shock is small. Export
subsidies are, however, detrimental to both reputation and welfare in countries al-
ready exporting high-quality products, as they encourage the entry of “fly-by-night”
unreliable firms.
This paper could be enriched in several directions. We have developed a model
with reduced-form import demand, abstracting from the determinants of demand
for domestic versus foreign goods. We could explore further the conditions under
which developing countries end up specializing in low-quality exports by introducing
within-sector competition between domestic and foreign firms and non-homothetic
preferences for quality. Both country reputations and the sensitivity of host market
consumers to quality will be determinants of within-industry specialization across
countries. Specifically, as long as the elasticity of demand to perceived quality rises
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with income, we expect that asymmetric information concerns will affect exports from
developing countries to advanced countries more than to other developing countries.
Hence, the relative force of factor-driven comparative advantage and “reputational
comparative advantage” will shape export patterns differently both in more versus
less differentiated industries and towards high- versus low-income destination mar-
kets.
Regarding policy responses, we have focused on country-level economic and trade
policies, designed to enhance the position of a country’s exports along the quality lad-
der. Going further, our analysis provides a framework for a richer understanding of
firms’ sourcing decisions through the lens of a strategic use of “made in” rules. Ex-
porters can find it optimal to resort to original equipment manufacturers or depart
from the cost-minimizing way of splitting the production process across locations, in
order to obtain a favorable country-of-origin denomination. The location of manufac-
turing and assembly will be decided not only according to cost considerations, but
also depending on the regulations surrounding rules of origin, consumer sensitivity
to quality, and the degree of asymmetric information in the industry. An extension
of our model along these lines would generate testable predictions at the firm level.
These topics will be investigated in future research.
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2. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND MULTINATIONAL CAPITAL
STRUCTURE
2.1 Introduction
There is huge variation in the extent to which the foreign subsidiaries of multina-
tional firms are financed in the local debt or equity market or through parent financ-
ing. In 2008, majority-owned foreign affiliates of nonfinancial US companies raised
over 45% of their external funds (excluding retained earnings) in the host country,
and only 24% from the parent. As shown in Table 2.1, the host country share was as
high as 60% in Japan, and as low as 27% in Israel .
Why do multinational firms choose to finance the capital expenditures of their af-
filiates in the home or in the host market? The existing literature has emphasized tax
regimes, exchange rate variability and creditor rights (e.g. Desai, Foley, and Hines,
2004). Affiliates seem to substitute between local debt and debt from parent com-
panies to arbitrage differences in corporate tax rates and financial conditions. Other
papers have focused on the role of subsidiary debt to incentivize local managers (e.g.
Antra`s, Desai, and Foley, 2009). In this paper, we will argue that local financing
is a (possibly costly) diversification strategy when business cycles are not perfectly
correlated across markets and the multinational faces a risk of financial distress. The
parent can exploit differences in creditor protection across countries, choosing its cap-
ital structure to minimize the overall cost of capital as well as the risk of bankruptcy.
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Table 2.1: External financing of US majority-owned foreign affiliates (in %). Source: Bureau
of Economic Analysis Survey of Direct Investment Abroad, 2008.
Host country share Parent share
All countries 45.1 24.2
Japan 60.2 17.4
UK 58.4 22.3
Germany 51.1 19.6
France 48.7 21.9
South Africa 42.7 29.6
China 42.3 34.1
Mexico 37.2 38.6
India 37.2 38.9
Brazil 35.3 30.3
Chile 31.9 43.6
Nigeria 29.0 16.3
Israel 27.5 51.7
Hence, we will abstract from contractual frictions and focus on a case where the only
difference between arm’s length partners and foreign affiliates is the latter’s access to
internal capital markets and the ex post reallocation of cash flows across subsidiaries.
Specifically, we restrict our attention to horizontal FDI, and point out two main
characteristics of multinational operations. As opposed to domestic conglomerates,
multinational enterprises (MNEs) derive revenue and profits from sales in several
markets, and are thus affected by demand shocks in several countries as well as by ex-
change rates. And as opposed to exporting firms, they own assets in several countries
through their subsidiaries, and can use them as collateral to borrow on host markets.
The former can be a source of either diversification or additional risk, depending on
the correlation between foreign and domestic profits. The latter provides the com-
pany with the opportunity to make a strategic use of home and host country credit
markets, and lower its overall borrowing costs in the presence of financial frictions.
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We restrict our attention to debt finance, since the vast majority of subsidiary funding
takes place through debt rather than equity or other contractual arrangements.
We explore the determinants of local versus parent borrowing under three main
assumptions. First, there is ex ante uncertainty about the profitability of each mar-
ket, leading to a risk of bankruptcy for externally financed firms if demand is low.
Second, due to collateral constraints, not all projects with positive expected returns
are funded by creditors. Third, countries have different levels of financial develop-
ment, affecting banks’ ability to recover collateral in case of default. We derive the
following main effects. A multinational affiliate’s borrowing costs on the host mar-
ket relative to the home market decrease in local financial development, and increase
in the informational disadvantage of home banks about foreign assets. Moreover,
having operations in several, imperfectly correlated markets stabilizes the cash flow
of MNEs, which lowers the likelihood of distress for sufficiently productive firms.
However, if affiliates are funded through parent debt raised on the home market,
joint balance sheets create a contagion risk for less productive firms: financial dis-
tress in an affiliate can force the whole firm into bankruptcy. Borrowing in local
markets mitigates this risk by providing firms with the option to select the market in
which they default. In countries with low financial development, these firms face a
tradeoff between higher interest rates on local debt and a higher risk of liquidation
with parent debt. We show that the correlation of business cycles between the home
and host markets plays a key role in this tradeoff. Finally, we find that host country
debt has an additional benefit in the presence of foreign exchange risk. Local debt,
denominated in foreign currency, provides a hedge against fluctuations in profits due
to exchange rate movements. Holding constant financial development, debt raised on
local markets becomes more attractive when the risk of a currency depreciation rises.
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This financing channel has important implications for the relationship between
FDI and capital flows. The choice of local or parent debt affects the extent to which
FDI does create a capital inflow to host countries, which is key for developing and
emerging economies. Countries strive to attract FDI from foreign companies that
will provide technology, jobs, and funds. But if these companies finance their sub-
sidiaries’ investments locally, they may crowd out credit to local firms. Alternatively,
the involvement of multinational affiliates may contribute to developing host financial
markets. Although this question is beyond the scope of this paper, we will shed light
on the conditions which make either local borrowing or capital inflows more likely.
Lastly, their capital structure also affects the degree to which multinational firms’
liabilities can act as a channel for the international transmission of demand shocks.
Parents with locally financed affiliates are more insulated again foreign recessions
than parents raising external finance on their own to fund their subsidiaries. Hence,
their financing choices contribute to either amplifying or mitigating the transmission
of shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the liter-
ature on internal capital markets and multinational finance. Section 2.3 lays out the
building blocks of the model. Section 2.4 derives the optimal debt mix of multina-
tional firms. Section 2.5 introduces exchange rate risk. Finally, Section 2.6 tests some
empirical predictions of the model.
2.2 Literature
There is a large corporate finance literature about the benefits and costs of internal
capital markets in a domestic setting, surveyed by Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and
Phillips (2007). On the “bright side”, diversification within a firm allows headquarters
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to reallocate funds across divisions and engage in winner-picking if they are better
informed about the prospects of different divisions than external actors, and it allows
for better monitoring than bank lending (Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1994; Stein,
1997; Hubbard and Palia, 1999). As internal funds are less costly to raise than external
funds, reallocating resources across divisions relaxes credit constraints by limiting
the need for costly external finance. However, there is also a “dark side” to internal
capital markets. The ex post reallocation of cash flows can facilitate overinvestment
in divisions with bad prospects; dilute the effort of divisional managers; generate
distortionary rent-seeking and lobbying activities over the division of cash flows;
lower incentives to repay external debt; and create comovement of returns between
unrelated divisions (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000;
Brusco and Panunzi, 2005; Inderst and Muller, 2003; Ozbas and Scharfstein, 2010;
Wulf, 2009). Overall, determinants of whether internal capital markets help or hurt a
company’s value in these papers are the variability of investment opportunities and
cash-generating activities across divisions within the firm, as well as the degree of
credit constraints and the severity of agency problems. This literature has focused on
domestic conglomerates, which differ from multinational firms in several respects.
First, rather than having activities in several unrelated industries, the primary source
of diversification within multinational enterprises is geographical. Second, unlike
domestic firms, they are able to obtain external finance on several segmented capital
markets since they can put up collateral in foreign countries. These two features
will be key to our analysis. Third, the degree of information asymmetry between
headquarters and division managers is potentially higher within firms operating in
different countries.
A recent theoretical literature has incorporated financial frictions into theories of
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international firms. Manova (2011) and Chaney (2005) study how liquidity constraints
affect the behavior of exporting firms, but do not consider multinational firms. Noe
(1999) looks directly at the choice of parent versus subsidiary debt for a multina-
tional operating in a country with different creditor rights. The main mechanism in
his model is the ability to renegotiate ex post, which allows multinationals to exploit
conflicts of interest between domestic and local creditors. He predicts that the debt
mix will place a larger weight on the more creditor-friendly financial system, and that
MNEs with lower distress risk will rely less on local credit markets. One difference
between his model and ours is that we rule out renegotiation but focus on bankruptcy
risk and inefficient liquidation. Most importantly, Noe’s framework, which features
a single project in the foreign country, misses a crucial characteristic of multinational
firms: not only can they borrow in several credit markets, but they also receive cash
flows from several product markets. Instead of looking at one project in isolation, a
key parameter of our model will be the correlation of cash flows across markets and
its effect on the company’s default risk. Ramondo and Rappoport (2008) consider
explicitly how the correlation of shocks between home and host markets affects the
decision to serve a foreign market through exports or affiliate sales: country pairs
with less correlated business cycles should have larger bilateral trade relative to affil-
iate sales. Contrary to us, they assume perfect financial markets and thus disregard
the role of international diversification in overcoming financial frictions. Moreover,
they are silent about the mix of internal and external debt in subsidiaries.
Two papers study the choice of local versus parent finance in a setting in which
local managers need to be incentivized. Marin and Schnitzer (2011) look at the role of
local financing in alleviating concerns that the manager may fail to expend effort or
may hide returns from the parent. Their model predicts that even if internal financing
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is available and less costly, local external finance is chosen when the agency problems
are severe. Antra`s, Desai, and Foley (2009) also focus on the impact of managerial
misbehavior on multinational activity and subsidiary financing. In their model, par-
ent funding arises in the optimal contract between the entrepreneur, external funders
and affiliates in countries with weak investor protection. As parents are better able to
monitor managers, banks require their participation to overcome the paucity of cred-
itor rights. They predict that both the share of arm’s length technology transfers and
the share of external financing rise with the strength of creditor protection. However,
both of these papers consider one project only, shutting off the effect of the affiliate’s
returns on the overall financial health of the firm. Indeed, they assume that the par-
ent firm faces no financial constraints in its home country. Instead, we abstract from
incentive concerns, assuming that the probability of high returns is independent of
managerial effort, but focus on the effect of the comovement of returns as well as host
country financial development on the firm’s financing choices.
A last strand of literature related to this paper consists of empirical studies of
the financing choices of multinational companies. Feinberg and Phillips (2002) find
evidence that in countries with less developed financial markets, affiliates compete
for resources with their US parents, leading to financing tradeoffs within affiliate
networks. Then, a series of empirical papers used detailed data on the affiliates of
US multinational companies to study their reliance on internal capital markets. De-
sai, Foley, and Hines (2004) show that the capital structure of subsidiaries responds
opportunistically to financial frictions. Affiliates in countries with higher corporate
tax rates borrow more externally, and less from parent companies. They also raise
less external debt in countries where financial markets are less developed, and three
quarters of this difference is substituted for by borrowing from parent companies.
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In related papers, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) find that MNEs take advantage of
internal capital markets to circumvent capital controls, by adjusting reported prof-
itability and dividend repatriations; and Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) identify do-
mestic financing needs as one of the determinants of the dividend repatriation policy
of financially constrained multinationals. Finally, Desai, Foley, and Forbes (2008) find
that US affiliates expand sales and investment more than local firms following sharp
currency depreciations; the difference is not driven by different investment opportu-
nities but different abilities to deal with financial constraints, as MNE affiliates are
able to obtain more financing from parents in large depreciation episodes.
2.3 Model setup
This section presents the building blocks of the model. To keep matters simple, we
build a two-country framework in which firms serve both markets and must decide
on their organizational form and debt structure. In order to highlight the financing
channel, we abstract from managerial incentive concerns.
2.3.1 Production and demand
Suppose the home country and the foreign country are symmetric in terms of
size and labor costs but differ in financial development. We study the horizontal
FDI decision from the perspective of a home firm. There are three periods in this
economy (times 0, 1 and 2), and a continuum of entrepreneurs. Each of them owns
the technology to produce and sell a good with productivity θ, distributed on
[
θ, θ
]
.
The productivity level is exogenous, drawn from a distribution G (θ), and observable.
At the time investment and financing decisions are made, there is uncertainty
about the future demand level in each market. More precisely, in order to sell in a
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given market, a capital outlay of I must be sunk in period 0. Once this expense is
incurred to set up a plant, production can take place in this country for the next two
periods. The demand level is stochastic and revealed after investment is realized but
before production takes place. With probability pH, demand is high (state H) and
revenue is θRH in each period if the firm still exists then1. With probability pL ≡
1− pH, demand is low and revenue is θRL, where RL < RH2. These unconditional
probabilities and revenues are identical in the two countries. We also define pHH,
pLL and pHL as the probabilities of, respectively, observing states (H, H∗), (L, L∗) and
either (L, H∗) or (H, L∗).
Finally, capital is illiquid and depreciates over time. The value of installed capital
to the firm is I in period 0, L in period 1 and 0 in period 2, where L < I. This value L
corresponds to the resale value of fixed capital on the local market. We assume that
2θRH > I > 2θRL and θRL > L3. There is no discounting.
2.3.2 Debt contracts
Financial environment
The entrepreneur has no own wealth and must finance capital outlays through
external borrowing. We assume he cannot raise additional equity. The firm enters
into a standard debt contract with a bank. The banking sector is competitive, so that
1 It is straightforward to generalize to a case where demand follows a Markov process and the con-
ditional probability of staying in the same state is higher than the probability of switching.
2 This reduced-form revenue can be derived, for instance, from a constant elasticity of substitution
utility function with monopolistic competition and stochastic aggregate demand.
3 These assumptions are meant to focus our attention on the implications of inefficient liquidation
rather than on voluntary exit decisions. We take the range
[
θ, θ
]
to identify firms for which serving
the foreign market is potentially profitable, thus excluding the least productive ones as in Melitz (2003).
Intuitively, we are assuming that there is “not too much” variance in productivity among entrepreneurs
and high uncertainty about demand conditions.
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banks make zero expected profits on every loan.
Suppose for now that the firm only operates in its home country. In order to
fund the firm’s activity on its domestic market, the bank lends the initial investment
I to the entrepreneur, against promised repayments of DA2 in each of periods 1 and
2, where DA ≥ I. Thus, DA−II is the interest rate or borrowing cost, which we will
derive below. It will be determined by both country-level financial imperfections and
firm-specific default risk.
The financial friction comes from the fact that only physical is pledgeable, while
future revenue is not. If the firm fails to make the promised payment in period 1, the
bank can seize its physical assets and sell them on the secondary market. If it does
so, it obtains a liquidation value γL. It cannot seize the firm’s revenue itself. The
parameter γ < 1 captures the bank’s ability to recover collateral and is our measure
of financial development. Banks cannot realize the full resale value of installed capital
for several reasons: the manager may be able to hide some of the collateral; the bank
will incur legal fees; it does not know the market and potential buyers as well as the
firm itself, etc.
Arm’s length production contracts
Serving the foreign market involves two related decisions. First, the firm must
decide whether to contract with an independent foreign firm which will serve the
foreign market, or open an affiliate abroad. Second, if it undertakes FDI, it can choose
where to borrow. We start by characterizing the contracts under arm’s length produc-
tion, whereby the entrepreneur licenses the firm’s technology to a foreign producer.
In this case, the entrepreneur makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a local foreign firm
to license the technology. In exchange of the right to sell the product, he receives an
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upfront transfer equal to expected foreign profits. The foreign supplier then borrows
on her own from a local foreign bank, produces and sells.
The debt contract is similar to that of the home country, except that the level of
financial development γ∗ may differ. Thus, the foreign firm borrows I, collateralized
by its fixed capital, against promised repayments of D
∗
A
2 in periods 1 and 2, where
D∗A ≥ I. If it fails to repay, the foreign bank seizes its assets in period 1 and receives
the liquidation value γ∗L. The balance sheets of both firms are entirely independent.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the foreign country is less financially
developed that the home country: γ > γ∗.
Foreign direct investment contracts
If the firm sets up a wholly-owned affiliate abroad, it pools the parent and sub-
sidiary’s liabilities and borrows a total of 2I. We rule out capital controls, so that
profits can be freely transferred across borders. There are two financing options.
First, the multinational can replicate the debt of two independent firms. In this case,
it borrows from both a home bank and a foreign bank, where each loan is collateral-
ized by local assets. The total face value of the debt is noted DF + D∗F, to be repaid in
half every period.
Second, it can borrow the full amount of both investments from the home bank
only. We note the corresponding face value of the debt 2DI , and the debt contract
requires a payment of DI per period. Foreign assets can be used as collateral; however,
in the event of liquidation, the home bank has an informational disadvantage in
selling foreign assets. Hence, it can only recover a value γL from the firm’s foreign
capital, as opposed to γL from domestic capital, where L < L.
While γ indexes the country’s financial development through the degree of en-
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forcement of debt contracts, the gap between L and L is meant to reflect technical
and informational issues. In particular, it may reflect the geographical specificity of
the fixed assets being liquidated, or high transport costs for physical capital. Alter-
natively, the less the bank has information about or partners in the foreign country,
the larger the discount it will have to incur in order to sell the assets locally.
2.3.3 Timing
The timing of events proceeds as follows:
• At time 0, the entrepreneur decides whether to license the technology to a for-
eign firm or undertake FDI. If he sets up an affiliate, he decides where to borrow.
The initial capital investment I is made in each country.
• At time 1, the state of nature H or L is revealed in each country. Firms produce,
sell, and make the first debt payment if they are able to. If not, every bank that
has not been repaid seizes and liquidates the collateral.
• At time 2, production and sales take place again in every plant that has not been
liquidated. The second debt payment is made. The firm has no more activity.
2.4 Choice of capital structure
2.4.1 First best
Suppose there are no financial market imperfections. Since external finance is the
only source of frictions in the model, the organizational form and capital structure
are then irrelevant. According to the first best allocation of funds, an investment is
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undertaken if and only if it has a positive net present value, that is if:
2θR ≥ I
where we define
R ≡ pHRH + pLRL
such that the expected revenue per period is θR for a firm of productivity θ. Hence,
all firms with
θ ≥ θFB ≡ I
2R
(2.1)
sell in the home and foreign markets in both periods. At t = 1, liquidation is ineffi-
cient, so plants are never shut down.
2.4.2 Borrowing costs and default risk
Licensing
Now let us examine the debt contracts with financial imperfections. Under arm’s
length technology transfer, the two firms function as separate legal entities with inde-
pendent balance sheets. Since I > 2θRL, whenever the low state occurs in a country,
the corresponding firm fails to meet its debt payments and is liquidated in period
1. The home bank (respectively, foreign bank) receives DA (respectively, D∗A) in the
high state, and γL (respectively, γ∗L) in the low state. Using the bank’s expected zero
profit condition, we derive the face value of the debt of the home firm and the foreign
firm:
DA = I +
pL
pH
(I − γL) (2.2)
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D∗A = I +
pL
pH
(I − γ∗L) (2.3)
The expected profits of each firm, respectively piA and pi∗A, are its expected sales
revenue net of principal and interest payments. If RH occurs, it sells in both periods
and fully repays its debt. If RL occurs, it sells in the first period only and defaults on
the debt. Hence,
piA = pH [2θRH − DA] + pLθRL (2.4)
= 2θR− I − pL [θRL − γL]
and
pi∗A = pH [2θRH − D∗A] + pLθRL (2.5)
= 2θR− I − pL [θRL − γ∗L]
The first term in the expected profit is the net present value of the investment
2θR − I, which also corresponds to expected profits under perfect capital markets.
The second term is the cost of liquidation. Here, the only ex ante difference between
the two firms is that lower financial development in the foreign country results in
higher borrowing costs and lower expected profits. Since the foreign bank can recover
a lower fraction of physical assets in the event of default, it compensates for the more
acute default risk by charging a higher interest rate.
It immediately follows that firms produce at home if and only if θ ≥ θA and
abroad if and only if θ ≥ θ∗A > θA, where:
θA =
I − pLγL
2R− pLRL
(2.6)
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and
θ∗A =
I − pLγ∗L
2R− pLRL
(2.7)
The latter is decreasing in γ∗, so that we expect more activity in more financially
developed countries.
FDI with home country debt
Under FDI with domestic debt, the parent firm decides to set up a foreign affiliate
through FDI and borrows 2I from the home bank only, against future payments of
DI per period. In each of periods 1 and 2, it receives cash flow from sales in both
countries. The whole firm, i.e. both plants, is liquidated if it is unable to meet its
payment in period 1. Hence if both countries have low revenue, the firm is liquidated
in period 1. If only one has low revenue, two cases may arise.
On the one hand, if the firm is able to repay its debt when only one country yields
high revenue (“diversification case”), then the bank’s zero profit condition yields the
following expected debt payment DI,D:
DI,D = I +
pLL
1− pLL
[
I − γ
2
(L + L)
]
(2.8)
and expected worldwide profits are:
piI,D + pi
∗
I,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − γ (L + L)] (2.9)
The condition for the firm to be in the diversification region is
θ (RH + RL) ≥ I + pLL1− pLL
[
I − γ
2
(L + L)
]
(2.10)
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which is more likely to hold for high productivity firms. In this setting, multinational
activity – as opposed to contracting with a separate entity – provides diversification
benefits. It enables the firm to use cross-subsidization between its plants in order
to avoid an inefficient liquidation in states of the world in which, for instance, one
country experiences a recession but the other one does not. Importantly, the more
comovement of revenue there is between the firm’s home and foreign markets, the
higher the ratios pLLpL and
pHH
pH
, and the less likely it is that the firm will need to
transfer cash flows between its divisions. Thus the scope for diversification, and
the associated interest rate discount compared to independent firms, falls with the
correlation of business cycles between countries.
On the other hand, if the firm does not have enough revenue to cover its debt
payments when one country only is in the high state (“contagion case”), then it is liq-
uidated in every state except (H, H∗). The corresponding debt payments and profits
are:
DI,C = I +
1− pHH
pHH
[
I − γ
2
(L + L)
]
(2.11)
piI,C + pi
∗
I,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− 2θ [pHLRH + pLRL] + (1− pHH) γ (L + L) (2.12)
The contagion case occurs if condition (2.10) does not hold. Then, instead of provid-
ing opportunities for diversification, a multinational firm which is financially respon-
sible for its affiliates is vulnerable to the risk that bad shocks will have a ripple effect
across its divisions. When one country is is the high state and the other one in the
low state, the whole firm’s assets are still seized by the bank, including the plant that
yields high revenue. This leads to more frequent liquidations than when the home
and foreign producer are independent firms.
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FDI with domestic and foreign debt
Under FDI with borrowing on both markets, the firm borrows I from a domestic
bank and I from a foreign bank, each loan being collateralized with local assets. It
has to repay DF2 to the home bank and
D∗F
2 to the foreign bank in each of periods 1 and
2. We distinguish again between two cases depending on whether pooling resources
lowers or increases default risk.
Following the same logic as in the previous case, if sales revenues θ (RH + RL)
suffice to cover the per-period debt payment, the firm only defaults when both coun-
tries are in the low state. In state (L, L∗), it defaults on both loans. Therefore, we
have:
DF,D = I +
pLL
1− pLL [I − γL] (2.13)
D∗F,D = I +
pLL
1− pLL [I − γ
∗L] (2.14)
piF,D + pi
∗
F,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L] (2.15)
The condition for this diversification case to exist is that θ (RH + RL) ≥ 12
(
DF,D + D∗F,D
)
or equivalently
θ (RH + RL) ≥ I + pLL1− pLL
[
I − γ+ γ
∗
2
L
]
(2.16)
If condition (2.16) does not hold, then the firm does not benefit from pooling
risks. If only one country is in a recession, the entrepreneur can choose where to
default and will thus declare bankruptcy in a given country whenever it is in the low
state. Hence, the terms of the debt contracts and expected profits are equivalent to
the licensing case.
DF,C = I +
pL
pH
(I − γL) (2.17)
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D∗F,C = I +
pL
pH
(I − γ∗L) (2.18)
piF,C + pi
∗
F,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L] (2.19)
Finally, we assume that when the entrepreneur is indifferent between integration
and licensing, he chooses to license the technology.
2.4.3 Optimal capital structure
High financial development
Suppose the foreign country has high financial development, which we define as:
γ∗L ≥ γL
Then we can prove that it is never worth borrowing funds for the foreign investment
from the home bank. Intuitively, the comparative disadvantage of the home bank in
selling geographically distant assets outweighs its better ability to recover collateral.
The interest rate charged by the home bank on a loan for the whole firm therefore
exceeds the average interest on two local loans.
Lemma 2.1 If γ∗L > γL , FDI with both domestic and foreign debt strictly dominates FDI
with domestic debt only.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Also, irrespective of financial development, the choice between FDI with local
debt and licensing only depends on whether the firm is in the diversification or in
the contagion region. If a common balance sheet enables the firm to reduce its prob-
ability of bankruptcy, FDI is better than selling through a separate firm. If it raises
73
the probability of bankruptcy, the firm is better off contracting the technology to an
independent producer. This result is formalized in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2 If condition (2.16) holds, FDI with both domestic and foreign debt strictly dom-
inates licensing. If condition (2.16) does not hold, FDI with both domestic and foreign debt is
equivalent to licensing.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Having established these two results, we proceed to characterize the optimal struc-
ture of a firm operating in its domestic market and in a highly financially developed
foreign market. Since the costs associated with financial frictions are higher in the
foreign market, there is a range of firms – the least productive among domestically
active firms – for which serving the foreign market is not profitable. Among those
that do sell abroad, the most productive ones are in the diversification region, set
up an affiliate and borrow in both markets. Intermediate productivity firms prefer
to isolate their balance sheets from the risk of contagion and operate through two
separate entities, as long as doing so yields positive expected profits. This sorting is
formally described in Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1 Optimal financial structure with high financial development:
If γ∗L > γL ,
(i) Firms with θ < θ∗ do not produce for the foreign market, where
θ∗ =
 θ
∗
A if θ
∗
A ≤ θF
max {θ∗F, θF} if θ∗A > θF
θ∗A =
I − pLγ∗L
2R− pLRL
;
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θ∗F =
I − 12 pLL (γ+ γ∗) L
2R− pLLRL
;
θF =
I − 12 pLL (γ+ γ∗) L
(1− pLL) (RH + RL) .
(ii) Firms with θ∗A ≤ θ ≤ θF produce for their home market and license their technology
to an independent foreign firm.
(iii) Firms with θ > max {θ∗F, θF} produce for their domestic market, open a subsidiary
and borrow in both markets.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Low financial development
Suppose the foreign country has low financial development, i.e.
γ∗L ≤ γL
Contrary to the high financial development case, FDI with home borrowing only
now strictly dominates FDI with local borrowing when the firm is able to diversify.
The intuition mirrors the reasoning of the previous section: even though the home
bank obtains a lower value for the foreign assets it liquidates than a local bank, its
better ability to recover them more than makes up for this disadvantage. It is there-
fore able to charge a lower interest rate on a loan covering the firm’s worldwide
investments.
Lemma 2.3 If γ∗L < γL and condition (2.10) holds, FDI with domestic debt only strictly
dominates FDI with both domestic and foreign debt.
Proof: see Appendix B.
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Therefore, FDI with local borrowing will not be used in the diversification region
in countries with low financial development. Similarly to Lemma 2.2, we can also
prove that if θ is high enough for diversification, the firm prefers FDI with home
borrowing to an independent affiliate.
Lemma 2.4 If γ∗L > γL and condition (2.10) holds, FDI with home borrowing only strictly
dominates licensing.
Proof: see Appendix B.
Condition (2.10) defines a threshold θI above which joint balance sheets provide
diversification opportunities:
θI ≡ I −
1
2 pLLγ (L + L)
(1− pLL) (RH + RL) (2.20)
If θ < θI , the firm’s decision needs to balance a capital cost effect and an excess
liquidation effect. Borrowing the full amount of worldwide investments from the
home bank leads to a higher probability of bankruptcy. However, it also implies a
higher liquidation value in the event of default, which lowers borrowing costs. In the
contagion region, the difference between profits with FDI and home borrowing and
profits with licensing is given by:
pL (γL− γ∗L)︸ ︷︷ ︸− pHL [2θRH − γ (L + L)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of capital Excess liquidation
so that FDI is preferred to licensing whenever either θ > θI or
θ < θ′I ≡
pL (γL− γ∗L) + pHLγ (L + L)
2pHLRH
(2.21)
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Taking into account the profitability of entry under each organizational form, we
can now derive the choice of capital structure by productivity levels.
Proposition 2.2 Optimal capital structure with low financial development:
If γ∗L < γL,
(i) Firms with θ < θ∗ do not produce for the foreign market, where
θ∗ =

θ∗A if θ
∗
A ≤ min {θI , θ′∗I }
θ∗I if θI ≤ min {θ∗A, θ′∗I }
θ′∗I if θ
′∗
I ≤ min {θ∗A, θI}
θ∗A =
I − pLγ∗L
2R− pLRL
;
θ∗I =
I − 12 pLLγ (L + L)
2R− pLLRL
;
θ
′∗
I =
I − 12 (1− pHH) γ (L + L)
2R− pLRL − pHLRH
;
θI =
I − 12 pLLγ (L + L)
(1− pLL) (RH + RL) .
(ii) Firms with θ∗A ≤ θ and θ′I ≤ θ ≤ θI produce for their home market and license their
technology to an independent foreign firm, where
θ′I =
pL (γL− γ∗L) + pHLγ (L + L)
2pHLRH
(iii) Firms with θ > max {θ∗I , θI} or θ
′∗
I < θ < θ
′
I produce for their domestic market, open a
subsidiary and borrow from a home bank only.
Proof: see Appendix B.
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Summing up
Let us sum up the firm’s choices accroding to θ and γ∗. Figure 2.1 presents a case
with a low correlation of business cycles between the home and host country, i.e. a
high contagion risk (pHL high). In this case, θ′I < θ
′∗
I for all values of γ
∗, implying that
FDI with parent debt never both yields positive expected profits and is preferred to
licensing in the contagion region. Hence, in countries with low financial development,
we observe no foreign activity when θ < θ∗A (the red line representing θ
∗
A), arm’s
length technology transfer when θ∗A ≤ θ ≤ θI (the blue line representing θI), and
FDI with debt raised on the home market above θI . In countries with high financial
development, there are no foreign sales below θ∗A, licensing when θ
∗
A ≤ θ ≤ θF (the
blue line representing θF), and FDI with locally raised financing above θF. In both
cases, the only firms that engage in FDI are those in the diversification region.
Figure 2.2 shows a case with a high correlation of sales between the home and
host markets, so that contagion is unlikely. In high financial development countries,
everything is identical to the previous figure. However, in less financially developed
countries, some firms in the contagion region still engage in FDI in order to take
advantage of better creditor rights in the home country. The threshold θ′I (represented
by the dark green line) below which arm’s length contracting is less profitable than
parent-financed FDI is higher than θ
′∗
I (represented by the light green line). Therefore,
the prevalence of FDI and home finance is larger, as well as the total volume of foreign
activity.
Testable predictions
The simple model we have analyzed yields several testable predictions about
multinational activity and the financing of multinational affiliates.
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Figure 2.1: Choices of firms with low revenue correlation
Figure 2.2: Choices of firms with high revenue correlation
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Result 2.1 For given host country creditor rights, a foreign investment is more likely to be
conducted in-house if θ is high, and more likely to be contracted out to an outside producer if
θ is low.
This result stems from the fact that holding γ∗ constant, highly productive firms
are led to engage in MNE activity, rather than licensing, by a diversification motive
(reducing overall default risk and borrowing costs). The same mechanism works
against multinationals with lower θ, which are subject to a risk of contagion and
avoid it by serving the foreign market through an independent firm.
Result 2.2 Multinational activity in countries with low financial development is more preva-
lent, relative to arm’s length production, the higher the correlation of profits across countries.
Multinational activity in countries with high financial development may be less prevalent,
relative to arm’s length production, the higher the correlation of profits across countries.
The first part of this result comes from the role of contagion risk. In countries with
low financial development, more correlated sales across markets lower the probability
of contagion, which arises when profits are high in one country and low in the other.
Hence, a high correlation tilts the tradeoff between lower borrowing costs and a lower
risk of liquidation towards borrowing in the home country to serve both markets
through affiliate sales.
The second part of this result deals with the diversification benefits of multina-
tional activity. A higher correlation of sales across markets makes these diversifica-
tion opportunities less relevant, leading firms to favor licensing technology to local
producers. However, we have seen that when the default risk is not reduced by pro-
ducing in-house, licensing and setting up an affiliate are still equivalent in terms of
expected profits, so that the prediction is not a strong one.
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Result 2.3 The propensity of multinationals to borrow in host markets increases in local
financial development γ∗ and decreases in the distance to the home country and geographic
specificity of physical assets (L−L).
These predictions are fairly intuitive: a high γ∗ and a high L both lower the cost
of borrowing from local banks relative to home banks, making local borrowing more
attractive. Hence, among all US multinationals having affiliates in foreign countries,
we expect the share of local debt in affiliates’ external financing, relative to parent
financing, to increase with the development of local credit markets and decrease with
distance to the United States.
Finally, although we provide no formal welfare analysis is this paper, let us make
a few comments about the efficiency costs and benefits of multinational activity in
this setting. On the one hand, the ability to pool risks and borrow on home terms
may increase total investment in countries with low financial development. This is
the case when financial frictions are high enough to deter investment by some local
firms, but multinational affiliates of similar productivity are profitable because of the
parent firm’s ability to borrow on its domestic market at lower rates. Moreover, in
financially developed countries, multinational affiliates experience financial distress
less often than both comparable local firms and comparable home firms that do not
sell abroad, since they able to pool cash flows and thus lower their default probability.
On the other hand, in less financially developed countries, there is a range of pro-
ductivity levels for which multinationals experience financial distress more often that
local and home firms of similar productivity, as they take on a higher bankruptcy risk
in order not to incur the foreign country’s high borrowing costs. Hence, when finan-
cial frictions are large in the host country, FDI can mitigate one source of inefficiency
(the fact that some investments with positive expected returns are not funded) but
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may worsen another one (inefficient liquidations).
2.5 Exchange rate risk
In the previous section, we ignored exchange rate concerns in the firm’s choice
of where to borrow the funds for its foreign investment. In practice, exchange rate
fluctuations change the home currency value of repatriated profits. Through this
channel, they can affect the tradeoff between home country and host country debt,
as local debt provides a hedge against exchange rate variations. We assume that
host country debt is denominated in the foreign currency. We model currency risk
in a very simple way as the probability of a severe exchange rate crisis4. Naturally,
introducing exchange rate risk does not affect the default probabilities and borrowing
conditions of independent home and foreign firms, so we will focus on the cases with
foreign subsidiaries.
2.5.1 FDI with host country debt
Suppose a currency crisis occurs with a small probability λ in the foreign country
at time 1, making foreign currency worthless in the home country. Both foreign
revenue and host country debt see their value plummet in crisis episodes. The firm
will default on its payments to the home bank if the state is (L, L∗) , or if it is (L, H∗)
and a currency crisis occurs. In the latter case, the exchange rate shock prevents
subsidization from the foreign plant to the home plant. It will also default on its
payments to the foreign bank in state (L, L∗).
Hence in the diversification region, the face value of the firm’s debts now takes
4 The model could easily be extended to account for smaller exchange rate fluctuations. It would
deliver the same qualitative results.
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into account the increased default risk:
DF,D = I +
pLL + λpHL
1− pLL − λpHL [I − γL] (2.22)
D∗F,D = I +
pLL
1− pLL [I − γ
∗L]
and the condition for the firm to be in the diversification zone is:
θ ≥ θF ≡ 12 (RH + RL)
(
I − (pLL + λpHL) γL
1− pLL − λpHL +
I − pLLγ∗L
1− pLL
)
(2.23)
which is more stringent than condition (2.16). In this diversification region, expected
profits from home and foreign activities are given by:
piF,D = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γL)− λθpHLRL (2.24)
pi∗F,D = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γ∗L)− 2λθ (pHRH + pHLRL)
On the other hand, if (2.23) does not hold, then default probabilities and debt
conditions are not changed from equations (2.17) and (2.18) since cross-subsidization
was not an option. The exchange rate risk only lowers expected profits, so that in this
case:
piF,C = 2θR− I − pL (θRL − γL) (2.25)
pi∗F,C = 2θR− I − pL (θRL − γ∗L)− 2λθpHRH
2.5.2 FDI with home country debt only
If there is only home country debt, a currency crisis in the foreign country may
prompt the firm to default on all its obligations. The default risk depends on the
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extent of cross-subsidization when one country is in the low state and the other one
in the high state. We can distinguish between three cases. In the first case, the revenue
from one country in state H suffices to cover the whole debt payment. Then the firm
defaults if (L, L∗) occurs, or if (L, H∗) occurs and a currency crisis strikes. Precisely,
if θRH ≥ DI,D as defined below, then DI,D is the face value of debt:
DI,D =
I − 12γ [(pLL + λpHL) L + (1− λ) pLLL]
1− pLL − λpHL (2.26)
The corresponding expected profits from the home plant and the foreign plant are:
piI,D = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γL)− λpHL (θRL − γL) (2.27)
pi∗I,D = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γL)− 2λθ (pHRH + pHLRL)
In the second case, revenue from one country only is never enough to meet the full
debt payment, but combined sales from a high revenue country and a low revenue
country are. Then, the firm defaults if state (L, L∗) is realized or if there is a currency
crisis. Hence, if θRH < DI,D but θ (RH + RL) ≥ DI,D′ then the expected debt payment
is:
DI,D′ =
I − 12γ [(1− λ) pLL (L + L) + λL]
(1− λ) (1− pLL) (2.28)
and expected profits are:
piI,D′ = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γL)− λ (θ (pHRH + pHLRL)− γL) (2.29)
pi∗I,D′ = 2θR− I − pLL (θRL − γL)− 2λθ (pHRH + pHLRL)
Otherwise, the only case in which the firm repays its debt is when (H, H∗) is
realized and there is no currency crisis. Then, the interest rate is highest and given
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by:
DI,C =
I − 12γ [(1− λ) (1− pHH) (L + L) + λL]
(1− λ) pHH (2.30)
while expected profits are lowest and given by:
piI,C = 2θR− I − θ (pHLRH + pLRL) + (1− λ) (1− pHH) γL− λ (θpHHRH − γL)(2.31)
pi∗I,C = 2θR− I − θ (pHLRH + pLRL) + (1− λ) (1− pHH) γL− λθpHHRH
2.5.3 Choice of capital structure
The choice of capital structure follows the same determinants as in section 2.4,
and an additional hedging concern. The possibility of a currency crisis, albeit small,
disadvantages home debt compared to local debt denominated in foreign currency.
In the event of a sharp depreciation, the home currency value of domestic debt re-
mains unchanged in the face of falling revenues from foreign sales, while the value
of foreign-denominated debt falls accordingly.
In highly financially developed countries (γ∗L > γL), we found that borrowing
from the home bank only was never an optimal choice. Introducing exchange rate
variation, which reduces the relative attractiveness of parent finance, does not affect
this result. The main effect is to raise the productivity threshold above which MNE
activity is preferred to licensing. As the diversification condition (2.23) is stricter than
(2.16), the relative prevalence of affiliates falls with the probability of currency crisis.
In less financially developed countries (γ∗L < γL), the hedging benefits of foreign
debt make licensing and local borrowing more attractive for intermediate θ, even
though interest rates are higher on foreign capital markets. Contrary to the previous
case where λ = 0, FDI with local debt is not always strictly dominated by FDI with
home debt only, so that for some values of γ∗ all organizational forms may arise. The
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Figure 2.3: Choices of firms with exchange rate risk and low revenue correlation
highest productivity firms, for which θRH ≥ DI,D, still choose to borrow the totality
of their funds from their home market. But if γ∗ is not too small, there is a range
of intermediate productivity firms – among those that satisfy DI,D > θRH ≥ DI,D′ –
for which the benefits of a lower exchange rate risk outweigh the costs of the lower
liquidation value received by local banks. These firms raise funds on local capital
markets even in countries with low financial development.
An example of such a case is presented in Figure 2.3. As in Figure 2.1, parameters
are such that there is no FDI with parent debt in the contagion region. Yet, under low
financial development, there are some firms which are at risk of contagion with home
debt only but able to diversify with parent debt. The risk of a currency crisis creates
a wedge between parent finance and local finance at γ∗ = γLL , whereas with λ = 0
both were equivalent at this threshold. As a consequence, a fringe of firms choose
local borrowing in less financially developed countries despite their lack of creditor
rights, in order to hedge their investment against exchange rate risk.
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In sum, multinational firms operating in countries with underdeveloped capital
markets and significant foreign exchange risk face an additional tradeoff: local debt
carries higher borrowing costs, but protects against the risk of a sharp depreciation of
the foreign currency. Its hedging properties raise the attractiveness of local-currency
debt.
2.6 Empirical evidence
In this section, we present some supporting evidence about the main drivers of
capital structure in the model: host country financial development and the correlation
of sales across markets.
2.6.1 Data
We test our predictions on aggregate data about the activity and financing of
US multinational affiliates in 55 countries over the period 1999-2009. The Bureau
of Economic Analysis Survey of Direct Investment Abroad provides us with data
on the assets and liabilities of majority-owned foreign affiliates of US multinational
companies. We construct, for each country-year pair, the shares of US parents and
of persons in the affiliate’s country of location in “current liabilities and long-term
debt” and in total external liabilities. The same source lists total sales of US affiliates
in manufacturing sectors by destination. Given our focus on horizontal FDI, we retain
affiliate sales to the country in which they are located. In order to calculate the relative
shares of exports and affiliate sales serving a foreign market, we use Census data on
manufacturing exports from the US, disaggregated by country.
Financial development of host markets γ∗ is measured by the ratios of total credit
to GDP and private credit to GDP, from International Financial Statistics and Global
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Development Finance. As for distance between each country and the US, we use an
indicator for whether countries share a border, as well as the bilateral distance from
CEPII (Head, Mayer, and Ries, 2010). The latter is a weighted distance measure, where
the weights are calculated from city-level data to assess the geographic distribution
of population inside each country. This dataset also provides us with indicators
of cultural distance. We use common official language and common legal origin
indicators, which both render it easier for domestic creditors to deal with foreign
claims. Hence, distance, common language and common legal framework are our
empirical counterparts to the gap between L and L in the model.
Business cycle comovement is derived from GDP data from the World Develop-
ment Indicators and OECD. For each country, we calculate the correlation of annual
GDP growth in local currency with that of the US, over a moving window covering
the previous 20 years. Finally, we control for corporate taxation which, although left
out of the model, has been shown to affect firms’ decisions of where to borrow. Data
on the highest marginal corporate tax rate in the host country comes from WDI.
2.6.2 Some evidence
We do not test directly Result 2.1, which relates higher firm productivity to a more
frequent choice of serving a market through affiliates. A rigorous test of this predic-
tion would require firm-level data to back out productivity levels, and it has already
been explored in the literature. Though emphasizing different channels – a trade-
off between larger sunk costs and lower transport costs, known as the “proximity-
concentration tradeoff” – Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) also predict that the
most productive firms engage in horizontal FDI. Among US firms present in the
COMPUSTAT database, they show that within a sector, labor productivity is higher
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for MNEs than non-MNE exporters and firms with no foreign activities. We focus on
the other two results, which speak to the core of the model.
Business cycle correlation and affiliate sales
According to our second prediction, multinational firms in less financially devel-
oped countries rely more on affiliates, relative to arm’s length technology transfer, if
the correlation of sales with the home country is larger. More correlated business cy-
cles lower the risk of contagion within the firm, if a bad shock in one country would
jeopardize the financial health of the firm as a whole. Since home borrowing prevails
among multinationals operating in countries with less developed financial markets,
they cannot selectively declare bankruptcy, thereby isolating shocks. Hence, a higher
correlation means that there is a lower risk of having to close down healthy plants
following bad foreign returns. In turn, it makes in-house production more attractive
relative to outside licensing.
This prediction is borne out in the data about US affiliate sales, shown in Table
2.2. The dependent variable is local affiliate sales divided by the sum of local affiliate
sales and exports. As we can see, it is positively and significantly associated with
the correlation of GDP growth between the United States and the host country. The
coefficient is unchanged when we add time fixed effects in columns 3 and 6. These
results support the theory that multinational firms are concerned about how a foreign
investment adds to their overall riskiness.
We find no significant evidence that the relationship between business cycle cor-
relation and the share of affiliate sales varies with financial development, although
the point estimates are negative. As we mentioned above, however, our theoreti-
cal predictions are not clear-cut for countries with highly developed credit markets.
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Table 2.2: Share of affiliate sales and business cycle correlation
Share of affiliate sales in foreign sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP growth correlation 33.092*** 46.291*** 47.704*** 32.220*** 42.755** 43.865**
[9.728] [15.631] [15.940] [10.112] [16.339] [16.739]
Credit (% of GDP) 0.045 0.061 0.062
[0.032] [0.042] [0.043]
Private credit (% of GDP) 0.064 0.095 0.098
[0.049] [0.059] [0.060]
Credit * Correlation -0.138 -0.152
[0.125] [0.129]
Private credit * Corr. -0.138 -0.152
[0.159] [0.164]
Observations 429 429 429 418 418 418
R-squared 0.223 0.236 0.243 0.221 0.229 0.236
Standard errors clustered by country. (3) and (6) include year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
Moreover, compared to the United States, amost all countries in the world have lower
financial development, so that the case with low financial development in the host
country is most relevant. There is no direct influence either of credit conditions on
the choice between affiliate sales and exports.
Parent versus local borrowing
According to Result 2.3, the share of parent financing in affiliates’ liabilities, rela-
tive to local finance, increases with host country financial development. This predic-
tion is supported in the aggregate behavior of US multinational affiliates. Table 2.3
shows that a higher credit to GDP ratio is associated with a larger share of local bor-
rowing. This finding holds regardless of whether we measure financial development
with total credit or private credit. Results on geographical and cultural proximity
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Table 2.3: Source of borrowing and local financial development
Share of parents in affiliate debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit (% of GDP) -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.040***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Private credit (% of GDP) -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.048***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.018]
Log weighted distance -1.678 -1.757 -2.557 -2.533
[3.031] [3.110] [2.925] [2.998]
Border -4.770 -4.516 -6.118 -5.710
[5.193] [5.290] [4.993] [5.081]
Common legal origin 3.177 3.626 4.846* 5.108*
[2.537] [2.771] [2.526] [2.764]
Common language -0.560 -1.014 -0.806 -1.173
[2.424] [2.566] [2.309] [2.520]
Corporate tax 0.286** 0.274** 0.200* 0.200 0.177 0.108
[0.131] [0.122] [0.114] [0.135] [0.118] [0.113]
Observations 395 395 395 396 396 396
R-squared 0.115 0.133 0.203 0.074 0.111 0.186
Standard errors clustered by country. (3) and (6) include year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
are more mixed. The coefficients on distance, contiguity and common language are
insignificant. There is weak evidence that affiliates in countries which, like the US,
have legal systems rooted in British common law rely more on internal debt. This is
consistent with our model in which the discount incurred by home creditors when
they liquidate foreign assets is lower in more similar countries. Also, consistent with
existing empirical evidence, multinational affiliates rely more on parent debt in coun-
tries with higher corporate tax rates. This can be attributed to the tax deductibility of
interest payments.
Table 2.4 repeats the same exercise with the share of parents in total external
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Table 2.4: Source of external finance and local financial development
Share of parents in total affiliate liabilities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit (% of GDP) -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.064***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.013]
Private credit (% of GDP) -0.079*** -0.091*** -0.087***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019]
Log weighted distance 1.928 1.784 0.656 0.663
[3.716] [3.788] [3.736] [3.786]
Border 4.627 4.896 2.706 3.204
[5.347] [5.438] [5.391] [5.463]
Common legal origin 2.495 3.161 5.389 5.824
[5.197] [5.401] [5.217] [5.375]
Common language -2.624 -3.107 -3.000 -3.346
[5.082] [5.261] [4.933] [5.105]
Corporate tax 0.410** 0.391** 0.284 0.284 0.235 0.134
[0.174] [0.177] [0.173] [0.171] [0.166] [0.163]
Observations 401 401 401 402 402 402
R-squared 0.167 0.179 0.263 0.141 0.164 0.257
Standard errors clustered by country. (3) and (6) include year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1
liabilities instead of their share in total external debt. It shows, similarly, that a larger
share of affiliate financing is raised in local capital markets when the host country is
more financially developed.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shed light on the role of financial frictions in the decisions
of multinational firms, in particular the choice of whether to raise external finance
on local markets or rely on parent funding. When firms face imperfect credit mar-
kets, taking into account the risk of financial distress at the level of the multinational
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firm can help us understand the decision of whether to open foreign affiliates, as
opposed to arm’s length technology transfer, and how to finance their investment.
The only motive for integration we have stressed is to take advantage of internal cap-
ital markets. MNEs can borrow at the lowest available rates and share risks from
demand-side shocks across geographical divisions. The downsides are the potential
transmission of bad shocks within the firm, as well as the lack of information of home
banks about foreign projects. This framework predicts that only the most productive
firms are able to reap the diversification benefits of multinational activity, and that
they rely more on host country debt in more developed financial markets. Moreover,
the synchronization of business cycles plays an important role. In countries with un-
derdeveloped credit markets, a high correlation of sales between the home and host
markets encourages multinational activity, as it lowers the risk that bad returns in
one entity will force the firm to liquidate more profitable divisions. This last predic-
tion is specific to the financial frictions channel behind the choice of local debt versus
parent debt, as opposed to a contractual frictions channel which has been previously
uncovered in the literature.
This paper could be extended in several directions. First, we could generalize the
model to a multicountry framework, in which the parent firm would take into account
how each location adds to its overall financing mix and bankruptcy risk. It could also
be extended to an infinite horizon setting to study the role of retained earnings in al-
leviating credit constraints. Second, at the industry level, the ability of parent firms to
use home and host credit markets opportunistically differentiates MNE subsidiaries
from local firms. It would be interesting to study more precisely how finance acts as a
source of competitive advantage for multinational affiliates over local firms. In partic-
ular, we would expect that investment of MNE subsidiaries would be less affected by
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a local credit crunch than that of similar local enterprises, but may be more affected
by a global credit crunch. Third, we could refine the empirical analysis much further
by using firm-level data on affiliate assets and liabilities. Analyzing stock return data
on multinational companies would also allow us to find out whether geographical
diversification carries a premium or a discount depending on which markets the firm
is active in. These topics are left for future research.
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3. EDUCATION AND MILITARY RIVALRY1
3.1 Introduction
What makes countries engage in mass education investments? A common view is
that such investments are the flipside of democratic transitions (see e.g., Bourguignon
and Verdier, 2000). Absent democracy, the elite chooses to deny mass access to educa-
tion in order to secure its power, while the introduction of democracy – extending the
franchise, increasing electoral competition, or putting tighter constraints on the exec-
utive – promotes decisions that favor mass education. This explanation might look
quite convincing, and seemingly accounts for the history of education enrollment in
Europe starting with France. Indeed, Figure 3.1 (drawn from Lindert, 2004), suggests
that public contributions to primary-school education went up sharply in 1880, once
France had completed its transition from the Second Empire to the Third Republic,
which clearly reflected a move towards greater democracy2.
However, another event that precipitated the fall of the Second Empire is France’s
defeat against Germany in the 1870 Battle of Sedan. In the words of Lindert
“The resounding defeat by Prussia tipped the scales in favor of the ed-
ucation reformers. Enrollments and expenditures accelerated across the
1 Joint with Philippe Aghion, Harvard University, and Torsten Persson, IIES (Stockholm University).
We thank Xavier Jaravel for superb research assistance.
2 The complementary view that education favors democracy is analyzed, in particular, by Glaeser,
Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007).
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Figure 3.1: Shares in financial contributions to primary education in France
1870s, with local taxation leading the way. The real victory of univer-
sal tax-based education came with Jules Ferry’s Laic Laws of the 1880s,
especially the 1881 law abolishing all fees and tuitions charges in public
elementary schools. [...] While national politics could not deliver a cen-
tralized victory for universal schooling before the military defeat of 1870
[...] after 1881 centralization performed the mopping up role.” (Lindert,
2004, p. 112)
One reason why a military defeat may spur centralized investment in mass educa-
tion is suggested in the work of Eugene Weber on the modernization of rural France
between 1870 and 1914 (Weber, 1979). A highly disintegrated population, largely il-
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literate, speaking a multiplicity of dialects, and with no sense of nationhood3, was to
be transformed into a unified people sharing the same patriotic values, a spoken and
written language, a set of moral principles, and a motivation and ability to defend
France in future conflicts4.
In this paper, we study historical panel data on education spending and enroll-
ment – for Europe and Latin America since the 19th century and a larger set of
countries in the postwar period – to assess the correlation between military rivalry
or war risk and primary education enrollment (or the occurrence of educational re-
forms). First, we perform standard OLS regressions and find that, conditional on
country and year fixed effects, mass education is positively and significantly associ-
ated with military rivalry, and with involvement in an external war in the previous
10 years. Moreover, while the coefficient on democracy (gauged by the Polity IV in-
dex) comes out negative when we control for military rivalry, the interaction between
the two variables is often positively and significantly associated with mass education.
The coefficient on military rivalry remains stable when we control for the political
regime, suggesting that military threats have a stable and independent influence on
mass education.
To deal with appropriate concerns about endogeneity, we then instrument mil-
itary rivalry in two different ways. Our first instrument uses data on commodity
prices. The idea is that high prices of natural resources or agricultural commodities
are likely to foster rivalries, as states are tempted to compete for the control of more
valuable resources. Our second instrument uses rivalries with third countries of those
3 As a French novelist of that time would put it “In Velay, the word ”patrie” signifies nothing and
stirs nothing. It exists no more in local speech than in local hearts”.
4 As Leon Gambetta would say to the leader of the Breton forces: “I beg you to forget that you are
Bretons, and to remember only that you are French”.
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countries with which a certain country shares a border. The idea here is to capture
when military rivalries are rife in a country’s neighborhood. The corresponding IV
specifications show a positive and significant effect of rivalry on primary enrollment,
a negative direct effect of democracy, and (for the second instrument) a positive and
significant interaction term between the two. Overall, our empirical results indicate a
causal relationship from rivalry to primary educational enrollment.
Our paper relates to, at least, three literatures. As for the relationship between
public education investment and democracy, Lott (1999) suggests that non-democracies
could invest more than democracies in public education as a means of indoctrination.
On the other hand, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007) argue that education and
democracy should be positively correlated, due to the need for civic participation
to raise support for transitions from dictatorship into democracy. But the evidence
for a positive relationship between education spending or enrollment and democ-
racy is mixed, at best. In particular, Mulligan, Sala-i Martin, and Gil (2004) present
cross-country evidence indicating that more democratic political institutions do not
seem to correlate with higher levels of social expenditures and, in particular, higher
public education spending. More recently, Bursztyn (2011) shows that poor voters
in Brazil might prefer the government to allocate resources to redistributive policies,
yielding immediate income increases (such as cash transfers), instead of allocating
resources to public primary education. Also related to our analysis is the work by
Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), who develop a model to explain why the ruling
class may sometimes decide to invest in education even though schooling enhances
political participation. Along similar lines, Galor and Moav (2006) argue that capi-
tal accumulation gradually intensifies the importance of skilled labor in production
and therefore generates support among the ruling class for investing more in human
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capital. Galor, Moav, and Vollrath (2009) argue that a higher concentration of land
ownership typically discourages the development of human capital enhancing insti-
tutions, in particular schooling. However, none of these papers looks at the effect of
military threats in democracies and autocracies.
A second related literature deals with the economic and political impact of wars.
On the latter, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) analyze theoretically a mechanism whereby
international conflict may trigger democratic transitions, motivated by a large amount
of earlier research in political science and political sociology, such as Giddens (1985),
and empirical facts presented by Dolman (2004). Another literature on the economic
impact of wars starts with Anderton and Carter (2001), Blomberg and Hess (2006),
and Glick and Taylor (2005). More recent work by Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig
(2008a,b) and by Acemoglu and Yared (2010) evaluates the extent to which wars re-
duce trade flows. This research does not generally investigate the links between wars
and investment in education, though.
A third related literature deals with fiscal capacity and state capacity more gen-
erally. Hintze (1975) and Tilly (1975), preceding many others, provide historical ac-
counts on the importance of wars for state building. More recently, an economic
literature summarized in Besley and Persson (2011) considers theoretically invest-
ments in fiscal and legal capacity, and finds robust correlations between past wars
and current state capacity in international panel data. Thies (2004), using the same
measure of strategic rivalry as we do, shows that military rivalry raises fiscal capacity
in postcolonial developing states. Scheve and Stasavage (2011) investigate the links
between wars, democracy, and estate taxation in about 20 countries since 1816 and
find that democracy does not have a systematic influence on top rates of estate taxa-
tion, whereas wars with mass mobilizations do significantly raise these rates. Anal-
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ogously, we find support for a correlation between past wars – and military rivalry
more generally – and current educational investments, while (in parallel to Scheve
and Stasavage), the correlation between wars and democracy is more tenuous. In ad-
dition, we find that the effect of military rivalry on educational investment is larger
in democracies, something possibly quite specific to education. Also, in contrast to
this literature, we treat state capacity as exogenous, both in the theory part and in
our empirical analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we describe three historical
examples that speak to the relationship between military rivalry and education re-
forms. We also show that in nearly all countries for which we have long enough time
series, periods with large hikes in primary enrollment are preceded by wars rather
than by transitions to democracy. Section 3.3 presents our data, descriptive statistics,
and empirical specification. In Section 3.4, we describe the econometric results and
discuss their robustness to a variety of factual and statistical concerns. In Section 3.5,
we lay out a simple model that rationalizes our main empirical findings. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Lessons from history
While each national history has unique elements that cannot be forced into a
unified framework, the examples of France, Japan, and Prussia over the 19th century
all suggest a relationship between military defeats or rivalry and educational reforms.
Prussia led the way in terms of primary enrollment rates in Europe from 1815 until
about 1860. In the 1880s, France overtook Prussia as the European enrollment leader.
In addition we look at Japan, a leading Asian country at the end of the 19th century,
which ended up emulating the Prussian and French models in its own transition to
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mass education. For each of these examples, we describe the historical context, the
debate that emerged due to a volatile international environment, and the subsequent
education reforms with a particular focus on primary enrollment.
3.2.1 Prussia under Stein and Humboldt
Background
As late as 1803, Prussian King Frederick William III would declare:
“the children of this hardworking Volksklasse should not become lectur-
ers, not chancellery officials, not mathematicians, not religion professors.
They should learn to read their catechism, Bible, and hymnal, to write
and calculate in accordance to their limited circumstances, to love and
fear God and behave accordingly” (Lindert, 2004).
However, after the humiliating defeat to Napoleon I in Jena in 1806, which took the
Hohenzollern Monarchy by surprise, the King asked Baron Karl von Stein to head a
new ministry devoted to the improvement of Prussian institutions and infrastructures
“to make Prussia as vital and as strong as France”.
The reform process
Stein did not originally pay much attention to education. His primary focus was
on the organization and administration of the Prussian state. But he understood the
importance of promoting patriotism among the population – he first tried to do so
through a city governance reform, in the hope that the participation of the community
in its own affairs would create a civic sense. Stein realized that his major reforms,
namely the end of villeinage, the reform of the army, and the self-administration
101
of the towns, could be unsuccessful due to the insufficient level of education. He
thought that Wilhelm von Humboldt would be capable of bringing about a complete
reform of the Prussian education system and called him to Berlin. Thus, on February
28, 1809, von Humboldt became head of the culture and education section at the
Ministry of the Interior, although Stein had left office by then. Napoleon had called
for his dismissal and the King of Prussia had agreed to that request.
“From the beginning of the crisis, even prior to the startling defeats of Jena
and Auerstadt, two views were competing in government circles about the
future direction of Prussia” (Gray, 1986, p. 47)
A “peace party” was organized around von Haugwitz and Lombard, while the “pa-
triots” followed Stein and von Hardenberg. Von Humboldt endorsed the ideals de-
fended by Stein, who had said that
“the chief idea was to arouse a moral, religious and patriotic spirit in
the nation, to instill into it again courage, confidence, readiness for every
sacrifice in behalf of independence from foreigners and for the national
honor, and to seize the first favorable opportunity to begin the bloody and
hazardous struggle” (Ford, 1965, p. 122).
Humboldt sensed that his reforms could play a key role in the survival of Prussia.
He had developed his ideas in the 1809 treatise U¨ber Die Mit Dem Ko¨nigsberger Schulwe-
sen Vorzunehmende Reformen (On reforms to execute with the teaching in Ko¨nigsberg)
and was able to initiate fundamental reforms of curricula, teaching methods, teacher
education, and auditing in the school system. His reforms delegated the powers to
administer and fund schools to local communities in order to circumvent the surveil-
lance of the French. They also helped found Berlin University. However, his percep-
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tion of insufficient support for his plan to reform educational administration under
the current government led Humboldt to present his resignation to the King in the
spring of 1810.
After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 to a coalition of European powers, the imme-
diate external threat to Prussia was removed and the Prussian government stopped
endorsing the ideal of reform. Yet, “once the reformed Prussian educational frame-
work was in place, it could not be dislodged by the subsequent waves of conser-
vatism” (Lindert, 2004), because von Humboldt had set up a decentralized education
system. In 1876, funds from the Prussian state accounted for only 9% of the bud-
gets of public primary schools, endowments for 3%, fees for 15%, and the remaining
73% came from local taxes. Throughout the 19th century, the provision of local ed-
ucation in German communities kept increasing, and Prussia eventually became the
leader in primary enrollment. In this respect, von Humboldt’s reforms had lasting
consequences. It is also interesting to note that Stein encouraged democratization of
towns to gain the support of the population. This may suggest that the probability of
successful educational reform is higher in democracies.
The outcomes
The educational reforms in Prussia had a substantial long-run impact. Of the
cohorts born in Prussia before 1801, 16.8% of males were completely illiterate, as
against 2.9% for males born between 1837 and 1841 (Block, 1995). The literacy rate
inched up towards 85% in 1850 and Prussia became the European leader with regard
to primary enrollment until the 1880s. The primary school enrollment per 10,000
inhabitants5 rose from 1,131 in 1815 to 1,592 in 1850.
5 School02 variable from the CNTS data archive (Banks, 2011).
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3.2.2 Jules Ferry’s France
Background
In 1870, French public expenditures on education were lagging behind that of
Prussia and other European countries. The French education system was mainly
private, largely revolving around churches. Teaching was done by priests or more ca-
sually by anyone around who knew how to read. Classrooms were often improvised
in the backyard of a farm, with poor equipment and amenities. And a high fraction
of registered children never attended school. The result was that a large share of
the population was either illiterate or unable to understand the content of a text. In
1863, 7.5 million citizens (about a fifth of the French population) could not even speak
French properly but only local dialects.
Even prior to the war with Prussia in 1870, French elites were aware of the fact
that the French education system had failed to promote national unity. Victor Duruy,
appointed Minister of Education in 1863 by Napoleon III, was already advocating
sweeping educational reforms, the improvement of educational facilities, and the de-
velopment of technical education. His plans were in many ways similar to those
that Jules Ferry would pursue some 20 years later6. Duruy tried to gather politi-
cal support and convince the Emperor that it was in his own interest to implement
such a reform. But he did not succeed, partly due to a lack of support from a rural
population influenced by the Church7.
6 “Duruy’s major objective was to make primary education compulsory and tuition free so that each
citizen could fulfill his duties under universal suffrage and contribute to the burgeoning economy”
(Moody, 1978, p. 72).
7 “In a letter to the Emperor on 6 February 1866, [Duruy] maintained that his plan would embarrass
the Orleanists, the clericals and the republicans, and win millions of families to the Empire, particularly
the parents of the million and a half pupils who were now accepted free, but under the stigma of
charity” (Moody, p. 72). In fact, Duruy never managed to reduce the hostility of the rural masses, who
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The turning point was the French defeat against Prussia in 1870. On September
2, 1870, Napoleon III was made prisoner at Sedan, and on February 26, 1871, Ger-
many took control of the French regions of Alsace and Lorraine. This resounding
defeat prompted the fall of the Second Empire and helped trigger the subsequent
educational reforms by leaders of the Third Republic.
The reform process
After the Sedan defeat, the debate would continue between conservative forces
opposing and progressive forces supporting educational reforms, even though the
balance of power had shifted towards the latter. While the conservatives led by the
Church would see Sedan as a punishment for France’s infidelity to its old (monar-
chical) traditions, the progressives saw Sedan as a reflection of the superiority of
Prussian schools and university system8. Overall, even though groups and political
parties would still disagree on the causes of military defeat, a majority of them agreed
that education in Prussia had played a key role in the rise of this new power, and that
education in France had to be reformed, not only to increase literacy, but also to ac-
looked on farm labor as a natural apprenticeship, and consequently Napoleon decided to let the project
of his minister be defeated by the legislature.
8 “Unexpected defeat, occupation, and sanguinary civil war fixed 1870-71 in the French consciousness
as ‘the terrible year.’ Several national myths were deposed, end of the vision of national glory built
during the Second Empire. [. . . ] Frenchmen who had lived through the experience were aware that
defeat had exacerbated the social and political divisions of the nation – the Commune provided brutal
evidence. But intellectual disagreements were also sharpened as Frenchmen sought for a cause of the
disasters that had befallen them. [. . . ] There was a debate about the source of the defeat: the prime
culprit was the Empire and all its works. The right viewed Sedan as deserved punishment for infidelity
to the traditions of France. Toward the Church there was an initial ambivalence. Most people thought
that ‘France had neglected intellectual formation, particularly in the sciences [. . . ].’ There was nearly
universal belief among the French elite that Prussia had triumphed because of the superiority of its
celebrated universities: a popular aphorism was that the University of Berlin was the revenge for the
defeat at Iena. French praise for German education extended to all levels of the system. Journalists
repeated the dicta that the Prussian elementary school teacher was the architect of Sedan and that the
modern secondary education of the Realschulen had provided the scientific base for Prussian military
efficiency.” (Moody, p. 87).
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quaint new generations with basic knowledge in arithmetics, history and geography,
and to
“teach Frenchmen to be confident of their nation’s superiority in law, civ-
ilization and republican institutions. It should be consistent with reigning
social values, and thereby eliminate disruptive conflicts and promote the
unity of the classes. Since France no longer enjoyed religious unity, it must
forge a new moral unity from a unified education that would teach civic
morality based on the principles of natural reason” (Moody, 1978, p. 88).
Jules Ferry was appointed as the new Minister of Education in February 1879.
In 1881, he abolished all tuitions fees in public elementary schools; in 1882, he made
school enrollment compulsory from age six to thirteen; in 1883, it became compulsory
for every village with more than twenty children at school age to host a public ele-
mentary school; in 1885, subsidies were devoted to the building and maintenance of
schools and to paying teachers; and in 1886, an elementary teaching program was es-
tablished, together with monitoring provisions. These are the so-called “Laic Laws”,
which still characterize the French educational system today. At the same time, a
whole infrastructure program – the Freycinet plan – was initiated to facilitate chil-
dren’s access to schools. Millions of francs were spent on building roads to match
the large amounts spent on schools: 17,320 new schools had to be built, 5,428 schools
were enlarged, 8,381 schools were repaired (Weber, 1979). As a result, enrollment as
well as attendance in primary education steadily increased.
The reforms not only generalized the access to schooling, but also transformed the
content of elementary education: new programs emphasized geography, history, and
dictation. The new teaching programs in history and geography aimed at conveying
patriotic values to new generations. As for dictations, they were useful to teach
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people the French language but, beyond that
“the exercise was a sort of catechism designed to teach the child that it
was his duty to defend the fatherland, to shed his blood or die for the
commonwealth, to obey the government, to perform military service, to
work, learn, pay taxes and so on” (Lindert, 2004, p. 333).
From their very first day at school, children were taught that their first duty was
to defend the fatherland. Even gymnastics were meant “to develop in the child the
idea of discipline, and prepare him [. . . ] to be a good soldier and a good Frenchman.”
Outcomes
Official statistics attest that school attendance rose appreciably in the decade after
1882. Primary enrollment rates went up from 1,176 per 10,000 inhabitants in 1870 to
1,430 in 1912. Literacy rates rose from 80% in 1870 to 96% in 1912 (and the initial 80%
figure is partly misleading, as most supposedly literate children did not understand
the content of what they read prior to the reforms). Finally, the reforms appear to
have increased the sense of patriotism and national unity. Thanks to the Ferry laws,
“in Ain, Ardennes, Vendee, all children became familiar with references
or identities that could thereafter be used by the authorities, the press, and
the politicians to appeal to them as a single body” (Lindert, 2004, p. 337),
and in that respect Ferry’s efforts paid off during the subsequent mobilization in 1914.
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3.2.3 Japan in the Meiji Era
Background
From the 17th century, Japan was ruled by military lords (the so-called shoguns)
of the Tokugawa dynasty. Under the Tokugawa, education was a privilege of the
Samurais and centered on tradition and the study of Confucian classics. However,
starting in the mid 1850s, Japan came under threats by Western powers. In 1853,
Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Japan from the United States with an ulti-
matum to the authorities: agree to trade or suffer the consequences of war. To add
credibility to this threat, American warships were sent to Japan in 1854. Subsequently,
the Trade Convention of Kanagawa was signed on 31 March, 1854. The threats posed
to Japan by Western powers in the second half of the 19th century acted as a catalyst
for educational reforms. As put by Duke:
“In 1872, government leaders were haunted by a crisis of international
proportions. Powerful western nations were expanding trading posts
throughout the world. European colonial empires had spread into the
Far East, threatening the very existence of Japan as a sovereign state. Dur-
ing the years of self-imposed isolation by the Tokugawa regime from the
early 1600s, the country had fallen dangerously behind the West as the
industrial revolution got under way. The rise of western capitalism and
international colonialism posed a pervasive threat to Japan, as perceived
by the new leaders. They were determined to use any means necessary to
transform their country into a modern state in order to preserve the polit-
ical order and the national sovereignty. Education on the Western model
was envisioned as an instrument to achieve that goal.” (Duke, 2009, p. 1).
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The Tokugawa implemented various reforms at the beginning of the 1860s, but
did not go far enough to satisfy the Samurais. As a result, Japan fell into civil war. In
early January 1868, the insurgents prompted the Emperor Meiji, who had just taken
the throne, to announce an “imperial restoration,” which in fact was nothing less than
a coup d’Etat.
The reform process
The education debate featured the opposition between those who wanted to pre-
serve the focus on Confucian classics and maintain interpersonal hierarchical relation-
ships, and those who wanted to introduce secular Western science with more math-
ematical thinking to catch up with Western technology. This debate fed a broader
political crisis, culminating with the civil war. Following the imperial restoration,
Western-oriented progressives eventually prevailed over Eastern-oriented tradition-
alists. The newly founded Ministry of Education sent delegates to the West to learn
about their education system, for instance with the Iwakura mission of 1872-1873.
To rise up to the challenges posed by the West, in 1872, a new education system
was instituted which declared four years of compulsory elementary education for all
children. As explained by Burnett and Wada (2007),
“in just a one-year period following the Gakusei of 1872, 12,500 primary
schools were established. Within the next five years the number of schools
doubled to a figure not surpassed until the 1960s.”
The move to mass education was completed by a national training system for teach-
ers. The first teacher’s college was created in Tokyo in July 1872, based on American
principles of elementary-school instruction.
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Outcomes
Initially, reactions to the educational reform were mixed.
“Not everyone was so happy at the obligation to attend school and the
opportunity to graduate. The elementary schools were to be financed by
a 10 percent local surcharge to the national property tax. In the 1870s,
angry taxpayers reacted to compulsory schooling as they had to the draft:
they rioted. Crowds of people destroyed at least two thousand schools,
usually by setting them afire. This represented close to one-tenth of the
total number of schools. The passive resistance of simply not going to
school was even more widespread. Rates of attendance for school-age
boys and girls stood at 25 to 50 percent of the eligible population for the
first decade of the new system” (Gordon, 2000, p. 68).
One might argue that popular resistance to the educational reforms reflected a lack of
democracy in the Japanese system – the peasants did not identify with the emperor,
nor with the new ruling class, and therefore disapproved of the nationalistic educa-
tion that was now compulsory. Similarly, people at first tried to resist the military
reform.
Yet, over time, the Japanese educational reforms appeared more and more as a
resounding success. Japan overtook most European powers with regard to primary
enrollment per school-age child, which rose from 28.1% in 1873 to 98.1% in 1910.
From 1865 to 1910, the literacy rate increased from 35% to 75% for men and from 8%
to 68% for women. The primary school enrollment per 10,000 inhabitants rose with
blistering speed, from 65 in 1876 to 1,122 in 1905.
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The success of education reforms certainly played a role in the unexpected mili-
tary victories by Japan in the 1895 war against China and the 1905 war against Russia.
Overall, Japan’s educational reforms during the Meiji era further illustrate the idea
that education reform occur as a result of strategic military concerns. The Japanese
example is probably even clearer than the French one, in that the military consid-
erations clearly took precedence over humanist ones. The popular resistance to the
reforms may reflect the fact that a lack of democracy reduces the effectiveness of
educational reforms.
3.2.4 Taking stock
Figure 3.2 summarizes our historical overview of educational reforms in Prussia,
France and Japan. In all three cases, military defeats and/or perceived military threats
appear to have prompted an otherwise reluctant ruling class to invest in mass primary
education.
Let us also take a less detailed bird’s-eye view on historical evidence from the
large sample (of 137 countries) that we use for econometric estimation in the next
section. We restrict attention to 53 countries within that sample for which more than
forty years of primary enrollment data are available. For each of these countries,
we first identify the twenty-year period during which primary enrollment rose most
sharply – we call this the “educational reform period”9). We then look at the preced-
ing twenty years to see whether a war or a democratic transition took place during
that period.
9 The educational reform period in Table 3.1 is defined as the period during which the change in
primary enrollment rate was the greatest in percentage terms, not in absolute value.
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We use the polity2 index from the Polity IV database10 and define a democratic
transition as occurring when the polity2 variable moves from the “anocracy” to the
“democracy” range, i.e. when crossing the score of 6 (at a scale from -10 to 10) from
below. We identify external wars from the Correlates of War dataset11 and military
rivalry data are drawn from Thompson (2001). These two datasets are described in
more details in the next section.
Table 3.1 summarizes our findings. The first column indicates the educational re-
form period, the second whether or not a war occurred during the preceding twenty
years, while the third indicates whether a democratic transition occurred in the pre-
ceding twenty years.
The table shows clearly that in most countries of the sample a war precedes the
educational reform, while a democratic transition rarely occurs in the pre-reform
period. Among the 53 countries in this table, it is only in two countries where a
democratic transition occurs before the rise in education. Most often, the democratic
transition instead takes place after the educational reform period12.
However, in several countries in this sample the sharpest increase in primary
enrollment took place after the first or the second World War, and the degree of in-
volvement in either of those wars varied a great deal across countries. More generally,
the table by no means shows any causal evidence. Also, our identification of the “ed-
ucational reform” is very crude and may miss important changes in the education
system. For example, in the case of France as well as Germany, the greatest increase
10 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
11 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/
12 See Appendix C.2 for details about the dates of wars and democratization, as well as the availability
of data on primary enrollment per country.
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Table 3.1: Education surge, democratization and wars: 53 countries
Country Greatest increase in Democratization in War in preceding
primary enrollment preceding 20 years? 20 years?
Afghanistan 1946-1966 No Yes
Albania 1934-1954 No Yes
Argentina 1889-1919 No Yes
Belgium 1889-1919 No No
Bolivia 1882-1902 No Yes
Brazil 1946-1966 No Yes
Bulgaria 1889-1909 No Yes
Canada 1946-1966 No Yes
Chile 1893-1913 No Yes
China 1938-1958 No Yes
Columbia 1893-1913 No No
Costa Rica 1946-1966 No Yes
Cuba 1954-1974 No Yes
Czechoslovakia 1943-1963 No No data
Denmark 1882-1902 No Yes
Dominican Republic 1900-1920 No No data
Ecuador 1946-1966 No Yes
Finland 1919-1939 Yes Yes
France 1827-1847 No Yes
Germany 1867-1887 No Yes
Greece 1913-1933 No Yes
Guatemala 1947-1967 No Yes
Haiti 1907-1927 No Yes
Honduras 1946-1966 No Yes
Hungary 1926-1946 No Yes
Iran 1889-1909 No No
Ireland 1946-1966 No Yes
Italy 1889-1919 No Yes
Japan 1867-1887 No Yes
Liberia 1946-1966 No Yes
Luxembourg 1926-1946 No data Yes
Mexico 1919-1939 No Yes
Mongolia 1930-1950 No Yes
Netherlands 1899-1919 No Yes
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Table 3.1: Education surge, democratization and wars: 53 countries (continued)
Country Greatest increase in Democratization in War in preceding
primary enrollment preceding 20 years? 20 years?
New Zealand 1946-1966 No Yes
Nicaragua 1939-1959 No No data
Norway 1960-1980 No Yes
Panama 1906-1926 No Yes
Paraguay 1882-1902 No Yes
Peru 1930-1950 No Yes
Poland 1946-1966 No Yes
Portugal 1854-1874 No No data
Romania 1893-1913 No No
Spain 1919-1939 Yes Yes
Sweden 1939-1959 No No
Switzerland 1939-1959 No No
Thailand 1919-1939 No Yes
Turkey 1886-1906 No Yes
United Kingdom 1860-1880 No Yes
United States 1860-1880 No Yes
Uruguay 1946-1966 No Yes
Venezuela 1919-1939 No Yes
Yugoslavia 1930-1950 No Yes
in primary enrollment does not coincide with the reform periods pinpointed in the
historical case studies above13. Yet, this crude measure of educational reform hints at
the possibility that wars, and more generally military threats, play a more important
a role than democratic transitions in promoting broad access to education.
Subsections 3.2.1-3.2.3 presented case-study evidence about wars or military threats
leading to educational reforms for Prussia, France and Japan. Subsection 3.2.4 pre-
sented cruder but broader historical evidence suggesting that wars or military rivalry
13 In France, measured literacy rates were already high prior by 1870. Yet the Jules Ferry reforms of the
1880s raised the average educational level of the French population to a considerable extent compared
to what it was before 1880.
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are likely drivers of educational reform, while democracy may not be. In the next
section, we turn to a more systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between
primary enrollment, military wars or rivalry, and democracy.
3.3 Data and specifications
3.3.1 Sources and variable definitions
Education
To investigate the determinants of mass education reforms empirically, we use an
unbalanced panel with annual data for 137 countries between 1830 and 2001. Our
main dependent variable, enrollment, measures primary enrollment per capita. It is
defined according to the UNESCO criteria and expressed per 10,000 inhabitants. The
underlying data are drawn from the CNTS Data Archive of Banks (2011). In a first set
of regressions, we use primary enrollment as a continuous dependent variable. Since
it is constructed as enrollment per capita, rather than enrollment per school-age child,
this measure is affected by shifts in the demographic structure of the population.
We therefore control for population growth in the previous 10 years to mitigate this
concern.
We also analyze the probability of education reforms, where reform is defined in
two alternative ways. For the complete sample of countries, a binary imputed reform
variable is set equal to one in a given year if primary enrollment grew by more than
10% over the previous 5-year period. When we perform the analysis of imputed re-
forms, we collapse the data into five-year averages so as to minimize measurement
error. For a reduced sample of 14 European countries (over the period 1830 to 1975), a
binary known reform variable is set equal to one in years when new education reforms
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were adopted. The latter entail any new law which extends compulsory education,
lowers the cost of education (e.g., abolish school fees, provide for free primary edu-
cation), or increases the number of schools (e.g., by making it compulsory for each
municipality to set up at least one primary school). The source for this variable is
Flora and Alber (1983).
War threats
We measure war risk and vulnerability to military threats in two alternative ways.
Recent experience of external war is likely to raise the perceived likelihood of a new
conflict and the salience of military concerns in policy decisions. Hence, our first
variable war risk is a binary indicator set equal to one if the country was engaged in
an interstate war in the previous 10 years, according to the variable ”inter-state war”
in the Correlates of War (COW) database. This database also provides information
on the outcome (victory or defeat) of past wars and a measure of the number of
casualties as a percentage of the pre-war population.
This measure of war risk is, of course, completely backward-looking and may
therefore miss emerging threats without a history of war. Our second measure, mil-
itary rivalry, is less subject to this concern. Here, we define a dummy variable for
whether a country has a strategic rival in a given year according to Thompson (2001).
Thompson’s measure captures the risk of armed conflict with a country of signifi-
cant relative size and military strength. It is based on contemporary perceptions by
political decision-makers, gathered through the investigation of historical sources on
foreign policy and diplomacy. Specifically, military rivalries are identified by three
criteria: whether two countries regard each other as “(a) competitors14; (b) a source
14 “Most states are not viewed as competitors—that is, capable of “playing” in the same league. Rel-
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of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized; (c) ene-
mies” (see Appendix C.1 for details). We also create a measure of the relative strength
of rivals, assessing the probability of winning or losing a potential military conflict,
by gauging the ratio of their respective army sizes. To this end, we draw military
personnel numbers from the COW National Material Capabilities database.
Political regimes
The political regime is constructed from the institutionalized autocracy and democ-
racy scores in the Polity IV database (polity2 variable), which are themselves combina-
tions of constraints on the executive, the openness and competitiveness of executive
recruitment, and the competitiveness of political participation. The combined score
democracy ranges from -10 to +10, where a higher score means that the country is
more democratic in the year considered.
Covariates
Finally, our regressions include several control variables. Military expenditure
and total population are drawn from the COW National Material Capabilities. Fiscal
capacity is proxied by a dummy variable equal to one whenever the country has
atively weak states are usually capable of interacting competitively only with states in their immediate
neighborhood, thereby winnowing the playing field dramatically. Stronger actors may move into the
neighborhood in threatening ways but without necessarily being perceived, or without perceiving them-
selves, as genuine competitors. If an opponent is too strong to be opposed unilaterally, assistance may
be sought from a rival of the opponent. Other opponents may be regarded more as nuisances or, more
neutrally, as policy problems than as full-fledged competitors or rivals. [...] Threatening enemies who
are also adjudged to be competitors in some sense, as opposed to irritants or simply problems, are
branded as rivals. This categorization is very much a social-psychological process. Actors interpret the
intentions of others based on earlier behavior and forecasts about the future behavior of these other
actors. The interpretation of these intentions leads to expectations about the likelihood of conflicts es-
calating to physical attacks. Strategic rivals anticipate some positive probability of an attack from their
competitors over issues in contention.” (Thompson, 2001)
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a (permanent) income-tax system in a particular year. Information on the date of
introduction of an income tax is available for 76 countries and comes from Besley
and Persson (2011). We use data for GDP per capita, converted to US dollars, from
Penn World Tables 7.0 and CNTS, as well as measures of government expenditures
per capita from the WDI and CNTS databases.
3.3.2 Specifications
Our baseline regression equation is expressed as:
enrollmenti,t = α0 + α1war riski,t + α2democracyi,t + (3.1)
α3war riski,t · democracyi,t + α4Xi,t + νi + δt + ui,t ,
where enrollmenti,t refers to the primary enrollment rate in country i and year t. Our
main coefficient of interest is α1, which captures the effect of the war risk faced by
country i in year t. As explained above, this military threat is measured either by
having had a war some time in the past 10 years (i.e., between years t− 10 and t− 1)
or by having at least one strategic rival in year t as defined above. We also include
democracyi,t, the democracy index in country i at time t, and an interaction term
between war risk and democracy, as well as a set of control variables Xi,t. Finally, and
importantly, the specification entails country fixed effects νi, and year fixed effects
δt. Hence, the effects we estimate are identified from the variation over time within
countries of the right-hand side variables relative to their world average levels..
We also estimate the probability of a discrete education reform according to the
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following Probit specification:
Pr (re f ormi,t) = β0 + β1war riski,t + β2democracyi,t + (3.2)
β3war riski,t · democracyi,t + β4Xi,t + ηi + µt + vi,t ,
where the re f orm variable is either imputed reforms (for the entire sample of countries)
or known reforms (for the historical European sample).
Our main prediction is that the coefficients which capture the effect of war risk on
education policy should be positive. We exclude countries at war from the sample, as
an ongoing war (as opposed to a latent rivalry) may severely increase the opportunity
cost of public funds. Maybe more importantly, data in times of war tend to be unre-
liable. The expected coefficient on democracy is not clear a priori. On the one hand,
the median voter in a democracy may be poorer than in an autocracy and thus more
favorable to mass education. On the other hand, a rent-seeking policymaker in an
autocracy may be more likely to appropriate the future benefits of higher income due
to education investments, and therefore more inclined to incur the cost of educational
reforms than a democratic government.
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the annual data underlying the specifications with con-
tinuous primary enrollment (as in (3.1)) as the left-hand side variables are shown in
Table 3.2. These data are averaged over 5-year periods for the specifications with im-
puted reforms (as in (3.2)) as the left-hand side variable. As the table shows, 16% of
the country-years in our sample have a war in the previous 10 years, around 50% are
associated with one or more strategic rivalries, and 4% involve war with another state.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics (yearly)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Enrollment per 10,000 6939 1052.99 528.29 1 3023
Rivalry 6939 0.496 0.500 0 1
Rel. army largest rival 6359 1.106 2.777 0 56
Rel. army total rivals 6359 1.653 4.303 0 59
War in previous 10 years 6939 0.159 0.366 0 1
Lost war casualties 6939 0.033 0.281 0 7.932
Won war casualties 6939 0.028 0.214 0 3.922
Polity2 6939 -0.369 7.116 -10 10
Democracy indicator 6939 0.424 0.494 0 1
Population growth (10 yrs) 5401 19.31 14.89 -53.65 178.52
Military expenditure p.c. 6194 48.11 218.98 0 7398.57
Govt expenditure p.c. 6362 161.97 538.71 031 8402.08
Income tax 4207 0.681 0.466 0 1
GDP p.c. 4150 1563.04 3543.89 18 38344.9
Of the country-years in the sample, about 42% have positive values of the democracy
score, with a mean score of −0.37. We see a large variance in the severity of war
threats either in terms of the number of casualties in past wars, or in terms of the
relative size of the military in the largest rival (or the sum of rivals) vs. the country
itself.
3.4 Empirical results
3.4.1 Primary enrollment rates
Baseline results
Table 3.3 shows the results from our baseline estimation of (3.1) on the yearly
panel, with primary enrollment rates as the dependent variable and war risk mea-
sured by the presence of an ongoing military rivalry. All specifications include 10-
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year population growth, to account for varying shares of school-age children in total
population, as well as military expenditure per capita, to control for the possibility
that military spending may crowd out education spending. Indeed, we find that high
population growth rates are consistently associated with higher primary enrollment
per capita, while military spending – holding constant the level of external threats –
has a negative coefficient. A natural interpretation of the latter is that fiscal capacity
is limited, so that more effort towards building an army restricts the ability of the
government to invest in mass education.
Column 1 shows that the correlation between rivalry and primary enrollment is
positive and significant. In column 2, we add the democracy score. Interestingly,
when faced with the same level of military threats, autocracies invest more in ed-
ucation than democracies. This finding runs counter to the median voter view of
mass education reforms, which would predict better education outcomes in more
democratic countries. Also, the coefficient on military rivalry remains stable as we
control for the political regime, which appears inconsistent with the view that de-
mocratization per se would be the main underlying force behind increases in primary
enrollment across countries. In column 3, we add an interaction term to check if the
impact of rivalries on educational investments differs by political regime. We find
that primary enrollment responds more positively to military threats in democracies
than in autocracies. We discuss the democracy results in Subsection 3.4.3 below.
Covariates
In columns 4 and 5, we include the relative strength of rivals, defined as the
military size of the largest rival (column 4) or of the sum of rivals (column 5), in
both cases divided by the size of the country’s own military. The point estimates
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Table 3.3: Primary enrollment and military rivalry (OLS)
Rate of primary enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 55.843*** 54.922*** 94.242*** 78.431*** 77.437*** 63.460***
[17.537] [17.820] [17.891] [19.905] [19.798] [20.274]
Polity2 -6.877*** -17.644*** -18.952*** -18.979*** -17.986***
[1.152] [1.474] [1.484] [1.482] [1.499]
Rivalry*Polity2 22.261*** 23.331*** 23.390*** 22.420***
[1.943] [2.064] [2.065] [2.076]
Rel. army largest rival 2.521
[2.672]
Rel. army total rivals 2.157 4.108***
[1.518] [1.544]
Govt expenditure p.c. -0.250***
[0.014]
Population growth 9.033*** 9.423*** 8.811*** 9.807*** 9.808*** 8.962***
[0.473] [0.489] [0.485] [0.545] [0.545] [0.544]
Military expenditure -0.885*** -0.898*** -0.885*** -1.150*** -1.148*** -0.337***
[0.049] [0.050] [0.049] [0.061] [0.061] [0.080]
Observations 4849 4636 4636 4285 4285 3995
R-squared 0.675 0.670 0.679 0.697 0.698 0.722
All specifications include country and time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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suggest that countries with stronger rivals (i.e., with a higher risk of losing a potential
war) have higher enrollment rates, magnifying the effect of war threats for countries
more likely to lose war if a war were to occur. However, this magnification effect
is not statistically significant. Finally, in column 6, we control for total government
expenditures per capita. Our main results are unchanged, namely the presence of a
strategic rival is associated with higher enrollment in primary education, democracies
have less primary education, while the interaction between the democracy indicator
and military rivalry is positive. In addition, the relative strength of rivals is now
significantly associated with higher enrollment rates.
Past wars instead of rivalries
Table 3.4 presents the same set of regressions, except that we replace military ri-
valry by the occurrence of a war in the past 10 years, distinguishing also between won
and lost wars. Our main finding is that primary enrollment responds positively and
significantly to a recent experience of war. Systematically, this effect appears stronger
if the war was won than if it was lost. This finding goes against the view that past
wars might favor future education investments because defeats weaken incumbent
elites that might oppose mass education. A higher number of casualties, gauging the
intensity of the recent war, tends to magnify the impact of recent wars on education,
but the coefficient is only significant for wars won. Consistent with our previous set
of results, we find that everything else equal, autocracies invest more in education
than democracies. However, the interaction between democracy and past wars now
appears to be negative (in the case of lost wars).
124
Table 3.4: Primary enrollment and recent wars (OLS)
Rate of primary enrollment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
War in 92.726*** 101.734*** 105.710***
previous 10 years [15.173] [15.627] [15.915]
Won war in 123.198*** 105.674*** 89.445***
previous 10 years [20.713] [21.603] [20.997]
Lost war in 71.446*** 60.262*** 26.721
previous 10 years [20.142] [21.232] [21.548]
Polity2 -7.262*** -6.915*** -6.897*** -7.254*** -6.119***
[1.148] [1.177] [1.178] [1.149] [1.147]
War in 10 years -2.716
*Polity2 [2.065]
Won war*Polity2 2.051
[2.343]
Lost war*Polity2 -7.495***
[2.181]
Won war casualties 65.060** 73.110***
[27.147] [27.568]
Lost war casualties 2.141 -6.476
[26.933] [28.124]
Govt exp. p.c. -0.275***
[0.013]
Population growth. 9.191*** 9.575*** 9.545*** 9.475*** 9.597*** 8.828***
[0.472] [0.487] [0.487] [0.490] [0.487] [0.487]
Military expenditure -0.900*** -0.916*** -0.921*** -0.911*** -0.909*** -0.107
[0.049] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.067]
Observations 4849 4636 4636 4636 4636 4307
R-squared 0.677 0.672 0.672 0.673 0.673 0.702
All specifications include country and time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.4.2 Education reforms
Next, we consider the effect of war risk on the probability of an educational re-
form, based on the probit regression in (3.2). Table 3.5 looks at the effects of military
risk or rivalry on imputed reforms (i.e., a 10% or higher increase in primary enroll-
ment over a five-year period). Consistent with our predictions, we find that a strategic
rivalry raises the probability of a large increase in primary enrollment. However, we
find no significant impact of the military strength of rivals. The democracy index still
enters negatively, and its interaction with rivalry is positive although not significant,
consistent with the previous tables. Finally, neither population growth, nor total gov-
ernment expenditure, nor military expenditure, show significant coefficients when
democracy is included in the regression.
In Table 3.6, we study the effect of military threats on known reforms which
broaden access to primary or secondary education. We restrict our attention to the
subsample of 14 European countries for which these data are available since 1830.
The results are weaker than in the previous regressions, which is not surprising with
such a small number of countries. In particular, we find no effect of democracy and
its interaction with rivalry. But our main findings still hold: a significant positive
effect of rivalry, or rival’s military strength, on the probability of observing a reform
in primary or secondary education, once we control for democracy.
3.4.3 The political regime
Our estimates are striking in that they imply that democratic countries invest less
in primary education and pursue less education reforms than autocratic countries,
absent rivalries or war threats. However, the gap between democracies and autocra-
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Table 3.5: Imputed education reforms and military rivalry (Probit)
Probit for “imputed reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.271** 0.177 0.190* 0.347** 0.379*** 0.374**
[0.119] [0.113] [0.113] [0.145] [0.145] [0.148]
Polity2 -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.065***
[0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.019
[0.014] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017]
Rel. army largest rival 0.007
[0.029]
Rel. army total rivals -0.005 -0.000
[0.019] [0.019]
Govt expenditure p.c. 0.000
[0.000]
Population growth. 0.009*** 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Military expenditure -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1390 1299 1299 1163 1163 1099
All specifications include time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: Known education reforms and military rivalry (Probit)
Probit for “known reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.233*** 0.235** 0.283* -0.036 -0.111 -0.021
[0.085] [0.092] [0.144] [0.234] [0.237] [0.213]
Polity2 0.005 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000
[0.013] [0.013] [0.023] [0.023] [0.022]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.033 0.040 0.028
[0.034] [0.034] [0.026]
Rel. army largest rival 0.107***
[0.024]
Rel. army total rivals 0.074*** 0.095***
[0.016] [0.018]
Govt expenditure p.c. 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001]
Population growth -0.001 -0.000 -0.009 0.006 0.009 0.009
[0.009] [0.009] [0.016] [0.008] [0.008] [0.013]
Military expenditure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 881 880 826 852 852 798
Standard errors clustered by country.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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cies narrows when war risk is high.
The nature of the political system may affect education policy along several chan-
nels. As mentioned already in the introduction, extending the franchise might fos-
ter policies in the interest of the poor, which may include publicly funded primary
schooling. But we find little evidence supporting this hypothesis15. A prospective
mechanism leading in the opposite direction is that democratically elected leaders
have higher turnover – and therefore supposedly shorter time horizons – than auto-
crats, which may make the former less willing to invest in mass-education policies
with mainly long-term benefits. A third channel could conceivably run through the
effect of rivalries and wars on regime change: wars might affect education spending
mainly because they promote regime change, which in turn affects education policy.
However, our findings do not support this idea, since the direct estimates of military
rivalry on education remains unchanged when we hold constant the political regime.
Instead, our results suggest that war threats or past wars tilt the preferences of the
elite towards mass education, even in autocratic regimes where more schooling might
imply a higher risk of the leader being ousted.
While the positive interaction effect is an intriguing finding which remains to be
understood, our results thus suggest that military competition between states has
played a more important role for the emergence of mass education than has democ-
ratization. (Section 3.5 below gives an attempt of a theoretical rationalization.)
15 As mentioned earlier, Bursztyn (2011) questions the impact of democratization on education spend-
ing based on the Brazilian example.
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Disaggregating democracy
But maybe the concept of democracy is too broadbrush to help us understand the
mechanisms at work. To make further progress, we try to disentangle the effects of
two main components of the democracy score: constraints on the executive and the
openness of executive recruitment. In Table 3.7, we thus run our main specifications,
letting each of these two aspects of democracy enter separately on the right hand
side. Specifically, we use constraints on the executive (xconst) in the Polity IV database,
which takes values between 1 and 7, and openness of executive recruitment (xropen) in
the same database, which takes values between 1 and 4.
Panel A looks at the effect on primary enrollment with military rivalry as the
measure of war risk. The estimates in Columns 1 and 3 show that executive openness
is negatively correlated with the enrollment rate, while executive constraints are not.
However, when we introduce interaction terms between rivalry and one particular
aspect of democracy in Columns 2 and 4, both direct effects are negative and signif-
icant. The interactions with rivalry are both positive and statistically significant. In
Columns 5 and 6, we perform a horse race between the two measures of democracy,
with or without our interaction terms. The estimates show that the direct influence
of each component of democracy remains, albeit with a larger interaction term for
executive openness.
Panel B considers the same specifications as Panel A, but with the probability
of an imputed reform replacing primary enrollment as the dependent variable. In
columns 1 and 3, constraints on the executive as well as openness of recruitment
are negatively and significantly correlated with education reforms. When looking at
interactions between rivalry and these two measures of democracy in columns 2 and
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Table 3.7: Components of democracy
(a) Primary enrollment
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 57.964*** -19.809 49.743*** -9.417 51.501*** 54.668*
[17.539] [19.387] [17.583] [31.223] [17.569] [31.438]
Exec. constraints 43.401*** -85.481*** 53.526*** -70.731***
[15.227] [20.739] [15.378] [21.064]
Exec. const.*Rivalry 235.073*** 223.556***
[25.944] [26.169]
Exec. openness -67.249*** -106.153*** -76.699*** -86.308***
[17.597] [24.441] [17.784] [24.598]
Exec. open.*Rivalry 73.775** 41.445
[32.182] [32.108]
Population growth 8.959*** 8.393*** 9.070*** 9.051*** 8.983*** 8.431***
[0.474] [0.474] [0.473] [0.473] [0.473] [0.473]
Military expenditure -0.876*** -0.873*** -0.883*** -0.879*** -0.871*** -0.867***
[0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049]
Observations 4849 4849 4849 4849 4849 4849
R-squared 0.676 0.681 0.676 0.676 0.677 0.682
All specifications include country and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: Components of democracy (continued)
(b) Imputed reforms
Probability of “imputed reforms”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 0.170 0.023 0.264** 0.431 0.173 0.319
[0.111] [0.140] [0.114] [0.338] [0.109] [0.322]
Exec. constraints -0.710*** -0.883*** -0.658*** -0.859***
[0.119] [0.144] [0.119] [0.147]
Exec. openness -0.528*** -0.419 -0.324* -0.121
[0.189] [0.278] [0.186] [0.270]
Exec. const.*Rivalry 0.401* 0.458**
[0.225] [0.219]
Exec.open*Rivalry -0.198 -0.372
[0.342] [0.326]
Population growth 0.005 0.004 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Military expenditure -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390 1390
All specifications include time fixed effects and standard errors clustered by country.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4, however, none of the interactions comes out significant.
Overall, both measures of democracy appear to have a negative and significant di-
rect effect, regardless of how we measure mass education. Results for the interaction
effects are somewhat less clear. Taken together, the disaggregated results do not shed
all that much light on the underlying mechanism whereby political regimes influence
mass education.
3.4.4 Instrumental variables estimation
We have established a positive relationship between military rivalry and primary
education outcomes, as well as a positive interaction between rivalry and democracy.
Still, there might be concerns regarding the direction of causality. More educated
countries may be more prone to have rivalries for other reasons than the hypothesized
effect of primary education on their military efficiency. To disentangle the direction of
causality, we use an instrumental-variables approach with two different instruments,
both of which rely on the regional context in which rivalries are embedded.
Commodity-price approach
Our first IV approach relies on commodity price data. Positive shocks to the price
of natural resources or agricultural commodities are likely to foster rivalries, as states
will compete for the control of more valuable resources. We do not use shocks af-
fecting a country’s own commodity prices, which may affect education through other
channels than the emergence of rivalries, such as their effect on the fiscal balance.
Instead, our instrument is constructed exclusively from shocks to neighboring coun-
tries, which are the most likely potential rivals. The total commodity price shock
variable, available for 155 countries over the period 1960-2000, comes from Aghion,
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Angeletos, Banerjee, and Manova (2010). It is a composite measure calculated from
yearly changes in the prices of 42 commodity categories, weighted by their average
shares in the country’s total exports in 1985-1987. For each country i, we define our
instrument shock contigi.t as the fraction of its bordering countries that experienced a
positive commodity price shock of more than one standard deviation in year t. We in-
clude shock contig and up to three lags of this variable as instruments in the first stage.
In the second stage, we control for the country’s own commodity price shock (again,
set equal to 1 if the shock is above one standard deviation in a given year). This is
to rule out that the exclusion restriction is violated because of correlated commod-
ity prices, due to similar crop choices (soil qualities) and mineral availability among
neighboring countries.
The main results of the IV estimation are shown in Table 3.8. The first stage is a
Probit regression for the likelihood of observing a strategic rivalry. We see from these
regressions that current or recent positive commodity price shocks in neighboring
countries do raise the probability of engaging in a strategic rivalry. We have tested for
more lags, results not reported, and found only non-significant coefficients after year
3. In the second stage, we confirm a positive effect of rivalry on primary education
and a negative effect of the democracy score. In columns 1 and 2, we run the regres-
sion without fixed effects. We find that rivalry has a positive and significant effect
on primary enrollment rates. Surprisingly, the coefficient on the democracy (polity2)
score turns out positive. However, when we include country and year fixed effects
in columns 3 and 4, the same regressions yield a negative coefficient on democracy,
indicating that the positive correlation was due to time-invariant country character-
istics. The coefficients on military rivalry remain positive, significant and larger than
their OLS counterparts. These IV results lend support to our claim that causality runs
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Table 3.8: IV estimation: Commodity price shocks
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 799.292* 671.247*** 292.107 290.874**
[434.690] [207.962] [209.645] [132.882]
Polity2 6.879*** 6.453*** -8.434*** -6.692***
[1.426] [1.557] [1.258] [1.340]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.023 -0.064* -0.134*** -0.124***
[0.035] [0.038] [0.025] [0.028]
Own country shock 2.846 -9.588 53.349***
[41.559] [38.961] [18.769]
Year fixed effects no no yes yes
Country fixed effects no no yes yes
First stage: rivalry
shock contig 0.364*** 0.261** 0.364*** 0.261**
[0.114] [0.125] [0.114] [0.125]
L.shock contig 0.291** 0.291**
[0.126] [0.126]
L2.shock contig 0.392*** 0.392***
[0.129] [0.129]
L3.shock contig 0.297** 0.297**
[0.144] [0.144]
Observations 2402 2087 2402 2087
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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from military threats to education policies rather than from education levels to the
aggressiveness of foreign policy.
Rivalries approach
Our second IV approach relies more directly on the strategic rivalries data. It
captures the exogenous component, from the perspective of a given country, of the
competition between its neighbors. Specifically, this instrument rivalry contig is con-
structed, for each country i, from rivalries of a neighboring state j with other countries
k. For country i, rivalry contigi,t is defined as the number of rivalries between border-
ing states j and other countries k 6= i, weighted by the inverse of the distance between
the countries i and j, in year t. In this calculation, we restrict attention to neighbors
j which are not too small or too large relative to country i to be credible rivals, us-
ing the criterion that neighbors must have at least 30% of the population of country
i and vice versa. Hence, rivalry contig measures how prone the immediate regional
environment of country i is to military rivalries. We also use the interaction of ri-
valry contig and the democracy (polity2) score to instrument for the interaction term
between military threats and democracy.
Table 3.9, panel A shows the estimates of the first-stage regressions. We find
that rivalry contig has predictive power for the probability that a country is engaged
in a strategic rivalry, and its interaction with the democracy score is positively and
significantly associated with the interaction of rivalry and democracy. The F-tests
confirm that our instruments are not weak. Panel B of the table displays the second-
stage estimates. In columns 1 and 2, the first stage is a probit regression for the
probability of rivalry. In columns 3 to 5, the first stage is an OLS regression of rivalry
and its interaction with democracy on our instruments and controls. The IV regressions
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Table 3.9: IV estimation: Regional rivalries
(a) First stage
Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry Rivalry*polity2
Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry contig 15.815*** 16.024*** 13.514*** 13.493*** -30.028*
[2.654] [2.700] [1.737] [1.733] [15.927]
Polity2 0.007** -0.001 0.001 0.487***
[0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.012]
Rivalry contig*polity2 -0.564*** 17.403***
[0.163] [1.496]
Observations 3455 3379 3379 3379 3379
R-squared 0.772 0.773 0.825
F statistic 1450.28 1401.31 900.28
Other coefficients not reported. Standard errors in brackets.
(b) Second stage
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 331.629 277.712 242.998 325.646* 492.938***
[266.452] [271.384] [147.834] [167.145] [187.981]
Polity2 -0.508 -0.448 -20.727** -20.454**
[1.189] [1.376] [8.985] [8.247]
Rivalry*Polity2 36.408** 37.543***
[15.819] [14.482]
Gov’t expenditure p.c. -0.399***
[0.049]
Population growth 7.570*** 7.809*** 7.688*** 6.829*** 5.607***
[0.441] [0.452] [0.725] [0.833] [0.769]
Military expenditure p.c. -0.579*** -0.574*** -0.585*** -0.605*** 0.230*
[0.048] [0.048] [0.106] [0.109] [0.138]
Endogenous variables rivalry rivalry rivalry rivalry, rivalry,
riv.*polity2 riv.*polity2
First stage Probit Probit OLS OLS OLS
Observations 3455 3379 3379 3379 3164
All specifications includes year and country FE. Western Europe excluded.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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show again a positive and significant effect of rivalry on primary enrollment rates,
as well as a negative direct coefficient on democracy and a positive and significant
interaction term.
These regressions exclude Western European countries, because our instrument
does not capture adequately the historical determinants of rivalry in Western Eu-
rope. Most European countries in our sample were involved in treaties or alliances
throughout the period considered. This makes it hard to believe that country i would
not directly interact with third parties k that a neighboring country j face as rivals
– such direct interaction between i and k would violate the exclusion restriction. It
may also be that states involved in other rivalries did not raise the external threat
perception of bordering countries, if they were bound together by alliances. Indeed,
the simple correlation between the instrument and rivalry is positive and significant
in all other regions, but negative in Western Europe suggesting that rivalries in this
area are of a different nature16.
3.4.5 Robustness checks
In this section, we run a series of robustness checks to test the validity of our
baseline results.
Industrialization and urbanization
First, democracy may be correlated with the level of industrialization and urban-
ization. If an educated military is more valuable in more industrialized countries,
where the army requires more skills, we may be concerned that our interaction term
16 As it turns out, including Western European countries into this regression leads to coefficients on
rivalry that are implausibly large, about ten times higher than those in Table 3.9, Panel B.
138
Table 3.10: Industrialization and urbanization
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 60.902*** -148.555*** 150.333*** -154.856*** 118.140*** -254.160***
[17.728] [32.812] [15.924] [24.782] [16.255] [26.133]
Polity2 -8.452*** -9.117*** -19.069*** -10.909*** -20.662*** -11.825***
[1.472] [1.462] [1.359] [1.423] [1.377] [1.423]
Rivalry*polity2 5.621*** 5.973*** 21.357*** 11.197*** 23.297*** 12.327***
[1.779] [1.765] [1.734] [1.810] [1.750] [1.803]
Industry/GDP 7.092*** 2.886***
[0.758] [0.935]
Riv.*industry/GDP 7.128***
[0.943]
% Urban (50,000) 8.687*** -0.976
[0.832] [1.016]
Riv.*% urban 14.523***
(50,000) [0.918]
% Urban (20,000) 5.699*** -1.792**
[0.700] [0.797]
Riv.*% urban 12.788***
(20,000) [0.716]
Observations 3551 3551 5341 5341 5134 5134
R-squared 0.785 0.789 0.712 0.725 0.715 0.732
All specifications include year and country fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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between rivalry and democracy is picking up this effect. In Table 3.10, we add as con-
trol variables several measures of industrial development and their interaction with
rivalry: the share of industrial activities in GDP (available for 1946-2000), the share of
population living in cities of 50,000 or more inhabitants, and the share of population
living in cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants (drawn from Banks, 2011).
Most importantly, our results on democracy are unchanged: its direct coefficient
is negative, its interaction with rivalry is positive, and both are significant. Moreover,
as expected, more industrialized and more urbanized countries have higher rates
of primary enrollment. Interestingly, we do find that enrollment responds more to
military threats in countries with a larger share of industrial activities and a larger
share of urban population. For a country which has a score of 0 on the polity2 scale,
the point estimates suggest that the effect of military rivalry on primary education
becomes positive around a 20% share of industry in value added, or around a 10%
share of population living in cities of at least 50,000 people. In short, rivalry is pos-
itively associated with primary enrollment except for the least urbanized and least
industrialized countries.
Other covariates and sample selection
We perform several other robustness tests on our baseline specification in Table
3.11. In column 1, we include the index of ethnic fractionalization from Alesina, De-
vleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003), as well as its interaction with
rivalry. Ethnic diversity has been shown to affect the amount of social spending and
in particular education investment. We find that more fractionalized countries have
higher enrollment rates, but the effect of rivalry on primary enrollment decreases
with ethnic fractionalization. Yet, our main coefficients remain unaffected. In column
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Table 3.11: Covariates and sample selection
Primary enrollment rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rivalry 235.331*** 162.249 102.291*** 185.977*** 7.798 120.891***
[50.843] [146.363] [14.971] [22.597] [22.872] [16.390]
Polity2 -6.038*** -89.206*** -5.397*** -8.944*** -8.505*** -2.500**
[1.836] [27.911] [1.187] [1.753] [1.272] [1.245]
Rivalry*polity2 2.733 92.965*** 5.597*** 14.514*** 6.204*** 7.671***
[2.318] [27.914] [1.595] [2.323] [1.763] [1.737]
Rel. army rivals 8.685*** -0.707 10.823*** 2.664** 1.101
[1.313] [1.144] [1.446] [1.246] [1.261]
Ethnic frac. 1,497.845***
[332.801]
Ethnic frac*rivalry -313.186***
[88.696]
Rivals enrollment 0.185***
[0.020]
L10.Prim. enrollment 0.803***
[0.015]
Population growth 3.689*** 8.957*** 3.612*** 7.650*** 2.880*** 5.720***
[0.566] [0.655] [0.454] [0.513] [0.474] [0.445]
Military expenditure -0.330*** -0.532*** -0.193*** -0.634*** -0.372*** -0.217***
[0.042] [0.067] [0.051] [0.065] [0.048] [0.053]
Observations 2692 1952 3927 3099 4285 4175
R-squared 0.778 0.838 0.838 0.813 0.842 0.816
All specifications include country and time fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1.
(4) excludes Western Europe.
In (5) country FE are interacted with before/after 1950 dummies.
(6) includes continent-specific time trends.
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2, we include the primary enrollment rate of the rival. Consistent with our intuition,
the results show that countries increase their enrollment rates more when their rivals
have more educated populations, and therefore presumably more effective armies.
In column 3, we add 10-year lagged enrollment to control for initial conditions. As
expected, primary enrollment displays high serial autocorrelation, but our main co-
efficients of interest are unchanged. In column 4, we check that our results do not
reflect an entirely European story by excluding Western Europe from the sample.
Again, our results are robust to this change, and the coefficients on rivalry actually
increase. In column 5, we account for the possibility that country-specific factors may
vary over the sample period, by interacting country fixed effects with dummies for
before and after 1950. Finally in column 6, we add continent-specific time trends to
the regression. Each time we find that primary enrollment rates are higher, all things
equal, in countries engaged in a military rivalry, and that the effect of a rivalry is
stronger in more democratic countries.
Alternative measure of education
We also compare our baseline results with those obtained with an alternative
measure of primary schooling, namely education attainment from the Barro and Lee
(2010) data set, available at five-year intervals for the postwar period only. We run
the specifications of (3.1), using as the dependent variable the amount of primary
education achieved by adults in the 15-19 age span at year t + 5, starting in 1950.
Table 3.12 presents the results. Since education attainment is defined per person of
the relevant age group, we do not need to control for population growth in these
specifications. We find similar results to those in Table 3.3 – a (weakly) positive effect
of rivalry, a negative effect of democracy, and a positive interaction term. The results
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Table 3.12: Barro-Lee education attainment
Percentage of primary schooling attained 5 years later by adults 15-19 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 3.049* 3.334 3.243
[1.844] [2.595] [2.571]
Polity2 -0.365** -0.345** -0.346** -0.196 -0.198
[0.146] [0.153] [0.153] [0.123] [0.122]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.452** 0.892*** 0.893***
[0.206] [0.257] [0.257]
Rel. army largest rival -0.151
[0.641]
Rel. army total rivals -0.095
[0.558]
War in previous 10 years 7.032***
[2.090]
War in 10 years*Polity2 -0.164
[0.257]
Won war in previous 10 years 5.247*
[2.882]
Lost war in previous 10 years 9.188***
[2.619]
Won war in 10 years*Polity2 0.241
[0.349]
Lost war in 10 years*Polity2 -0.338
[0.315]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.005
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Govt expenditure p.c. -0.002** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 1114 952 952 1114 1114
R-squared 0.112 0.098 0.098 0.116 0.122
All specifications include year and country FE. Robust standard errors in brackets..
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Table 3.13: Military expenditure and rivalry
Military expenditure per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivalry 34.084*** 30.979*** 31.256*** 32.491*** 32.841*
[10.049] [10.678] [10.792] [5.925] [17.328]
Polity2 -4.206*** -4.291*** -2.984*** -9.043***
[0.706] [0.852] [0.394] [1.307]
Rivalry*Polity2 0.204 -1.337** 5.498***
[1.149] [0.624] [1.819]
Rel. army largest rival 0.402
[0.823]
Share of industry in GDP -5.406***
[0.685]
Population growth. -1.218*** -1.279*** -1.281*** 1.358*** -2.293***
[0.241] [0.257] [0.257] [0.129] [0.455]
Observations 9113 8283 8283 6914 5273
R-squared 0.451 0.442 0.442 0.684 0.403
All specifications include country and time fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
are somewhat weaker with the recent occurrence of an external war as the threat
variable, but the positive effect of a recent war is significant.
Military expenditures
As a check that education investments are indeed driven by military concerns, we
also run our baseline regression replacing education with military expenditure per
capita as the left-hand side variable. As we can see in Table 3.13, we find the same
pattern for military spending as we did for primary education enrollment: military
spending responds positively to strategic rivalries and it is higher in autocracies.
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Table 3.14: Education and probability of future victory
Probability of war Probability of winning
in next 10 years if war in next 10 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary enrollment per 10,000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002]
Democracy score 0.004 0.007 0.001 -0.016
[0.007] [0.007] [0.051] [0.070]
Military expenditure 0.001*** 0.003
[0.000] [0.003]
Rivalry 1.499*** -12.780
[0.125] [290.386]
Observations 4117 3453 320 280
All specifications include year and country fixed effects.
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Education as a means to win future wars
The motive for investing in mass education in our narrative above, as well as our
theory below, is that a more educated population is more effective at fighting wars.
If we regress the probability of winning the next war, conditional on a war outbreak
in the next 10 years, we do find that it is positively and significantly associated with
current primary enrollment. The regressions are shown in Table 3.14. Together with
the historical evidence outlined in Section 3.2, these findings support the view that
military threats spur investments in mass education in order to build more effec-
tive armies. We also find that primary education has some predictive power on the
probability of observing a war in the near future.
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Other robustness tests17
We have performed other robustness tests as well. One is to consider yet another
measure of external threats, based on future conflicts. If countries correctly anticipate
war risks, the incidence of future wars should proxy for military threats ex ante.
This proxy is more vulnerable to endogeneity concerns than our rivalry or past war
data, as the willingness to engage in wars can be influenced by past education levels.
Despite this word of caution, it provides a useful check to our main hypothesis. We
run (3.1) measuring war risk by a binary variable that takes a value of one if and
only if a war breaks out in the following 10 years. Our results are the same in the
basic specification, namely: future wars enter positively in the enrollment regression,
democracy enters negatively, and the interaction term is positive.
We have also checked the sensitivity of our results to the threshold of education
expansion used to define imputed reforms. Specifically, we have used thresholds of
5% and 15% expansions in the last five years, instead of 10%. The signs of the coeffi-
cients on rivalry and on the democracy score are similar to those obtained with our
baseline specification, although the interaction term between rivalries and democracy
is no longer significant.
Summary of empirical findings
Taken together, our empirical results provide robust evidence that in the wake of
increased strategic rivalry (or in reaction to past wars), countries invest more in mass
education. Everything else equal, democracies invest less in primary education than
do autocracies. But the interaction between democracy indicators and military rivalry
17 To save space, we do not show the corresponding regression results. These are available upon
request.
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appears to be positive, especially when democracy is measured by constraints on the
executive.
3.5 A simple theory
How can we understand the empirical results summarized at the end of the pre-
vious section? This is certainly not obvious, but in this section we propose a sim-
ple theoretical model that may help rationalize our main findings. In line with the
historical discussion and the focus of our empirical work, the model highlights the
prospective role of public education in the efficient operation of the military.
Basic setup
The formal model we develop borrows in spirit from the state-capacity frame-
work of Besley and Persson (2009, 2011), from the voter participation frameworks by
Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and Coate and Conlin (2004), and from the analysis
by Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) of fighting incentives across different political regimes.
Consider a society, where the population is normalized to unity and divided into
two equally large and homogenous groups (with regard to education) of risk-neutral
individuals, J = I, O. There are two time periods. Output per capita in each period –
equal to total resources and the tax base – is exogenous and constant over time and
normalized to 12 . All consumption takes place at the end of the second period.
One of the groups serves as the incumbent in both periods (thus there is no po-
litical turnover). Among political institutions, we focus on the constraints on the
executive. These are modeled as a share of output δ that the incumbent group, I,
must grant to the opposition group, O. Hence a higher value of δ captures more
democratic institutions in the sense of higher checks and balances, protecting oppo-
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sition groups from discretionary redistribution. A war can occur in period 2 with
exogenous probability p. For simplicity, all accumulated income perishes from the
country as a whole – i.e., to both groups – if a war is lost.
The conditional probability q of winning a war, once it has broken out, depends
on individual effort choices by the members of each group in period 2. Specifically,
each individual can expend a unit of effort at an individual specific utility cost that
is decreasing in the level of education e. We assume a very simple cost function xe ,
where variable x is individual-specific and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] in each
group. Any individual in group J will follow a behavioral rule to expend his unit of
effort if xe <
ωJ
e , where ωJ is the rule set by group J members, which if followed by all
other members of the group, maximizes the group’s aggregate utility (in Feddersen
and Sandroni’s language, each individual member of group J wants to ”do her part”
to maximize the group’s utility).
We assume that the conditional probability of winning the war depends on the
shares of individuals in each group that expend effort:
q =
1
α
[(∫ ωO
0
dx
)α
+
(∫ ωI
0
dx
)α]
=
1
α
(ωαO +ω
α
I ) ,
where we assume that α < 1. This formulation assumes that efforts of the two groups
are complementary. This could be for geographical reasons: if the two groups inhabit
different parts of the country’s territory, effort is needed along different parts of the
border. Another possibility is that the groups represent an dominant elite from which
officers are drawn and a large non-elite from which common soldiers are drawn:
again, effort is needed from both groups.
Thus, education in this basic model only serves to cut the cost of each individual’s
perceived fighting effort, but it is straightforward to let output depend on the level
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of education (see further below). The level of education is chosen by the incumbent
group. Specifically, in period 1, the incumbent group can augment the initial educa-
tion level, normalized at zero, by investment e in future education at cost C(e) = eγ,
where γ > 1. We study this choice of education below.
Timing
The timing of the model is as follows:
1. In period 1, the incumbent makes investment e in future education
2. At the beginning of period 2, a war with a foreign power erupts with probability
p.
3. If war has erupted, members of each group choose the behavioral rule for effort
choice, thus setting ωI and ωO. Individual members of each group observe the
individual component of their effort cost x and then choose whether to expend
one unit of effort at cost xe .
4. If a war has erupted, it is won with probability q.
5. If no war has erupted or a war has been won, the incumbent group consumes
1− δ, while the opposition group consumes δ.
To analyze the model, we proceed by backward induction, starting from the effort
choices at stage 3 and going back to the education choice at stage 1. For simplicity,
we assume no time discounting.
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Equilibrium
Without a behavioral rule for effort choice, individuals would face a severe free-
rider problem similar to the problem of voter participation. In our setting, individuals
choose to expend effort when their utility cost is low enough. In analogy with the
analyses in Feddersen and Sandroni (2006) and Coate and Conlin (2004), we assume
that group members choose the behavioral rule that maximizes the expected payoff
to the group: i.e., expected consumption minus the group-wide cost of effort.
Thus, group O solves
max
ωJ
{
qδ−
(∫ ωO
0
x
e
dx
)}
=
{
1
α
(ωαO +ω
α
I )δ−
1
e
ω2O
2
}
,
taking ωI as given, while the incumbent group’s effort solves
max
ωI
{
1
α
(ωαO +ω
α
I )(1− δ)−
1
e
ω2I
2
}
.
Simple algebra gives us:
ωO = (δe)
1
2−α and ωI = ((1− δ)e)
1
2−α .
In equilibrium, the conditional probability of winning a war q becomes18:
q∗(e, δ) =
1
α
e
α
2−α
[
δ
α
2−α + (1− δ) α2−α
]
.
18 Note that we are implicitly assuming an interior solution q∗ ∈ (0, 1). This in turn is guaranteed by
assuming γ sufficiently large, which in turn implies that the equilibrium e is sufficiently small.
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Moving back to period 1, the incumbent group chooses education investment e to
max
e
{[(1− p) + pq∗(e, δ)](1− δ)− C(e)} .
The first-order condition becomes:
C′(e) = p(1− δ)∂q
∗(e, δ)
∂e
, (3.3)
or
γeγ−1 =
p(1− δ)
2− α
[
δ
α
2−α + (1− δ) α2−α
]
e
2(α−1)
2−α ,
which implies equilibrium educational investment
e =
{
p(1− δ)
γ (2− α)
[
δ
α
2−α + (1− δ) α2−α
]} 2−α(γ−1)(2−α)+2(1−α)
. (3.4)
Equation (3.4) immediately implies that for γ sufficiently large the expression
q∗(e, δ) = 1α e
α
2−α
[
δ
α
2−α + (1− δ) α2−α
]
strictly lies between 0 and 1, as claimed earlier.
Comparative statics
One can now show:
Proposition 3.1 For δ small enough and γ large enough that we do not run into corners,
equilibrium investment in education e, is increasing in the risk of war, p, and positively
affected by the interaction between democracy δ and the risk of war p, namely: ∂e∂p > 0 and
∂2e
∂p∂δ > 0.
Proof 3.1 The first part follows straightforwardly from (3.4); the second part follows from the
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fact that:
sign
(
∂2e
∂p∂δ
)
= sign
(
∂
∂δ
{(1− δ)E(δ)}
)
,
where
E(δ) ≡
[
δ
α
2−α + (1− δ) α2−α
]
.
But one can verify that
∂
∂δ
{(1− δ)E(δ)} = −E(δ) + (1− δ)
(
α
2− α
)(
δ
α
2−α−1 − (1− δ) α2−α−1
)
,
where the first term in the RHS of the above equation remains bounded when δ → 0 whereas
the second term becomes arbitrarily large. This establishes the Proposition.
Intuitively, these results of our model capture a relatively simple idea. Society’s
income is (partly) expropriated if a war is lost to a foreign power. The probability of
winning a war depends upon both the educational level and fighting efforts by mem-
bers of the incumbent and opposition groups. In these circumstances, the incumbent
group has stronger motives to invest in education if a war becomes more likely. Ab-
sent democracy in the form of some checks and balances, however, opposition-group
members do not benefit a great deal from the economy’s resources. Therefore, they
have weaker incentives to exert fighting effort than members of the incumbent group
– this mechanism is similar to the one in Ticchi and Vindigni (2009). If the efforts
by the incumbent and opponent groups are sufficiently complementary (α < 1), this
incentive gap may lower the prospects of winning a war to such an extent that in-
vestments in education respond less to a higher war threat in autocracies than in
democracies.
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As it stands, the above model does not predict different signs for the direct effect
of democracy on education ∂e∂δ and the interaction effect
∂2e
∂p∂δ . However, once we allow
output y to also depend positively on education, then the direct effect of democracy
can become negative. For example, suppose that y = y(e) = 1+ βe, with β small. For
small enough β, it is still the case (by continuity) that for sufficiently low δ : ∂e∂p > 0
and ∂
2e
∂p∂δ > 0. But in addition, we also obtain
∂e
∂δ < 0. To see the latter, note that in the
extended model, the first-order condition for e becomes
C′(e) = (1− p)(1− δ)y′(e) + p(1− δ)∂[q
∗(e, δ)y(e)]
∂e
,
where y′(e) = β > 0.
In the absence of military rivalry, i.e., for p = 0, we can write equilibrium educa-
tional investment as
e =
[
(1− δ)β
γ
] 1
γ−1
.
Clearly, education is now decreasing in democracy parameter δ. By continuity, the
results remains true for p sufficiently small.
Intuitively, democracy has a direct negative effect on the motives to invest in edu-
cation, simply because stronger checks and balances reduce the incumbent’s residual
claim on the additional output generated by education.
An auxiliary prediction
The unverifiable and complementary decisions on fighting effort by the two groups
are the drivers of the model’s positive interaction effect between military threats and
democracy. But for other types of physical investments, their contribution to mili-
tary success presumably depend less on such efforts. Following this logic, military
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Table 3.15: Road investments, rivalry and democracy
% change in length of paved roads
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rivalry 1.856** 1.801** 1.732** 1.879**
[0.859] [0.853] [0.862] [0.861]
Polity2 0.035 0.059 0.034
[0.053] [0.068] [0.071]
Rivalry*Polity2 -0.051 -0.048
[0.089] [0.090]
Real GDP 4.149*
[2.465]
Military expenditure p.c. 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.005*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 9113 8283 8283 6914
R-squared 0.451 0.442 0.442 0.684
All specifications include country and time FE and SE clustered by
country. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
rivalry might affect other measures of state capacity such as infrastructure, but the
interaction between rivalry and democracy should be less significant. We confront
this auxiliary prediction of the model with data on the length of paved roads from
Caldero´n and Serve´n (2010), which covers 97 countries over the period 1960-2000.
Table 3.15 shows the results of estimating our main specification with the yearly per-
centage change in the length of paved roads as the left-hand side variable. While
military rivalries still drive this type of investment, we find no effect – either directly
nor through the interaction term – of the political regime on road-building.
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3.6 Conclusion
We have argued that military rivalry is an important factor behind countries’ deci-
sions to invest in mass primary education. Democratization does not seem to play an
important role, even though primary enrollment appears to respond more to threats
in democracies than in autocracies. Moreover, a more severe war, as measured by a
higher number of casualties, tends to magnify the impact of recent wars on educa-
tion, whereas the impact of military rivalry on primary education is larger in more
industrialized countries and in those facing stronger and more educated rivals.
Our approach could be extended in several directions. A first would be to inves-
tigate if economic rivalry – e.g., measured by trade competition – has a similar effect
on education policies as military rivalry. A second direction would be to endogenize
fiscal capacity and in particular look at how much current or past military rivalry
affects future fiscal capacity. Yet another would be to consider not only the size of
primary enrollment, but also the governance of primary and secondary schools. Re-
cent work by Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2011) distinguishes between vertical and
horizontal school pedagogy, where the former relies heavily upon taking notes from
the teacher, whereas the latter involves group interactions among students. Our con-
jecture is that primary-education reforms primarily driven by past military rivalry
should put vertical systems in place, which may prevail still today. This and other
extensions are left for future research.
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A. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1.1
Assume µ > k1−w . First, we have
µ− k
w
> µ > θ∗
which ensures
pit+1 (θ) = µ− wθ − k > 0
for all firms born at t which have quality θ < θ∗. Hence all such firms enter initially.
Also, θ < k1−w and ρ
′ > 0 imply
Etpit+s (θ) = (ρ (s− 1)− w) θ + (1− ρ (s− 1)) µ− k
is decreasing in s and
lim
s→∞ Etpit+s = (1− w) θ − k < 0
so all firms below θ∗ expect to exit in finite time when their profits turn negative. The
expected number of periods a firm θ born at t is active is T (θ) given by
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[1− ρ (T (θ − 1))] µ > [w− ρ (T (θ)− 1)] θ + k
and [1− ρ (T (θ))] µ < [w− ρ (T (θ))] θ + k
The highest quality type θT that exits after selling for T periods (or the lowest quality
type that exits after selling for T + 1 periods) is defined by Etpit+T+1 (θT) = 0, hence
θT = max
{
k− [1− ρ (T)] µ
ρ (T)− w , θm
}
and θT is increasing with T:
∂θT
∂T
∝ ρ′ (T) (µ (1− w)− k) > 0 as ρ′ > 0 and µ > θ∗
Second, firms with θ∗ < θ < µ expects positive profits at all periods: they have
Etpit+s (θ) monotonically decreasing from
pit+1 (θ) = µ− wθ − k > µ (1− w)− k > 0 since θ < µ
to
lim
s→∞ Etpit+s (θ) = θ (1− w)− k > 0 since θ > θ
∗
Hence firms with θ∗ < θ < µ always enter the market and stay until they are exoge-
nously forced to exit.
Finally, firms with θ > µ have increasing expected profits over time. They enter
the market if and only if their expected intertemporal profits are positive, which
requires:
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Et
(
∞
∑
s=1
δs−1pit+s (θ)
)
=
∞
∑
s=0
δs [(ρ (s)− w) θ + (1− ρ (s)) µ]− k
1− δ > 0
or equivalently:
θ >
k− µ (1− δ)∑∞s=0 δs (1− ρ (s))
(1− δ)∑∞s=0 δsρ (s)− w
≡ θH
Let us show that θH < µ :
θH < µ⇔ µ
[
(1− δ)
∞
∑
s=0
δs (1− ρ (s)) + (1− δ)
∞
∑
s=0
δsρ (s)
]
> wµ+ k⇔ µ > k
1− w
which holds by assumption in the high reputation case. Hence all firms with θ > µ
always export until they are hit by the exogenous shock.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 1.2
Assume µ < k1−w and µ > k + wθm. First, consider firms with θ < µ born at date
t. Since their expected profits are decreasing with time, they are active in the first
period if and only if Etpit+1 (θ) = µ− wθ − k > 0, which requires
θ ≤ µ− k
w
≡ θL
and we can immediately check that
µ <
k
1− w ⇔ θL < µ.
Expected second-period profits are
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Etpit+2 (θ) = (ρ (1)− w) θ + (1− ρ (1)) µ− k < (1− w) µ− k < 0
since θ < µ and ρ (1) > w. Hence among firms with θ < µ, those with θ < θL are
active in the first period and exit afterwards, and those with θL ≤ θ < µ are never
active.
Second, consider firms with µ ≤ θ < θ∗. These firms have Etpit+1 (θ) < 0 since
θ > θL, Etpit+s (θ) monotonically increasing in s since θ ≥ µ, and lims→∞ Etpit+s (θ) <
0 since θ < θ∗. Thus their expected profits are negative in all periods and they
optimally exit after drawing their quality parameter.
Third, consider firms with θ > θ∗. These firms have Etpit+s (θ) monotonically
increasing in s since θ > µ, and lims→∞ Etpit+s (θ) > 0 since θ > θ∗. If they decide
to be active in the first period, they expect to remain in the market as long as they
survive the exogenous shock. However given θ > θL they incur a loss in the initial
periods. The condition for a firm of type θ > θ∗ to be active is for intertemporal
expected profits to be positive, which requires
θ >
k− (1− Aρ) µ
Aρ − w ≡ θH
as derived in the proof of Lemma 1.1, where we define Aρ ≡ (1− δ)∑∞s=0 δsρ (s).
Finally,
θH > θ
∗ ⇔ k−
(
1− Aρ
)
µ
Aρ − w >
k
1− w ⇔ k
(
1− Aρ
)
>
(
1− Aρ
)
µ (1− w)
which is equivalent to
k
1− w > µ
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and holds by assumption in the low reputation case. Hence firms with θ∗ ≤ θ ≤ θH
are never active and firms with θ > θH enter the export market and stay active.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.1
A HQE is a fixed point of θ (.) where
θ (µ) = µ0
1−∑
∞
T=0 δ
T+1
((
θm
θT
)α−1 − ( θmθT+1)α−1
)
1−∑∞T=0 δT+1
((
θm
θT
)α − ( θmθT+1)α)

θ (µ) = µ0
1+∑∞T=T˜ δT
(
θm
θT
)α−1
1+∑∞T=T˜ δ
T
(
θm
θT
)α

and T˜ is the lowest value of T such that θT > θm.
Step 1: Let us show that θ (µ) is strictly decreasing in µ on [θ∗,∞). We have
θ = µ0
(
1+ K (α− 1)
1+ K (α)
)
where K (α) ≡
∞
∑
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α
∂K (α)
∂α
=
∞
∑
T=T˜
δT ln (θm/θT)
(
θm
θT
)α
< 0
Consider a change in one of the thresholds, θS, leaving unchanged all other thresh-
olds. Then all else equal, average quality rises:
∂θ
∂θS
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1 [
α
(
θm
θS
)
(1+ K (α− 1))− (α− 1) (1+ K (α))
]
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1
(1+ K (α))
[
α
(
θm
θS
)
θ
µ0
− (α− 1)
]
=
δS
θS
(
θm
θS
)α−1
(1+ K (α)) (α− 1)
[(
θ
θS
)
− 1
]
> 0
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which derives from θ > θ∗ > θS for all S in a HQE. An increase in µ lowers all θT
given Assumption 1 and differentiating:
∂θT
∂µ
= − 1− ρ (T)
ρ (T)− w
Thus, in a HQE, θ (µ) is a decreasing function:
∂θ
∂µ
=
∞
∑
T=T˜
∂θ
∂θT
∂θT
∂µ
< 0
We have proved that θ is strictly and continuously decreasing in µ on [θ∗,∞).
Step 2: Show that
lim
µ→∞
θ (µ)
µ
< 1
As µ → ∞, it remains profitable for all firms to stay active, so firms of all qualities
continue exporting until hit by the exogenous shock: T (θ) → ∞ for all θ. Therefore,
limµ→∞ = µ0 which is finite, so limµ→∞
θ(µ)
µ < 1.
By the fixed point theorem, we have established that if θ (θ∗) > θ∗, θ (.) has a
unique fixed point on (θ∗,∞), which proves Proposition 1.1.
Step 3: Derive the condition for θ (θ∗) > θ∗. At µ = θ∗, pit (θ) < 0 for all t > 1 and
θ < θ∗. Then
θ (θ∗) =
∫ θ∗
θm
θdG (θ) + 11−δ
∫ ∞
θ∗ θdG (θ)∫ θ∗
θm
dG (θ) + 11−δ
∫ ∞
θ∗ dG (θ)
= µ0
1− δ+ δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α−1
1− δ+ δ
(
θm
θ∗
)α

So we have
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θ (θ∗) > θ∗ ⇔ µ0
1− δ+ δ
(
θm(1−w)
k
)α−1
1− δ+ δ
(
θm(1−w)
k
)α
 > k1− w
⇔ α
(
θm (1− w)
k
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm (1− w)
k
)α
> α− 1
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.2
A LQE is a fixed point of θ (µ) where:
θ (µ) = µ0
 (1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1)
+
(
θm
θH
)α−1
(1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α)
+
(
θm
θH
)α

Step 1: The sign of ∂θ(µ)∂µ is indeterminate. Differentiate with respect to each thresh-
old:
∂θ
∂θL
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α ( 1θL
)(
θm
θL
)α−1 [
1− θ
θL
]
< 0
∂θ
∂θH
=
1
1−δµo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α ( 1θH
)(
θm
θH
)α−1 [ θ
θH
− 1
]
< 0
∂θ
∂µ
=
∂θ
∂θL
∂θL
∂µ
+
∂θ
∂θH
∂θH
∂µ
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α [( θα−1mθαL ) [ θθL − 1] ( 1w)− 11−δ ( θα−1mθαH ) [1− θθH ] ( 1−AρAρ−w)]
∂θ
∂µ
< 0 iff
1
1− δ
(
1
θH
)α [
1− θ
θH
](
1− Aρ
Aρ − w
)
>
(
1
θL
)α [ θ
θL
− 1
](
1
w
)
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This condition can be rewritten as
δ > 1−
(
θL
θH
)α+1( θH − θ
θ − θL
)((
1− Aρ
)
w
Aρ − w
)
Then note that the bracketed terms are:
θL
θH
=
(µ− k) (Aρ − w)
w
(
k− (1− Aρ) µ)
θH − θ
θ − θL
=
k−(1−Aρ)µ
Aρ−w − θ
θ − µ−kw
=
w
Aρ − w
(
1− Aρ
(
θ − µ)
k− µ+ wθ
)
Therefore θ (µ) decreases in µ when
δ > 1−
(
µ− k
k− (1− Aρ) µ
)α+1 (
Aρ − w
w
)α−1(
1− Aρ
(
θ − µ)
k− µ+ wθ
)
and decreases in µ otherwise. The reason why θ (µ) needs not be monotonic over
[θm, θ∗] is that µ has opposite effects on θ coming from θL and θH. Which effect
dominates depends on the position of µ as well as the shape parameter α and the
survival parameter δ. This non-monotonicity is what gives rises to the possibility of
multiple equilibria.
Step 2: If µ = θm, no firm below θ∗ finds it profitable to export, as national
reputation imposes a first-period loss on all firms. Some firms with high enough θ
have a positive NPV of future profits and enter. So since θm is the lower bound of the
prior quality distribution, θ (θm) > θ∗ > θm.
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Step 3: From the derivation of Proposition 1.1 we know that
θ (θ∗) < θ∗ ⇔ α
(
θm (1− w)
k
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm (1− w)
k
)α
< α− 1
So we have proved that if this condition holds, there is no HQE and there must be at
least one LQE.
A.1.5 Proof of Result 1.1
In a LQE, the set of continuing firms is [θH,∞) from the second period onwards,
so the average price plqet,t+s of cohort t at time t + s is given by:
plqet,t+s
(
θ
)
=
 θ if s = 1θ + ρ (s) ( αα−1θH − θ) if s > 1
As θ < θH in a LQE and ρ (s) increases in s, it immediately follows that p
lqe
t,t+s increases
with s.
In a HQE, the set of active firms of cohort t at time t + s is [θs−1,∞), and their
average price is:
phqet,t+s
(
θ
)
=
 θ if s = 1θ + ρ (s) ( αα−1θs−1 − θ) if s > 1
ρ (s) and θs−1 increase with s. Immediately following the entry of cohort t, p
hqe
t,t+s may
fall with s if the distribution of θ has low variance (α high), such that αα−1θ1 > µ. In
this case, there is initially a large mass of firms at the bottom of the distribution of
continuing firms and their prices are falling. However, since µ < αα−1θ
∗, there is some
finite s′ such that for all s ≥ s′, phqet,t+s+1
(
θ
)
> phqet,t+s
(
θ
)
and thus at each given point
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in time, the average unit price is higher for older cohorts of firms.
A.1.6 Proof of Result 1.2
The first part establishes that across cohorts, the fraction of active firms that exit
per period is higher for lower quality firms. In a LQE, the hazard rate is 1 for firms
below θL and 1− δ for firms above θH. In a HQE, the hazard rate is 1−δ1−δT for firms
between θT−1 and θT for all T, which is decreasing in T, and 1− δ for firms above θ∗.
The second part states that the probability of exit, across quality levels, decreases
with the age of a cohort. In a LQE, the hazard rate of cohort t at time t + s is
hlqet,t+s =
 1− δ+ δ
G(θL)
G(θL)+1−G(θH) if s = 1
1− δ if s > 1
It falls from t + 1 to t + 2 and remains constant thereafter. In a HQE, the hazard
rate of cohort t at t + s is
hhqet,t+s = 1− δ+ δ
G (θs)− G (θs−1)
1− G (θs−1)
= 1− δ+ δ
(
1−
(
θs−1
θs
)α)
Since θs−1θs is decreasing in s, h
hqe
t,t+s falls over time.
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A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.3
In a LQE, average quality is given by:
θ = µ0
 (1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1)
+
(
θm
θH
)α−1
(1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α)
+
(
θm
θH
)α

Differentiate with respect to each threshold:
∂θ
∂θL
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α ( 1θL
)(
θm
θL
)α−1(
1− θ
θL
)
< 0
∂θ
∂θH
=
1
1−δµo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α ( 1θH
)(
θm
θH
)α−1( θ
θH
− 1
)
< 0
∂θ
∂k
=
∂θ
∂θL
∂θL
∂k
+
∂θ
∂θH
∂θH
∂k
=
µo (α− 1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α × ...
[
1
1−δ
(
1
θH
) (
θm
θH
)α−1 (
1− θθH
) (
1
Aρ−w
)
−
(
1
θL
) (
θm
θL
)α−1 (
θ
θL
− 1
) ( 1
w
)]
∂θ
∂k
> 0 iff
1
1− δ
(
1
θH
)α(
1− θ
θH
)(
1
Aρ − w
)
>
(
1
θL
)α( θ
θL
− 1
)(
1
w
)
This condition can be rewritten as
δ > 1−
(
θL
θH
)α+1( θH − θ
θ − θL
)(
w
Aρ − w
)
Then note that, starting from a steady-state (θ = µ), the bracketed terms are:
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θL
θH
=
(µ− k) (Aρ − w)
w
(
k− (1− Aρ) µ)
θH − θ
θ − θL
=
1
Aρ−w (k− (1− w) µ)
1
w (k− (1− w) µ)
=
w
Aρ − w
Therefore θ decreases in k if and only if
δ > 1−
(
µ− k
k− (1− Aρ) µ
)α+1 (
Aρ − w
w
)α−1
The RHS is decreasing in µ and α, so this holds for δ not too low, α not too high
and an initial µ not too low. Then starting from a LQE, a decrease in k moves up
the θ (µ) function left of the initial µ. The new steady-state equilibrium quality and
reputation are necessarily higher. If the steady-state is unique, the new steady-state
has higher µ. If there are multiple steady-states, ranked by increasing µ, either the
new steady-state has the same rank and higher µ, or the new steady-state has higher
rank and higher µ.
The welfare effect of a subsidy σ (σ = −dk) has three components. First, for firms
with θ parameters such that they sell both without and with the subsidy, the policy
adds to their profits the amount it costs to the government, plus the extra profits
brought by a higher reputation µ′ > µ. The total effect is unambiguously positive.
Second, for new exporters that enter around θL because of the policy (θL < θ < θL′),
the net benefit NBL of the subsidy is positive:
NBL =
∫ θL′
θL
(
µ′ − wθ − k + σ) dG (θ)− ∫ θL′
θL
σg (θ) dθ
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NBL =
(
µ′ − k) ∫ θL′
θL
g (θ) dθ − w
∫ θL′
θL
θdG (θ)
=
[(
µ′ − k) (( θmθL )α − ( θmθL′ )α)− w αα−1θm
((
θm
θL
)α−1 − ( θmθL′ )α−1
)]
= wθm
[(
θL′
θL
(
θm
θL
)α−1 − ( θmθL′ )α−1
)
− αα−1
((
θm
θL
)α−1 − ( θmθL′ )α−1
)]
> wθmα−1
((
θm
θL
)α−1 − ( θmθL′ )α−1
)
> 0
where we go from the second to the third line using wθL′ = µ′ − k.
Third, for new exporters that enter around θH because of the policy (θH′ < θ < θH),
the net benefit NBH of the subsidy is also positive:
NBH =
∫ θH
θH′
(
∞
∑
t=0
δt
(
ρ (t) θ + (1− ρ (t)) µ′ − wθ − k + σ)) g (θ) dθ − ...
1
1−δ
∫ θH
θH′
σg (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
∫ θH
θH′
((
Aρ − w
)
θ +
(
1− Aρ
)
µ′ − k) g (θ) dθ
= 11−δ
[
− (k− (1− Aρ) µ′) (( θmθH′ )α − ( θmθH )α)+ α(Aρ−w)α−1 θm
((
θm
θH′
)α−1 − ( θmθH )α−1
)]
= 11−δ
(
Aρ − w
)
θm
[((
θm
θH′
)α−1 − θH′θH ( θmθH )α−1
)
− αα−1
((
θm
θH′
)α−1 − ( θmθH )α−1
)]
> 11−δ
(
Aρ − w
)
θm
α−1
((
θm
θH′
)α−1 − ( θmθH )α−1
)
> 0
So the overall welfare gain is positive.
A.1.8 Proof of Proposition 1.4
In a HQE, average quality is given by
169
θ = µ0
(
1+ K (α− 1)
1+ K (α)
)
where K (α) ≡
∞
∑
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α
, θT =
k− (1− ρ (T)) µ
ρ (T)− w
∂θT
∂k
=
1
ρ (T)− w > 0 for all T > T˜
∂θ
∂k
=
∞
∑
T=T˜
∂θ
∂θT
∂θT
∂k
> 0
using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 1.1. Hence a subsidy that lowers k
shifts down the θ (µ) function. As θ is decreasing in µ in the HQE region, the new
steady-state equilibrium defined by θ (µ) = µ necessarily has lower µ. So average
quality and national reputation are higher in the HQE steady-state without subsidies
than with subsidies.
A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 1.5
This appendix section provides a sketch of the proof of Proposition 1.5. It essen-
tially relies on the stability of µS and µ′S and the instability of µU . For (i) and (ii),
let us show that if µS is a steady-state LQE and
∂θ(µ)
∂µ < 0 at µS, then µS is a stable
equilibrium for η < 1. Define θL,S ≡ µS−kw and θH,S ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µS
Aρ−w . At time t− 1 the
economy is in an initial steady-state where
µS = θ (µS) = µ0
1−
(
θm
θL,S
)α−1
+
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,S
)α
+
(
θm
θH,S
)α

Suppose θ is locally decreasing in µ. Then for all µS < µ < µU , θ (µ) < µ. Now
suppose there is a perturbation at time t such that µt = µS + ε, ε > 0 and ε < µU − µS.
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The entry thresholds at t are:
θL,t =
µt − k
w
=
µS + ε− k
w
θH,t =
k− (1− δ)∑∞u=0 (1− ρ (u)) µt+u
Aρ − w
where θH,t is determined by the zero intertemporal profits condition
∞
∑
u=0
δu [(ρ (u)− w) θH,t + (1− ρ (u)) Etµt+u − k]
and the absence of aggregate uncertainty allows us to remove the expectations oper-
ator.
Let us conjecture, to be verified, that µS ≤ µt+u+1 ≤ µt+u ≤ µS + ε for all u ≥ 1.
Then:
θL,S < θL,t+u+1 < θL,t+u < θL,t
θH,S > θH,t+u+1 > θH,t+u > θH,t
for all u ≥ 1
The average quality of exports is determined by the θL and θH thresholds in the
periods after the shock in the following manner:
θt+u = µ0
1−
(
θm
θL,t+u
)α−1
+
u
∑
l=0
δu−l
(
θm
θH,t+l
)α−1
+
∞
∑
l=u+1
δl
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t+u
)α
+
u
∑
l=0
δu−l
(
θm
θH,t+l
)α
+
∞
∑
l=u+1
δl
(
θm
θH,S
)α
 for u ≥ 0
θL,t+u =
µt+u − k
w
θH,t+u =
k− (1− δ)∑∞l=0 (1− ρ (l)) µt+u+l
Aρ − w
At time t, let us define θ
perm
t as the average quality that would prevail if firms
171
expected the shock to be permanent, i.e. if Etµt+u = µt for all u ≥ 0. We have:
θt = µ0
1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α−1
+
(
θm
θH,t
)α−1
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α

θt < θ
perm
t = µ0

1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α−1
+
(
θm
θ
perm
H,t
)α−1
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θ
perm
H,t
)α
+ δ1−δ
(
θm
θH,S
)α

as θpermH,t =
k−(1−Aρ)(µS+ε)
Aρ−w < θH,t from the conjecture µS ≤ µt+u+1 ≤ µt+u ≤ µS + ε for
all u ≥ 1. Also
θ
perm
t < θ (µS + ε) < µt
The first inequality results from θH,S > θ
perm
H,t . The second inequality comes from
θ (µ) < µ for µ ∈ (µS, µU). Hence θt < µt and therefore:
θt < µt+1 = µt + η
(
θt − µt
)
< µt
Additionally as long as η is not too close to 1, µt+1 > µS.
We can show, similarly, that in all subsequent periods, θt+u < µt+u as long as
µt+u > µS. Thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u and the conjecture that µt+u follows a
decreasing path from µS + ε to µS is verified. In case of a negative shock to µ at time
t starting from a steady-state where θ is locally decreasing in µ, the proof is identical
with opposite signs. It follows that if µS is a steady-state reputation and θ (µ) is
locally decreasing in µ at µS, then µS is stable. Any positive shock, starting from µS,
that brings µt to a value in (µS, µU) has no long-run effects as the economy moves
back to µS.
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By the same reasoning, µU is unstable. Suppose there is a negative shock to µ
starting from
µU = θ (µU) = µ0
1−
(
θm
θL,U
)α−1
+
(
θm
θH,U
)α−1
1−
(
θm
θL,U
)α
+
(
θm
θH,U
)α

where θL,U ≡ µU−kw , θH,U ≡
k−(1−Aρ)µU
Aρ−w and θ (µ) is increasing in µ at µU . At time t,
µt = µU − ε, where ε > 0 and ε < µU − µS. We conjecture µS ≤ µt+u+1 ≤ µt+u ≤ µU −
ε, which implies θL,S < θL,t+u+1 < θL,t+u < θL,U and θH,S > θH,t+u+1 > θH,t+u > θH,U
for all u ≥ 0. Then θt+u < µt+u and thus µt+u+1 < µt+u for all u ≥ 0.
For part (iii), consider a “large shock”, starting from µS, as a shock ε > µU − µS
such that if µt = µS + ε, then µ > µU , where θt is defined as in (ii) and µ is defined
below. θt+u, θL,t+u and θH,t+u are defined as in part (ii). Also, for µU < µ < µ′S,
we know that θ (µ) > µ. We can then show that θt+u is increasing in u as long as
θt+u < µ′S, and µt+u is increasing in u for u ≥ u if µt+u > µU for all u ≥ 0. u is
the inflexion point of the path of µt+u, which can initially decrease but is eventually
increasing as long as µ < µ′S. Define µ = µt+u, a large reputation shock is a shock
such that µ > µU . It ensures that reputation and average quality both grow along the
transition path until the economy reaches the steady-state µ′S.
Finally, note that more entry and higher reputation in the long-run imply higher
aggregate profits and higher average quality. The latter follows from θ = µ in the
long run. The former results from a higher number of active firms and the fact that
the range of firms which are active both with the initial µ and with the higher final µ
receive a higher sequence of prices.
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A.1.10 Proof of Appendix A.3 results
Case 1: Part (i) follows immediately from θL =
µ
τ−k
w and θH =
k− 1τ (1−Aρ)µ
1
τ Aρ−w
. The
proof of part (ii) uses the derivations of Proposition 1.2. We know
θ = µ0
 (1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α−1)
+
(
θm
θH
)α−1
(1− δ)
(
1−
(
θm
θL
)α)
+
(
θm
θH
)α

∂θ
∂τ
=
∂θ
∂θL
∂θL
∂τ
+
∂θ
∂θH
∂θH
∂τ
=
1
τ2
µo
θm
(α−1)
1−
(
θm
θL
)α
+ 11−δ
(
θm
θH
)α
[
1
1−δ
(
θαm
θαH
) (
1− θθH
)(
(1−Aρ)µ+AρθH
1
τ Aρ−w
)
−
(
θαm
θαL
) (
θ
θL
− 1
) ( µ
w
)]
∂θ
∂τ
> 0 iff
1
1− δ
(
1
θH
)α(
1− θ
θH
)((
1− Aρ
)
µ+ AρθH
1
τ Aρ − w
)
>
(
1
θL
)α( θ
θL
− 1
)( µ
w
)
This condition can be rewritten as
δ > 1−
(
θL
θH
)α+1( θH − θ
θ − θL
)(
w
1
τ Aρ − w
(
1− Aρ
)
µ+ AρθH
µ
)
Then note that, starting from a steady-state (θ = µ), the bracketed terms are:
θL
θH
=
( 1
τµ− k
) ( 1
τ Aρ − w
)
w
(
k− 1τ
(
1− Aρ
)
µ
)
θH − θ
θ − θL
=
w
1
τ Aρ − w
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Therefore θ decreases in τ if and only if
δ > 1−
(
1
τµ− k
k− 1τ
(
1− Aρ
)
µ
)α+1( 1
τ Aρ − w
w
)α−1 (
1− Aρ + AρθH
µ
)
Under this condition, starting from a LQE, an increase in τ moves down the θ (µ)
function. The new steady-state equilibrium quality and reputation are lower.
Case 2: In a HQE with trade costs,
θ∗ =
k
1
τ − w
θT =
k− 1τ (1− ρ (T)) µ
1
τρ (T)− w
Part (i) follows from (A.1) and modified Assumption 1 that θT increases with τ.
Part (ii) is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.4. In a HQE, average quality is
θ = µ0
(
1+ Kτ (α− 1)
1+ Kτ (α)
)
where Kτ (α) ≡
∞
∑
T=T˜
δT
(
θm
θT
)α
, θT =
k− 1τ (1− ρ (T)) µ
1
τρ (T)− w
∂θT
∂τ
=
(
1
τ2
)
(1− ρ (T)) µ+ ρ (T) θT
1
τρ (T)− w
> 0 for all T > T˜
∂θ
∂τ
=
∞
∑
T=T˜
∂θ
∂θT
∂θT
∂τ
> 0
using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 1. Hence an rise in the ad valorem
tariff τ shifts up the θ (µ) function. As θ is decreasing in µ in the HQE region, the new
steady-state equilibrium defined by θ (µ) = µ necessarily has higher µ. So average
quality and national reputation are higher, and the volume of trade is lower, in the
new steady state.
175
A.2 Informed and uninformed buyers
Suppose the population of importers is divided into N equal-sized groups. There
is perfect information diffusion within groups but no information diffusion across
groups. Thus, if any individual in group n has previously consumed the output of
firm j, then all buyers in group n are informed about good j. When firm j is matched
with buyer i, i ∈ I if there exists i′ ∈ n such that i′ has been matched with j in the
past, and i ∈ U if there is no i′ ∈ n such that i′ has been matched with j in the past.
Further assume that the firm observes in any period whether its buyer is informed
or not, but not which group the buyer belongs to; hence it does not know the exact
proportion of informed buyers in any period but only its expectation.
It follows immediately from this setup that ρ (0) = 0. After the firm has exported
for one period, one group is informed, so ρ (1) = 1N . For each subsequent period, if
the fraction of informed buyers after s export periods is ρ (s), then with probability
ρ (s), the firm is matched with a buyer in an informed group, and the proportion of
informed importers stays at ρ (s) for the next period. With probability 1− ρ (s), the
firm is matched with a buyer in an uniformed group; then the fraction of informed
importers next period is ρ (s) + 1N .
Therefore, the expected fraction of informed buyers is given by the following path:
ρ (0) = 0
ρ (s + 1) = ρ (s)2 + (1− ρ (s))
(
ρ (s) +
1
N
)
= ρ (s)
(
N − 1
N
)
+
1
N
for s ≥ 0
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We can check that this function satisfies Assumption 1.
ρ (s + 1)− ρ (s) = 1
N
(1− ρ (s)) > 0
ρ (s + 1)− ρ (s)
ρ (s)
=
1
N
(
1
ρ (s)
− 1
)
is decreasing in s
lim
s→∞ ρ (s) =
1
N
(
1− N − 1
N
)−1
= 1
So ρ (s) is increasing in s, rises with s at a falling rate, and converges to 1.
A.3 Ad valorem tariffs
A straightforward extension of the model allows for ad valorem trade costs. Sup-
pose that when a buyer pays pt+s (j) defined by (1.4) for the output of firm j, the
firm receives 1τ pt+s (j), where τ > 1. The price being set by the importer’s maximum
willingness to pay, trade costs are borne by exporters.
We modify Assumption 2 accordingly: let us assume 1τρ (1) > w. With positive
trade costs, the values of the relevant thresholds are modified as follows:
θ∗ =
k
1
τ − w
θL =
µ
τ − k
w
(A.1)
θH =
k− 1τ
(
1− Aρ
)
µ
1
τ Aρ − w
θT =
k− 1τ (1− ρ (T)) µ
1
τρ (T)− w
An increase in τ lowers export profits for all firms. In a LQE, it widens the
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range of non-exporters. In a HQE, it leads low-quality firms below θ∗ to exit sooner.
Also, holding constant the economy’s exogenous parameters (α, δ, θm, k, and w), a
higher τ makes it more likely that the steady-state equilibrium is a LQE. The existence
condition for a HQE with tariffs is
α
(
θm
( 1
τ − w
)
k
)
+
δ
1− δ
(
θm
( 1
τ − w
)
k
)α
> α− 1 (A.2)
Case 1 An increase in the ad-valorem tariff τ in a low-quality steady-state equilibrium:
(i) Lowers θL and raises θH;
(ii) Lowers the average quality of exports and equilibrium country reputation
if
(
1
τ µ−k
k− 1τ (1−Aρ)µ
)α+1 ( 1
τ Aρ−w
w
)α−1 (
1− Aρ + AρθHµ
)
> 1− δ.
See Appendix A.1.10 for proofs. In a LQE, an increase in τ discourages entry by
some relatively low-quality firms (as θL falls) as well as some relatively high-quality
firms (as θH rises). Under the stated condition, the latter dominates in the net effect
of τ on θ. Thus, a higher tariff, similarly to a higher k, results in lower steady-state
quality in a LQE.
Case 2 An increase in the ad-valorem tariff τ in a high-quality steady-state equilibrium:
(i) Increases θT for all T and lowers the survival rate of exporters below θ∗;
(ii) Increases the average quality of exports and equilibrium country reputation.
See Appendix A.1.10 for proofs. In a HQE, from an initial steady-state where
θ = µ > θ∗, an increase in tariffs induces firms with below-average quality in (θm, θ∗)
to exit sooner, and has no impact on the exit rate of firms with above-average quality
(θ > θ). Hence higher trade costs lead to a smaller mass of active exporters and a
higher average quality of their products. Conversely, trade liberalization raises the
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volume of exports and lowers their average quality in high-quality countries, but
brings about better average quality and unit prices, as well as higher trade volume,
in low-quality countries.
A.4 Hazard rates
We calculate hazard rates at the 10-digit product level in US manufacturing im-
ports (SITC codes 5-8) over 1989-2006, using data from Robert Feenstra. HS-10 prod-
ucts in the data are the equivalent of firms in our model. The exit rate is calculated
for each country, HS-2 industry and export duration. Specifically, the survival rate of
products from country c, industry i and export experience s at time t is the number
of 10-digit products that are exported to the US for the (s + 1)-th time from country
c in industry i , divided by the number of 10-digit products from the same country
and industry that were exported at time t− 1 for the s-th time. The hazard rate is one
minus the survival rate.
We find that across countries and industries, the average hazard rate falls with
export experience. Furthermore, hazard rates for products from non-OECD members
are higher than those of OECD members for all export durations, consistent with
higher exit rates in countries exporting lower-quality goods.
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Table A.1: Hazard rates in US manufacturing imports. HS-10 level, 1989-2006.
Hazard rate
s All OECD Non-OECD
1 31.2% 23.2% 38.5%
2 20.2% 16.6% 24.2%
3 15.8% 13.5% 18.4%
4 13.6% 11.9% 15.7%
5 13.8% 13.0% 15.0%
6 10.9% 9.6% 12.4%
7 9.0% 7.7% 10.8%
8 7.5% 6.2% 9.2%
9 7.4% 6.3% 8.8%
10 8.5% 7.8% 9.2%
Figure A.1: Hazard rates of products from all countries with s years of export experience in
US imports, 1989-2006
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Figure A.2: Hazard rates of products from OECD and non-OECD countries with s years of
export experience in US imports, 1989-2006
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B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Suppose γ∗L > γL. If θ satisfies (2.10) and (2.16), then borrowing on both markets
yields expected profits of
piF,D + pi
∗
F,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
while home debt only yields
piI,D + pi
∗
I,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − γ (L + L)]
It immediately follows from γ∗L > γL that piI,D + pi∗I,D < piF,D + pi
∗
F,D.
Similarly, if θ satisfies neither (2.10) nor (2.16), then borrowing on both markets
yields expected profits of
piF,C + pi
∗
F,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
while home debt only yields
piI,C + pi
∗
I,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− 2θ [pHLRH + pLRL] + (1− pHH) γ (L + L)
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Again, it follows from γ∗L > γL and pHL ≥ 0 that piI,C + pi∗I,C < piF,C + pi∗F,C.
Lastly, if (2.16) holds but (2.10) does not hold, there is diversification under home
and local debt and contagion under home debt.only. Since piF,D + pi∗F,D > piI,C + pi
∗
I,C,
FDI with local borrowing strictly dominates FDI with parent financing.
B.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Suppose (2.16) holds. Then FDI with domestic and foreign debt yields
piF,D + pi
∗
F,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
while licensing yields
piA + pi
∗
A = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
As long as pHL > 0, piF,D + pi∗F,D > piA + pi
∗
A.
Suppose (2.16) does not hold. Then FDI with domestic and foreign debt yields
piF,C + pi
∗
F,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
= piA + pi
∗
A
so FDI and licensing are equivalent in terms of expected profits.
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Lemma 2.1 rules out FDI with home debt only. Among firms active on their
domestic market, we compare no foreign sales, affiliate sales with local debt, and
licensing. By the definition of θ∗A, arm’s length technology transfer is not profitable
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below θ∗A. Similarly, in the diversification region, FDI with local debt is profitable if
and only if
θ ≥ θ∗F ≡
I − 12 pLL (γ+ γ∗) L
2R− pLLRL
Note that θ∗F ≤ θ∗A. Equation (2.16) defines a threshold
θF =
I − 12 pLL (γ+ γ∗) L
(1− pLL) (RH + RL)
such that (2.16) holds if and only if θ ≥ θF. By Lemma 2.2, if θ ≥ θF, FDI with
domestic and foreign debt dominates licensing, and if θ < θF, FDI with domestic
and foreign debt is equivalent to licensing. Hence, if θ∗A < θF, then licensing is
chosen whenever θ∗A ≤ θ ≤ θF, and FDI with local borrowing is chosen whenever
θ > θF ≥ θ∗A. If θ∗A > θF, then whenever licensing is profitable, it is dominated by
FDI. In this case there are no arm’s length technology transfers, and we only observe
FDI with local borrowing, whenever the firm is in the diversification zone and has
positive profits, i.e. whenever θ ≥ max {θ∗F, θF}.
B.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2.3
Suppose γ∗L < γL. If θ satisfies (2.10) and (2.16), then borrowing on both markets
yields expected profits of
piF,D + pi
∗
F,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
while home debt only yields
piI,D + pi
∗
I,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − γ (L + L)]
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It immediately follows from γ∗L < γL that piI,D + pi∗I,D > piF,D + pi
∗
F,D.
If (2.10) holds but (2.16) does not hold, there is diversification under home debt
only and contagion under home and foreign debt. Borrowing on both markets yields
expected profits of
piF,C + pi
∗
F,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
which is lower than piI,D + pi∗I,D since γ
∗L < γL and pHL ≥ 0. FDI with parent
financing still strictly dominates FDI with local borrowing.
Note that if neither (2.10) nor (2.16) holds, we are comparing
piF,C + pi
∗
F,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
= piA + pi
∗
A
and
piI,C + pi
∗
I,C = 2
[
2θR− I]− 2θ [pHLRH + pLRL] + (1− pHH) γ (L + L)
The choice is determined by a tradeoff between borrowing costs and bankruptcy risk.
(
piI,C + pi
∗
I,C
)− (piA + pi∗A) = pL (γL− γ∗L)− pHL [2θRH − γ (L + L)]
B.1.5 Proof of Lemma 2.4
Suppose (2.10) holds. Then FDI with home debt only yields
piI,D + pi
∗
I,D = 2
[
2θR− I]− pLL [2θRL − γ (L + L)]
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while licensing yields
piA + pi
∗
A = 2
[
2θR− I]− pL [2θRL − (γ+ γ∗) L]
Since γ∗L < γL and pHL ≥ 0, piI,D + pi∗I,D > piA + pi∗A.
B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Lemma 2.3 rules out FDI with local debt. If (2.10) holds, it is less profitable than
FDI with home debt only, while if (2.10) does not hold, it is no better than licensing.
Among firms active on their domestic market, we compare no foreign sales, affiliate
sales with home debt only, and licensing.
(i) There is no production for the foreign market if neither licensing nor FDI with
parent finance yields positive expected profits. By the definition of θ∗A, arm’s length
technology transfer is not profitable below θ∗A. Similarly, FDI with home debt only is
profitable in the diversification region if and only if
θ ≥ θ∗I ≡
I − 12 pLLγ (L + L)
2R− pLLRL
and in the contagion region if and only if
θ ≥ θ ′∗I ≡
I − 12 (1− pHH) γ (L + L)
2R− pLRL − pHLRH
If θ∗A < min
{
θ
′∗
I , θI
}
, then the least productive active firms choose licensing, and the
relevant threshold is θ∗A. If θI < min
{
θ∗A, θ
′∗
I
}
, then all active firms are in the diver-
sification region, choose FDI, and the relevant threshold is θ∗I . If θ
′∗
I < min {θ∗A, θI},
then the least productive active firms choose FDI and are in the contagion region, so
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that the relevant threshold is θ
′∗
I .
(ii) pi∗A < 0 if θ < θ
∗
A. Comparing FDI and licensing, piA + pi
∗
A < piI,C + pi
∗
I,C if
θ < θ′I < θI , and piA + pi
∗
A < piI,D + pi
∗
I,D if θ > θI . Therefore, licensing is the better
option whenever θ′I < θ < θI . This is a situation in which the firm is in the contagion
zone and the extra bankruptcy risk induced by a multinational firm is not made up
for with lower borrowing costs on the home market.
(iii) Conversely, FDI with home borrowing only is strictly better than licensing
whenever θ < θ′I or θ > θI . In the first case, it is profitable as long as θ > θ
′∗
I , and in
the second case, whenever θ > θ∗I , which completes the proof.
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C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 Data on strategic rivalries
Thompson (2001) lists the following qualitative coding rules to define strategic
rivalries and their duration for the period 1816-1999:
1. “Strategic rivals must be independent states, as determined by Gleditsch and
Ward’s (1999) inventory of independent states.
2. Beginning and ending dates are keyed as much as possible to the timing of
evidence about the onset of explicit threat, competitor, and enemy perceptions
on the part of decision-makers. Historical analyses, for instance, often spec-
ify that decision-makers were unconcerned about a competitor prior to some
year just as they also provide reasonably specific information about the timing
of rapprochements and whether they were meaningful ones or simply tactical
maneuvers. [...]
3. As a general rule, the competitor criterion restricts rivalries to their own class
within the major-minor power distinction. Major (minor) power rivalries are
most likely to involve two major (minor) powers. Definitely, there are exceptions
to this rule. Major-minor power rivalries emerge when minor powers become
something more than nuisances in the eyes of major power decision-makers.
Capability asymmetry may still be quite pronounced but that does not mean
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that the major power is in a position to, or is inclined toward, the use of its
capability advantage. [...]
4. No minimal duration is stipulated in advance [...]
5. Various constituencies within states may have different views about who their
state’s main rivals are or should be. Unless they control the government, con-
stituency views are not considered the same as those of the principal decision-
makers. If the principal decision-makers disagree about the identity of rivals,
the operational problem then becomes one of assessing where foreign policy-
making is most concentrated. [...]
6. If two states were not considered rivals prior to the outbreak of war, they do not
become rivals during the war unless their rivalry extends beyond the period
of war combat. This rule is designed to avoid complications in assessing the
linkages between rivalry and intensive forms of conflict. [...]
7. One needs to be especially skeptical about dating rivalry terminations. Some
rivalries experience short-lived and highly publicized rapprochements that turn
out to be less meaningful than one might have thought from reading the rele-
vant press accounts at the time. Some rivalries enter long periods of hibernation
only to erupt suddenly as if nothing had changed. All of these situations may
share the outward appearance of rivalry termination. What needs to be mani-
fested is evidence of some explicit kind of a significant de-escalation in threat
perceptions and hostility. [...]
8. The most valuable sources for information pertinent to identifying strategic ri-
valry are political histories of individual state’s foreign policy activities.”
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C.2 Primary enrollment, wars and democratization
This Appendix presents the data underlying Table 3.1. For each of the 53 countries
for which we have more than 40 years of education data, we list (i) the 20-year period
with the highest observed increase in primary enrollment rates; (ii) the date, if any,
in which the country became a democracy as measured by crossing the threshold of
6 in the polity2 scale; (iii) the wars in which the country was engaged in the 20 years
prior to the observed surge in primary education.
(*) The democratic transition is identified as the first year in which the Polity IV
index reached 6 (when the index is greater than 6 at the beginning of the Polity IV
sample, the cell indicates: > 6 in beginning date of sample).
(**) Wars are identified from the Correlates of War database; strategic rivalries are
identified from Thompson (2001).
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